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ABSTRACT
Electrical grids have been developed over a century, which are considered
as one of the most important infrastructures on the earth. In the past decade,
the emergence of the Smart Grid, referred to the next generation of power grid,
makes existing systems more complicated and vulnerable. Cyber-physical attacks
against existing systems and future smart grids have drawn increasing attention,
because such attacks could trigger large-scale cascading failures and result in major
blackouts.
In the traditional power society, contingencies are widely considered as the
causes that result in power outages. The contingency analysis is the predominant
method to investigate the vulnerability of power grids. With the increasing ma-
licious attacks against power transmission systems, however, studying the grid’s
security and reliability only from the contingency analysis perspective has apparent
limitations. First, contingencies happen randomly and unintentionally; malicious
attacks are mostly intentional. Second, it is rare that multiple contingencies hap-
pen simultaneously. Malicious attacks, however, can likely occur on a few, even
more, the power grid components.
In this dissertation, the security and reliability of power grids is investigated.
Briefly speaking, the attackers identify a few components in the grid as targets
(e.g., substations, transmission lines, or both). Then, the attackers take down
these targets by either physical sabotages or cyber intrusions, hoping that the
initial failures can trigger large-scale cascading failures. The goal of the attackers
is to find a group of targets, attacking on which can yield large damage to the
power grid.
In particular, this dissertation investigate the attacks against the power system
from the following aspects.
 It is a nature question that why attacking a few, even one, critical com-
ponents can severely weaken the system. In manuscript 1 (i.e., chapter 2),
the cascading process is visualized to help people under such complicated
phenomena, as well as discovering different types of failure propagation.
 Attackers might only know the topological connection of the power grid, e.g.,
the topology. In manuscript 2 (i.e., chapter 3), a topology-based cascading
model is adopted to study cascading failures. The metric load distribution
vector (LDV) and LDV-based attack strategy are proposed and investigated.
 Attackers can possibly know some general information of the power grid,
e.g., the topology, types of substations and length of transmission lines. In
manuscript 3 (i.e., chapter 4), the extended topological model is used to
mimic cascading failures. A novel metric, called the risk graph, is proposed to
reveal the hidden relationship among critical substations/transmission lines.
In addition, the risk-graph based attack strategies are developed regarding
substations and transmission lines, respectively.
 Attacks can occur on substations and transmission lines simultaneously. In
manuscript 4 (i.e., chapter 5), both the vulnerability analysis and the attacks
are investigated from the joint substation-transmission line perspective.
 Attacks can be conducted not only synchronously but sequentially. In
manuscript 5 (i.e., chapter 6), the sequential attack is introduced; the met-
ric sequential attack graph (SAG) is constructed; the SAG-based sequential
attack strategy is developed and evaluated.
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1CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The U.S. power grid has been developed over a century. Nowadays, this
grid has involved into a extremely complicated system with more than 55,000
substations and nearly 300,000 miles of transmission lines. Such a big system is
facing various security threats and reliability issues.
1.1 Public Voices on U.S. Grid Security
Recently, the U.S. power grid security and reliability has attracted increasing
public concerns.
Janet Napolitano, the former U.S. Homeland Security Secretary, had a warning
for her successor: A massive and “serious” cyber attack on the U.S. homeland is
coming, and a natural disaster - the likes of which the nation has never seen - is
also likely on its way [1]. An unreported study from the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission shows: the U.S. could suffer a coast-to-coast blackout if saboteurs
knocked out just nine of the country’s 55,000 electric-transmission substations on
a scorching summer day [2]. A report from Nature News and Comment : U.S.
electrical grid on the edge of failure [3]. Adam Kredo, a senior writer for the
Washington Free Beacon, had reported: U.S. Electric Grid Inherently Vulnerable
to Sabotage [4].
In the history, the U.S. power grid experienced several major blackouts, which
caused catastrophic results to the societies.
Traditionally, the causes that can trigger major blackouts are mainly uninten-
tional, such as natural disasters [5] (e.g., earthquakes, hurricanes, blizzards, tor-
nadoes, lightnings, etc.), errors from computer hardware and software [6], misop-
eration from operators, vegetation sagging [7] and increasing energy demand [8].
2Table 1.1. History of Major United States Blackouts
Date Location Reasons Consequences
Nov. 1965
Northeastern of U.S.,
Ontario in Canada
Human errors
30 million people
without power
Jul. 1977 New York City
An electrical substation
stroke by lightning
9 million people
without power
Jan. 1981 Utah
Knocking out
transmission lines
1.5 million
people lost power
Oct. 1989
Northern
California
Electrical substations
damaged by earthquakes
1.4 million
people lost power
Jan. 1989
Northeastern of
North America
Transmission towers
destroyed by ice
3.5 million
people affected
Aug. 2003
Northeastern of U.S.,
Ontario in Canada
Transmission lines
tripped by trees
55 million
people without
power for days
Sep. 2011 California
Error made by
a technician
7 million people
without power
Jul. 2012
New York
New Jersey
Hurricane Sandy
10 million people
without power;
some for weeks
These causes often occur in a unpredictable manner. Although many works have
been done to enhance the security and reliability of the U.S. grid, major blackouts
are still inevitable. Table 1.11 shows the history of U.S. notable blackouts in the
past 50 years.
1.2 Malicious Attacks
Recently, malicious attacks against power systems have drawn increasing at-
tention from many aspects, e.g., governments, industries, academies and even the
public. Recent terrorist attacks have shown that U.S. are vulnerable to physical
sabotages [10, 11]. With the emergence of the “Smart Grid”, generally referred to
as the next-generation power transmission system [12], power transmission systems
are growing to rely on modern techniques, e.g., computer and communication net-
works and smart meters. The new techniques for traditional power systems have
1The information is collected from [9].
3raised great concerns of cyber intrusions to the systems currently in use. Such
attacks, physical sabotages or cyber intrusions, can be controlled by attackers to
target on critical substations and transmission lines and likely cause national power
outage [13].
Attackers are referred to as those people with strong willing carry out attacks
to disable the power grid. Generally speaking, the attackers might include, but
not limited to, those as follows.
 Individuals : The person who is disgruntled with the society could likely be-
come the attacker [10]. The individual can target on those power grid com-
ponents that are less protected, e.g., transmission lines. Individual attacks
can be conducted by using simple physical sabotages.
 Terrorists : Terrorism is the critical issue to the United States. Terrorists
possibly come from both inside and outside. Inside terrorists can directly
attack substations by using sophisticated but low-tech physical sabotages
[11]; outside terrorists can access and destroy power grid components through
remote cyber intrusions [14].
 Hostile Countries : There are quite a few adversaries to the United States.
Nuclear weapons from those hostile nations can release electromagnetic pulse
(EMP) to destroy regional grids; the computer hackers in those hostile coun-
tries can remotely access and possibly shunt down target substations and
transmission lines.
Individual attacks and terrorist attacks are highly possible, some of which
already happened [10, 11]. Although attacks from hostile countries are less often
than individual attacks and terrorist attacks, once the type of attacks occur, the
entire U.S. grid might be shut down for weeks, even months [2].
4Physical Sabotages refer to physically destroy the parts of power grids, e.g.,
transmission lines, transformers, generators, and even substations. Such sabotages
can be conducted in different ways. Some ways can be easily done, e.g., failing
down poles that support transmission lines [10]. Others can be complicated and
powerful, e.g., terrorist attacks targeting on substations [11] and electromagnetic
pulse (EMP) attacks to destroy reginal grid [15].
Examples of physical sabotages against the U.S. electric grids include the
attacks on transmission lines in [10] and on substations in [11]. In 2013, a 37-year-
old Arkansas man launched three attacks on the local power grid [10]. Specifically,
the first attack occurred on August 21, 2013, with the sabotage of a 500 KV power
line; the second attack occurred on September 29, 2013, at a switching station; the
third attack occurred on October 6, 2013, destroyed two power poles that support
a 115 KV transmission line.
In addition, on April 16 2013, two gunmen assaulted an electrical substation
near San Jose, California [11]. During the 19 minutes of shooting, 17 transformers
were knocked out, which then took nearly a month to repair. The attack raises
great concerns on potential terrorist attacks against U.S. grid.
Finally, physical sabotages can possibly launched by military forces from hos-
tile nations [15], e.g., EMP attacks and airforce attacks. The type of sabotages are
powerful and possible to destroy many power grid components simultaneously.
Cyber intrusions to power systems are highly possible with the emergence of
the Smart Grid [14, 16]. In March 2007, a simulated cyber attack was conducted
at the Idaho National Laboratory to destroy a $1 million dollar large diesel-electric
generator [17]. In particular, the generator turbine is forced to overheat dramat-
ically and shut down, after receiving malicious commands from a hacker. The
destroyed generator is similar to many now in use throughout the United States.
5In order words, there exist many generators that could potentially be disabled the
same way.
Furthermore, cyber worms could intrude into supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems [14]. For instance, the well-known Stuxnet worm
were designed to target SCADA systems as well as nuclear power plants. With
modifications, Stuxnet worm could become a serious threat to power grids.
Attacks caused by cyber intrusions, or cyber attacks, can be conducted re-
motely and secretely. The attackers will mainly adopt cyber intrusions to attack
future smart grids.
1.3 Cascading Failure
Cascading failures are considered to be the leading reasons of large-scale power
outages in power systems [18]. The cascading failure refers to a sequence of de-
pendent failures of individual components that successively weakens the power
system [19]. Generally speaking, the cascading failure includes initial failure(s)
and dependent failures.
The initial failure(s) can occur on substations, transmission lines, or other
components. Initial failures can be triggered by different causes. From the per-
spective of traditional contingency analysis, random causes are under great consid-
erations. Such causes include natural disasters, e.g., earthquakes and hurricanes,
operator errors, equipment failures, supply shortages, and so on [5]. It is predom-
inant to check N − 1 and N − 2 system security [6], because it is rare that the
system loses multiple components simultaneously by random causes. From the at-
tack’s perspective, malicious attacks, e.g., physical sabotages and cyber intrusions,
are likely to trigger large-scale cascading failures. Different from random causes,
malicious attacks are powerful. Attacks can be controlled in terms of selecting
different targets and different number of targets. Attacks can be conducted in
6Figure 1.1. Brief Summary of Cascading Models
7different ways, simultaneously or sequentially.
Dependent failures are triggered by initial failure(s). The phenomenon is
that many power grid components are failed subsequently after initial failure(s).
These subsequent failures are referred to as the failure propagation. The reasons
causing the failure propagation are very complicated [6]. Briefly speaking, massive
power cannot be stored; the balance between power supply and demand should be
met on time; initial failure(s) of critical components could cause great power loss
or large-scale power redistribution; such disturbances trigger subsequent failures.
In existing works, the cascading process is mimicked by using different models.
Many models have been proposed to study the cascading failure from different
aspects [6, 20–22]. From the attack’s perspective, these models include CASCADE
model [23], Wang-Rong model [22], Motter-Lai model [24], betweenness model [25],
efficiency model [26], extended betweenness model or extended model [21], Hines
model and [27, 28], OPA model [29], hidden failure model [30] and Manchester
model [31]. (The models are named by either the popularly accepted name or the
author’s name who proposed the model.) The brief description of each model is
shown in Fig. 1.1.
In this dissertation, three models, i.e., the efficiency model [26], the extended
betweenness model, or the extended model in short [21] and the Hines model [28],
will be employed to investigate the attack strategies. The adopted models will
be introduced in details in each manuscript. For interested readers, the details of
other models can be found in [6, 20–22].
1.4 Attack Strategy
If attackers want to launch successful and powerful attacks, they need to
answer the following three questions.
1. In what ways can attackers initially attack the targets?
82. Which cascading model is the best one to predict the attack performance?
3. Which and how many components should be identified as targets?
Comprehensively answering any of aforementioned questions needs significant
amount of research work. In the current literature, the power grid is considered
as one of critical cyber-physical systems, and cyber-physical attacks against such
power grids have attracted broad attentions [32–35]. These works can well answer
the first question. In addition, many models have been developed by using different
information of power grids [20, 21]. These models are helpful to answer the second
question.
However, there are few works that specifically discuss the attack strategies. In
this dissertation, the attack strategy refers to the following aspects.
 Which substations, transmission lines, or both, should be considered as tar-
gets?
 How many targets should be chosen to balance between the attack cost and
performance?
 Should the targets be attacked synchronously or sequentially, aiming to ob-
tain the best strength?
This dissertation focuses on tackling the third question from the attackers’
perspective. The works in this dissertation also build the foundation for develop-
ing defense solutions. It is assumed that the attackers can completely conduct
attacks and have enough knowledge about the cascading models. In particular,
this dissertation will discuss four proposed attack strategies, which have strong
performances and low complexity. Brief discussions of proposed attack strategies
are given in Section 1.5.
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1.5 Motivations and Highlights of Manuscripts
It is a nature assumption that different attackers might have different amonts
of information on the power grid. In reality, power grid information can be ob-
tained in different ways, e.g., gathering the topology from online Google Maps [10],
purchasing the U.S. grid with raw data from commercial companies [36] and pos-
sibly hacking the details of power systems [37]. In this dissertation, it is not to
specifically discuss how the attackers can obtain the information of power grids.
Instead, developing attack strategies will be discussed based on three different
levels of power grid information that are possibly known by attackers. Brief de-
scriptions of the considered levels are given in Fig. 1.2. Under different levels of
power grid information, we have adopted different cascading models to develop
attack strategies.
1.5.1 Understanding Failure Propagation
Major blackouts, e.g., Northeast blackout of 2003 in Table 1.1, mainly result
from cascading failures in power transmission systems. It is of great importance
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for both attackers and defenders1 to understood how failures propagate in power
systems.
In manuscript 1, a useful tool is implemented to visualize cascading failures.
Such a tool can let people “watch” how the failure propagates from a local point
to the entire grid. It is of great help to understand the complicated cascading
process. In addition, through investigating single-substation attacks, it is possibly
to discover different failure propagation processes in the testing power grid.
1.5.2 LDV-based Attack Strategy
It is of importance for attackers to gather the information of the power grid.
The more detailed the collected information is, the more accurate the cascading
model can be adopted and the stronger the attack strategies can be developed.
In manuscript 2, it is assumed that the attackers have known the topology
(i.e., level 1) of the power grid. Under this scenario, the efficiency model [26] is
adopted to study cascading failures. In particular, a new metric, called the load
distribution vector (LDV), is proposed to represent the feature of substations or
transmission lines. The LDV can be used to design attack strategies on substations
or transmission lines. Take substations as an example. Referring to LDV, if two
substations have similar LDVs, they are close in terms of the Euclidean distance
between the two LDVs. Therefore, it is possible to cluster all substations into
different groups and then select a target from each group, which is referred to as
the LDV-based node attack strategy.
1.5.3 Riskgraph-based Attack Strategy
Attackers are likely to obtain more information of the power grid, not just
knowing the topology. One possible way is to purchase the power grid raw data
1Defenders refer to those who want to make power systems secure and reliable (e.g., power
companies).
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from business companies, e.g., Platts [36]. The raw data include the general in-
formation, e.g., the grid’s topology, geographic coordinates of substations, power
plants and generators, length of transmission lines and affiliations, but do not pro-
vide the details of power systems. The general information is enough for attackers
to adopt a more accurate model to mimic cascading failures and discover strong
attack strategies.
In manuscript 3, the extended model [21] is used to set up cascading simu-
lator. Adopting the extended model needs the topology, types of substations (i.e.,
generator, demand substation and transmission substation), and the admittance of
transmission lines. The needed information of the grid is either included in IEEE
standard test benchmarks [38] or can be estimated for the purchased data [39, 40].
In particular, it is found that there are hidden relationship among substations in
terms of vulnerability analysis. Such relationship is useful to design strong attack
strategies with low complexity. A new metric, called risk graph, is proposed to
show the hidden relationship. Based on the new metric, the riskgraph-based at-
tack strategies against substations or transmission lines are proposed for attackers.
1.5.4 CIG-based Attack Strategy
Continuing the discussion in the previous manuscript, in manuscript 4 it is
of great interest to investigate the attacks that occur on substations and trans-
mission lines simultaneously. Because, the previous two manuscripts and many
existing works on analyzing the vulnerability of power grids are conducted from
the substation-only perspective or the transmission-line-only perspective. In other
words, it is assumed that attacks or contingencies occur on either substations or
transmission lines.
However, it is reasonable that malicious attacks can occur on both substations
and transmission lines. In this manuscript, the joint-substation-transmission-line
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perspective is introduced to conduct vulnerability analysis in power grids. In
addition, the metric component interdependency graph (CIG) is proposed by gen-
eralizing the idea of risk graph in manuscript 3. Balancing between choosing
substations and transmission lines as targets, the CIG-based attack strategy is
proposed to possibly find strong attacks.
1.5.5 SAG-based Attack Strategy
Attackers can be the experts in power systems and have the details of target
power systems. For instance, the hostile countries can first obtain the entire or part
of the U.S. power grid details by hacking or other means, and then organize the
experts to launch possible attacks. Such possible attacks have attracted growing
concerns in the U.S. (seeing the public voices in Section 1.1). In addition, multiple
attacks can be conducted in different ways, e.g., synchronously or sequentially. In
manuscripts 2, 3 and 4, attacks are assumed to occur synchronously to possibly
trigger cascading failures, which is referred to as the synchronous attack. However,
the synchronous attack have apparently missed the scenario that multiple attacks
can be conducted sequentially.
In manuscript 5, a new attack scenario, called the sequential attack, is in-
troduced for attackers with expertise. Similar idea on contingency analysis in the
power society has rarely been reported. The Hines model [27, 28], a DC power-flow
model, is adopted to mimic cascading failures on transmission lines in power sys-
tems. From the sequential attack perspective, there are many multiple-substation
combinations that can yield large attack strength. Previously, these combinations
cannot yield large strength from the synchronous attack perspective. In addition,
a novel metric, called the sequential attack graph (SAG), is specifically designed to
reveal the relationship among substations from the sequential attack perspective.
Also, the SAG-based sequential attack strategy is proposed and compared with
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some representative schemes.
1.6 Summary
As a summary, it is of great importance to comprehensively investigate the
malicious attacks against power transmission systems. This dissertation focuses
on tackling such critical issues. Generally speaking, this dissertation provides the
reasonable answers to the following questions.
 Why can malicious attacks trigger large-scale power outages in power trans-
mission systems? The answer: initial failures of a few, even one in extreme
cases, critical power grid components can trigger severe cascading failures in
the entire grid and results in large-scale blackouts.
 How can attackers determine the targets, the attacks on which can trig-
ger major blackouts? The answer: there are hidden relationships among
power grid components in context of vulnerability analysis; such relation-
ships are revealed in four proposed metrics, i.e., load distribution vector,
risk graph, component interdependency graph and sequential at-
tack graph; relying on these metrics, attackers can easily identify targets
for different attack strategies.
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2.1 Abstract
The cascading failure is considered to be the leading reason of large-scale
power outages. One of the fundamental characteristics of cascading failures is
that failures can propagate within the entire power grid and cause severe power
loss. Investigating failure propagation significantly contributes to understanding
large-scale power outages. In this work, we introduce a new platform that can
visualize the failure propagation in power grids. The proposed platform not only let
people “watch” how failures propagate, but enable investigation on the insights of
cascading failure triggers. In particular, we adopt the extended model to simulate
cascading failures, and develop the platform in ArcMap. The power grid around
Bay Area, California, is used as the test benchmark. The proposed platform can
successfully demonstrate how a failure propagates from a local point to the entire
grid and eventually paralyzes the system. Through this platform, we investigate
single-node (i.e. substation) failure problem. We discover three different and
important types of failure propagation, which have different requirements on the
system protection
2.2 Introduction
In the past decade, several major blackouts, e.g., the famous cases in [1–3],
seriously affected the modern society and raised many concerns. Enhancing secu-
rity and robustness of these cyber-physical power transmission systems becomes an
increasingly urgent task [4–7]. Due to the complexity and significance of this prob-
lem, the investigation of blackouts attracts attentions from researchers, companies
and governments.
The cascading failure is considered to be the main mechanism that results in
major blackouts in power systems [8, 9]. Specifically, the failure of one or several
power grid components (i.e., substations and transmission lines), due to natural
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disasters, errors from equipments, etc., can trigger a series of successive failures of
other components and progressively weaken the power transmission system.
An important research direction on the cascading failure is to understand the
relationship between initial failures and the final damage to the power grid after
the cascading process finishes. Specifically, it is to investigate the vulnerability
of power grid components. In this type of research, the cascading failure process
is mimicked by different models [10]. The inputs are substations/transmission
lines that are initially failed; the outputs are the damage quantified in different
measures, such as blackout size [5], net-ability [11], and network efficiency [12].
The detailed cascading process is often treated as a “black box”.
Although the existing method is predominant in power grid vulnerability anal-
ysis, it is arguable that unfolding the “black box” gives opportunities to further
understand cascading phenomena. There are three interesting questions that have
not been answered. First, shall we treat the following two scenarios separately? (1)
An initial failure can immediately trigger large-scale failures; (2) an initial failure
can continually trigger trivial failures and eventually involve into large-scale fail-
ures. Second, two different initial failure cases might yield the same or very close
cascading damage, e.g., net-ability. Do they have similar impact on the power
grid? Finally, using two different cascading models, the damage for the same ini-
tial failure, e.g., net-ability or blackout size, can be different. Does this mean that
at least one model is wrong?
Unfolding the “black box” can disclose the diversities of cascading failures. It
has been found that the cascading failure has multifarious intermediate results [13].
Quantitative risk analysis can identify the criticality of components (i.e., substa-
tions/transmission lines) in a power grid. Generally speaking, the components that
have equal or very close quantitative results are considered to be of similar signif-
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icance to the power grid. In [13], however, even with equal quantitative results,
the initial failures can demonstrate different failure accumulation processes. Such
differences are the fundamental characteristics of cascading failures, and cannot be
revealed or further investigated, if one only checks the eventual damage.
Power grids are man-made cyber-physical systems on the Earth, whose se-
curity and reliability issues also have strong relation with the geographical and
regional information [14–16]. It is highly possible that malicious attackers can
trigger the initial failures by failing substations in different regions [14], or fail
several transmission lines in the same geographical area [15]. In addition, power
failures can affect different areas and result in different impact [16]. Integrating
the geographical and regional information into the existing quantitative analysis
can help people comprehensively understand power grid vulnerability.
There exist different methods in analyzing cascading failures [5, 10, 17, 18],
such as transient stability analysis (TSA), power-flow models and topological mod-
els. Comparisons among different methods or models can be conducted by looking
into the details of cascading processes. TSA methods, based on differential al-
gebraic equations, are predominant in power system control design; power-flow
models, based on steady-state analysis, are widely adopted in power grid vulnera-
bility analysis. In [17], the detailed power flow comparisons are conducted between
a DC-power model with a TSA method. At the beginning of cascading failures, the
power flow redistribution in the DC-power model is consistent to that in the TSA
method. Topological models are developed from complex network theories. It is
still necessary to further compare in detail the cascading processes of topological
models with those of other methods and models [5, 18].
Based on the aforementioned discussions, it is necessary to develop such a
tool that can reveal the insights of the cascading processes. It is of importance to
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point out that different research communities use different terminologies, models
and approaches when investigating the cascading failure. From the perspective of
power systems, people often use detailed electrical information of power grids to
perform analysis. From the perspective of complex networks, people mainly adopt
the topological structure of power grids to set up simulations. We would like to
give a solution that is meaningful to both aspects. A promising way is through
visualization.
In this work, we develop a platform to visualize the failure propagation in
detail. Such platform can lead to new discoveries of cascading failures. Generally
speaking, there are three major challenges in developing such a platform. First,
because of security reasons, the information of real-life power transmission systems
are not publically available, or available, but incomplete. Second, it is necessary
to develop reasonable cascading models based on the available power grid data.
Finally, both the simulation and visualization of cascading failures need heavy
computation, especially for large-scale power grids.
Specifically, we have purchased the real-life power grid data from Platts [19]
and adopted the extended model [11] to set up cascading simulation on the power
grid around Bay Area, California. In addition, we use ArcMap (i.e., a product
from ESRI [20]) to store the power grid topology and visualize cascading failure
processes.
Our contributions are as follows.
 We propose a new platform to investigate cascading failures in power grids.
The proposed platform can successfully demonstrate how failures propagate
and paralyze the power grid. The observations are consistent with recent
discoveries [21]. In addition, the proposed system is implemented with real-
life power grids, which provides not only quantitative analysis results but
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geographical results of cascading damage.
 By investigating single-substation failures in the proposed platform, we dis-
cover three different initial failures that can trigger failure propagation with
very different features in time domain. Such discoveries are of importance to
understand the cascading failure and protect power grids.
The work is structured as follows. The related work is given in Section 4.3.
System model and design are discussed in Section 2.4. Simulations and observa-
tions are made in Section 6.7. Finally, conclusions and future works are provided
in Section 6.8.
2.3 Related Work
In the current literature, different models have been proposed to mimic failure
propagation (i.e., the cascading failure) [11, 13, 22–29]. In [13, 22–24], pure topo-
logical models are adopted to model cascading failures. Although those models are
not accurate to reveal the power distribution in power systems, they are still use-
ful in conceptually setting up the cascading failure model and discovering stronger
attack strategies. Pure power-flow models in [25–27] are mainly employed to iden-
tify critical components (i.e., substations and transmission lines). Those models
are completely based on electrical theories. Such models, however, are with high
computation cost as well as needing detailed electrical features in analyzing cas-
cading failures. Although power-flow models are close to mimicking real cascading
failures, they are limited in many cases, e.g., without enough information of power
grids. Recently, the hybrid model, called the extended model, is proposed to inves-
tigate the vulnerability of power grids [11, 28]. The extended model adopts simple
electrical features (e.g., impedance of transmission lines) and the topology informa-
tion to set up the cascading model. The extended model has two key advantages.
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First, the extended model adopts Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDFs)
to calculate the power distribution [11, 30]. In other words, the extended model is
based on calculating DC power flows and is more accurate than pure topological
models in mimicking cascading failures. Second, the extended model needs much
less electrical features than pure power-flow models, and is more suitable for set-
ting cascading model to different power grid data. Different models for mimicking
cascading failures are summarized and compared in [10].
Furthermore, the application of visualization approaches provides other ways
to investigate the vulnerability of power grids [31–36]. The topology of U.S. power
grids is visualized in [31], including important power plants and high-voltage trans-
mission lines. Some visualization platforms, e.g. GreenGrid in [32] and 3D visu-
alization scheme in [33], have been explored to monitor the American electricity
infrastructure. To aid power system operators interpret contingency analysis re-
sults, a three-level visualization tool was proposed to visualize vulnerability and
severity of substations [34]. Besides, there are two tools that can visualize cascading
failures [35, 36]. However, the work in [35] adopted IEEE power grid benchmarks,
which could not connect the vulnerability analysis with the geographical informa-
tion of power grids; the work in [36] adopted the pure topological model to mimic
cascading failures, where the model itself could not reveal failure propagation ac-
curately.
In this work, we implement a new platform that can be used to investigate the
failure propagation in power grids. In particular, we adopt the extended model to
mimic cascading failures and choose the power grid around Bay Area, California,
as the test benchmark.
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2.4 System Model and Design
In this work, we adopt the power grid data that we purchased from Platts [19]
as the test benchmark. Generally speaking, to conduct investigation with such
commercial power grid data has advantages and disadvantages. The purchased
data include the power grid that is operating in real life. Such power grid provides
the possibility to study, even verify, the failure propagation in real power trans-
mission systems. However, the purchased data lack the detailed electrical features
of the power grids. In other words, the information about the purchased power
grid is not enough to set up pure power-flow models to study the cascading failure.
To balance between the availability of the power grid data and the accuracy of
cascading model, we choose the extended model to mimic the cascading failure.
In the rest of this section, we briefly review the extended model and the setup
of cascading simulator under this model in subsection 2.4.1. In subsection 2.4.2,
we introduce the constriction of the test benchmark from raw data we purchased.
In subsection 2.4.3, the design and implementation of the proposed platform is
introduced in details.
2.4.1 Cascading Failure Simulator using the Extended Model
The extended model is first introduced in [28], and well developed in [11]. We
briefly summarize the key features of this model as follows.
1. Directed Graph: The power grid under this model is considered to be a
directed graph G = {B,L}, where B represents the set of nodes (i.e. substa-
tions) and L represents the set of links (i.e. transmission lines). The direction
of a link stands for the direction of the electricity. The nodes consist of gen-
erators, transmission nodes and load nodes. Generators are denoted as the
set G (G ⊆ B); load nodes are denoted as the set D (D ⊆ B). In addition,
NB, NL, NG and ND are adopted to represent the number of substations,
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transmission lines, generators and load substations, respectively.
2. PTDFs : In power systems, power distribution basically follows electrical
theories. Under the extended model, Power Transfer Distribution Factors
(PTDFs) [11, 28, 30] are employed to reflect the sensitivities of power flow
changes in links, caused by the real power injection and withdrawal at a
pair of nodes. PTDFs are derived from DC power flow model, making the
power distribution under the extended model be governed by the fundamental
electrical theories. We adopt the PYPOWER in [37] to calculate all PTDFs
in the simulations.
3. Extended Betweenness : In power systems, power is transmitted from gen-
erators to load nodes along links, which means the change of power flow in
transmission lines is caused by each generator-load node pair. In other words,
the summation of all power in a link caused by all generator-load node pairs
could determine the total power in this link. The extended betweenness of a
node is defined as half of the total summation of power in all links connecting
to this node, as the summation double counts the inward and outward power
flow which are equal in the magnitude,
4. Net-ability : In [11], the net-ability of a power grid network (e.g. G), denoted
as E(G), is defined as 1
NGND
∑
g∈G
∑
d∈D
Pgd
Zgd
, where Pgd and Zgd are the
maximum power injection and the impedance between the generator g and
the load node d, respectively.
Cascading failures have already been well studied under pure topological mod-
els [24, 38]. Here, we defined the cascading failure simulator (CFS) under the
extended model by redefining some important concepts as follows.
 Load : The extended betweenness of a node, e.g. node i, is employed as the
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definition of its load, similar to the functionality of the betweenness in [38].
Before any failure, the load of node i is referred as its initial load. Once the
occurrence of any failure in the power grid, the load of node i will be updated
by recalculating its extended betweenness.
 System Tolerance: In cascading failure simulations, the system tolerance
is an important parameter, which represents the stability of power grids.
Generally speaking, the larger the system tolerance of a power grid is, the
more robust this power grid is.
 Capacity : In reality, the capacity of a node represents the maximum load
that it can tolerate. Due to many reasons, e.g., the cost of construction fee,
the capacity cannot be infinity. In the work, the definition of the capacity of
a node is similar to that in [24, 38], the multiplication of the system tolerance
and its initial load.
 Overloading : When the load of a node exceeds its capacity, the overloading
will happen. Under the extended model, the overloaded nodes and their links
are assumed to be removed from a power grid.
 Load Redistribution: After removing the overloaded nodes and its corre-
sponding links, the topological structure of the power grid network will
change. Thus, the power that originally passes through the removed nodes
needs to be detoured, which causes the power to be redistributed in the power
gird. Under the extended model, the new load distribution is based on recal-
culating the PTDFs and the extended betweenness. The load redistribution
may raise other nodes to be overloaded and removed from the power grid,
which might cause the failure propagate from one point to the while grid.
The load redistribution will stop until there is not any overloaded node in
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the remaining power grid network.
 Time Simulation: In the CFS, the concept of “round” is adopted to describe
the progress of cascading failures [13]. In the first round, initial failed nodes
will removed from power grids. In the following each round, the CFS will
first update the topological structure of power grids, then calculate the new
load distribution for all nodes, and finally remove all overloaded nodes. The
CFS will stop at the final round, in which there is not any overloaded node.
The number of rounds of each attack might be different, which will be seen
in Fig. 2.5.
The detail of the CFS is discussed in our previous works [29, 39].
2.4.2 Construction of the Test Benchmark
We have purchased the entire North American power grid data, which includes
thousands of substations and transmission lines, from Platts [19]. Currently, it is
computationally infeasible for us to conduct cascading simulations on such a big
power grid. For demonstration purpose, we chip the power grid around Bay Area,
California, as the test benchmark.
Originally, the raw GIS data consist of four types of layers (i.e., the shapefiles
in ArcGIS [40]), the substation layer, the transmission line layer, the generator
unit layer and the power plant layer. To construct the test benchmark from the
raw data, there are three challenges. First, the notations of substations in the
substation and transmission line layers are not completely consistent, due to the
fact that Platts originally collects those information from different providers. Sec-
ond, identifying the generators and load substations is difficult, because the IDs
of power plants in the power plant layer are different from that of substations
in the substation layer, and also no corresponding information is about the load
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Figure 2.1. Bay Area power grid topology
distribution in the raw data. Finally, the raw data also lacks the corresponding
information to discuss the electrical impedance of transmission lines.
In what follows we will briefly introduce how to set up the test grid network
according to the introduction of American power transmission system [41] and
some explanations from Platts [42].
First, originally there are 688 transmission lines and 532 substations in the
transmission line layer and the substation layer, respectively. In the substation
layer, every substation has an unique ID. In the transmission line layer, each
line has two endpoints (i.e. substations in the substation layer), which can be
represented by the unique IDs of the two endpoints. In addition, there are 23
fields in the transmission line layer to describe the properties of transmission lines,
such as voltage, length in KM (kilometer) and so on. The voltage of transmission
lines in USA is usually more or equal than 69 KV (kilovolt) [41]. When we dove
into the voltage field of all transmission lines, we found that the voltage of some
transmission lines are less than 69 KV, which are either 10 KV or a negative
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number. In [19], we know transmission lines with the voltage as 10 KV are just
used by Platts to connect a substation with a power plant, which only has one
valid endpoint and is not included in the real transmission system. The lines
with voltage as a negative number have two valid endpoints, and they are part
of the transmission system. Also, some substations in the substation layer are
redundant. When we filter out those transmission lines with the voltage as 10 KV
and the redundant substations, the Bay Area power grid network can be easily set
up.
Second, generators are decided according to explanations from Platts [19].
That is, substations, which associate with a 10 KV transmission line or geograph-
ically close to a power plant in power plant layer (within 1 KM in this work), are
considered as generators. In a transmission system, load substations usually work
in lower voltages [41]. In this work, substations that have the maximum voltage
less or equal than 115 KV but more than 0 KV are viewed as the load substations.
Other substations, not a generator or a load substation, are viewed as transmission
substations. It should be stated that some substations not only work as generators,
but work as load substations simultaneously.
Finally, the valid Bay Area power grid network consists of 614 transmission
lines and 467 substations, which includes 120 generators and 320 load substations.
Fig.2.1 shows this power grid and its generators and load substations.
Employing the extended model to analyzing the vulnerability of power grid
networks basically needs the reactance of each transmission line, due to the loss-
less assumption of transmission lines [30]. The reactance of transmission lines is
estimated according to [43], and the ratio is 0.4Ω/KM (ohm per kilometer). For
example, if the length of a transmission line is 15 KM, its estimated reactance
is 6Ω. This estimation is similar to the way directly adopting the length of a
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Figure 2.2. The flowchart of the proposed platform.
transmission line as its reactance in [15].
2.4.3 Platform Design
The proposed platform is to help people understand the principles of failure
propagation in power grids. The new platform consists of three major functional
modulations: visualization in ArcMap, user interface and CFS.
 Visualization in ArcMap: ArcMap is adopted as data storage and visualiza-
tion in this platform. The test benchmark is visualized in ArcMap as different
layers. The proposed platform adopts three of the four layers in the raw data,
i.e. the substation, transmission line and power plant layers, to construct the
grid network. In order to simulate the statuses and types of substations and
transmission lines, e.g. alive and failed, one additional field, called “STA-
TUS”, is added into each of these layers. We assume each valid transmission
line has two status, “failed” and “alive”. In ArcMap, the two statuses are
distinguished by using different colors (black and green). Also, substations
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are divided into four categories, generator only, load substation only, both
generator and load substation, and transmission substation. Originally, they
are alive and symbolized as green circles, blue triangles, red polygons, and
yellow squares, respectively. If a substation of any type is failed, it will be
replaced by a black circle.
 User Interface: A toolbar, based on the Python add-in in ArcGIS desktop, is
developed and added into ArcMap to control the procedures of the visualiza-
tion. The toolbar consists of three buttons named as “build”, “select” and
“start”, respectively. Each button has its corresponding functional script.
The “build” button is responsible for constructing the power grid network
from raw GIS data and resetting the statuses of substations and transmis-
sion lines. The “select” button is adopted to choose target substations in
ArcMap, while “start” button is used to trigger the cascading failures and
to refresh the statuses of substations and transmission lines in ArcMap.
 CFS : The extended model and the CFS, discussed in Section 2.4.1, are em-
ployed to simulate the load distribution and cascading failures after initial
failures. Given a certain system tolerance value, a cascading failure process
consists of one or more rounds. Within each round, the overloaded nodes
are failed, and their statuses (including the statuses of the connecting links)
are updated as “failed”, visualized as black circle and black lines in ArcMap,
respectively. If no more overloaded nodes, the cascading failure procedure
will stop.
The flowchart of the proposed visualization platform is shown in Fig. 2.2. As
a summary, the proposed visualization platform has the following features that are
not presented in the existing visualization tools [31–34, 36],
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Figure 2.3. An example of the cascading failure with six rounds.
 Providing a way to “watch” how cascading failures propagate in power grids,
which can help people understand the cascading phenomenon.
 Providing the user interface to trigger and simulate different types of initial
failures, e.g. selecting different initial nodes and different number of them.
 Providing a DC based model, i.e. the extended model, to investigate the
vulnerability of power grids.
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2.5 Simulation Results and Analysis
The proposed platform is developed in ArcMap and all scripts are written
in Python. The power grid around Bay Area, California, is adopted as the test
benchmark. The construction of the power grid network from the raw GIS data is
discussed in Section 2.4.2. The simulations and discussions are made detailedly in
the following subsections.
2.5.1 Failure Propagation
Understanding the failure propagation is an important aspect of studying the
vulnerability of power grids. In reality, the failure propagation means when one or
more substations/transmission lines fail, they will shift their load to other substa-
tions/transmission lines, which could trigger the successive failure of them. The
proposed visualization platform could let people “watch” how a failure propagates
from a point to the while grid network. In particular, we observe two critical failure
propagation patterns that can collapse the power grid.
The first critical pattern is that the single initial failure can continually trigger
other failures and paralyze the power grid after a few rounds. An example of such
pattern is demonstrated in Fig. 2.3. The single failure is manually triggered,
and the cascading failure finally stops after six rounds. In the subfigures, the
failed nodes, together with their links, are marked as black circles and black lines,
respectively. In Fig. 2.3(a), the failure begins after manually knocking down a
node. The removal of this node and its links changes the topological structure of
the power grid, then raises the power redistribution, and finally causes another
node to be overloaded and failed, as shown in Fig. 2.3(b). From Fig. 2.3(c) to Fig.
2.3(e), the number of overloaded and failed nodes is increasing, and the failure
propagates from the initial point to the global power grid. It is clearly seen in Fig.
2.3(f) that when the failure procedure stops, most nodes are failed and the power
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grid is almost paralyzed.
The second critical pattern is that the single initial failure can quickly trigger
many other failures and paralyze the power grid with one or two rounds. One of
such examples is shown in Fig. 2.4, where black circles and black lines have the
same meanings with those in Fig. 2.3. In Fig. 2.4(a), the initial failure is manually
triggered, which raises many nodes to be severely overloaded. Just after the second
round, the power grid occurs large-scale avalanche, demonstrated in Fig. 2.4(b).
We have the following observations from Figs. 2.3 and 2.4.
 The power grid, as a type of man-made orderly network, has lots of critical
node. The existence of such critical nodes significantly increase the instability
of the power grid. For instance, the two single failures demonstrated in Figs.
2.3 and 2.4 can severely damage the power grid. This observation is consistent
with the statement recently published in Nature News & Comment [21].
 Geographically, the failure propagation begins from the local point, where
the initial failure is triggered, gradually involves into large-scale failures,
and finally trigger failures that might be far from the initial point. This
observation is similar to the failure propagation process that occurred in real
cases, e.g., Northeast blackout [1].
 Different initial failures can affect different regions that the power grid serves.
Compared Fig. 2.4(b) with Fig. 2.3(f), although both initial failures result
in severe damage to the test benchmark, the regions that lose the power
are partially different. Put differently, it is of importance to analyze the
cascading damage from the perspective of the affected regions.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.4. An example of the cascading failure with two rounds
2.5.2 Different Initial Triggers of Cascading Failures
In Section 2.5.1, we discussed two different critical failure propagation pat-
terns, which were caused by initially failing different nodes. Therefore, it is of
great importance to investigate the classifications of nodes in the power grid based
on the contribution to power outage. In the context of single node failures, we
investigate that the initial failures of different nodes can result in different types
of cascading failures in the power grid.
Using the proposed visualization platform, we observed that different initial
failures could cause three types of power grid network failures: non-critical, rapid-
and-critical, and propagative-and-critical. The brief description of them is given as
follows.
 In the non-critical failures, the initial failure of a node could not cause severe
damage to a power grid.
 In the rapid-and-critical failures, the initial failure of a node could cause
severe damage to a power grid within very few rounds. In other words, the
large-scale failure occurs quickly after the initial failure.
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Figure 2.5. Three different types of initial failures.
 In the propagative-and-critical failures, the initial failure propagates to the
whole power grid network within several rounds, and eventually causes severe
damage. In other words, there is a certain amount of delay between the large-
scale cascading failure and the initial failure.
The definition and classification consider two factors: the damage to the power
grid and the number of rounds in each failure process. The amount of the damage
can be measured by various metrics [11, 12, 27]. For illustration purpose, we adopt
the metric percentage of drop in net-ability (PoDN), defined in [11]. The PoDN is
defined as,
PoDN =
E(G)− E(G′)
E(G)
(2.1)
where E(G) and E(G
′
) represents the net-ability of a grid network before and after
an initial failure, respectively. The more serious an initial failure is, the larger the
PoDN this failure causes.
In particular, using the test benchmark, we illustrate these three types of
initial failures. We set thresholds for PoDN and the corresponding number of
rounds as follows. The severe damage means the finial PoDN is more or equal
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than 15%. That is, if the final PoDN is below the threshold (i.e. < 15%), this
failure is marked as a non-critical failure. If the final PoDN is larger and equal
than 15%, the failure is either rapid-and-critical or propagative-and-critical. If the
PoDN increases more and equal than 20% in the first round or 30% within the
first two rounds, with the total number of rounds less than 5, this failure is called
as the rapid-and-critical failure, Otherwise, it is called the propagative-and-critical
failure. All thresholds mentioned above should be adjusted according to different
power grid networks. We use these numbers just for demonstration purpose. The
simulation is performed when the system tolerance (described in Section 2.4.1) is
1.2. There are 367 nodes whose failure cause non-critical failures, 18 nodes causing
rapid-and-critical failures, and 84 nodes causing propagative-and-critical failures.
For each type of initial failures, we show three typical cases in Fig. 2.5. The
horizontal axis is the number of rounds, and the vertical axis is the PoDN. In
addition, the magenta-triangle, blue-square and red-star curves present the non-
critical, rapid-and-critical and propagative-and-critical failures, respectively. Gen-
erally speaking, the non-critical nodes are not critical to power grids, and approx-
imately 80% of nodes in the Bay Area power grid network belong to this category.
This is consistent with the observations made in [27]. The rapid-and-critical nodes
are very important to power grids, the failure of which could seriously raise the
power redistribution and cause lots of other nodes to be overloaded in a short
time. The propagative-and-critical nodes are also very critical to power grids due
to its severe damage. However, its severe damage is due to the accumulation of
failures in each round. In Fig. 2.3, a case of the propagative-and-critical failure
is shown. It is clearly seen that this initial failure continually triggers small-scale
failures of other nodes in the test benchmark, and finally raises the overloading
of many nodes and causes large-scale failure. From the perspective of PoDN, the
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Table 2.1. Comparisons among different initial failures.
Failure Type Non-critical
Rapid-and
-critical
Propagative-and
-critical
Trigger severe power
redistribution
No Yes Yes
Critical to
power grids
No Yes Yes
Number of such nodes
in best benchmark
367 16 84
blue-square curves in Fig. 2.5 increase slowly within the beginning several rounds,
suddenly jump up within the next several rounds (showing the rapid increase of
the failed nodes), and finally reach the maximum PoDN.
From the perspective of protecting power grids, the classification presented
in this section is important for the investigation on defense. For example, for the
nodes that trigger rapid-and-critical failures, the protection should focus on pre-
venting these nodes from initial failures. On the other hands, for the propagative-
and-critical failures, the protection can be from several angles, including stopping
the cascading process before the failures become large scale.
As a summary, in Table 2.1, we listed the main features of these three types
of initial failures. Although the nodes causing rapid-and-critical and propagative-
and-critical failures only take a small percentage of total nodes, around 22% in the
test benchmark, these nodes are the pivot points that can affect the stability and
security of man-made power transmission systems.
2.6 Conclusion
In this work, we developed a new platform to investigate the failure propa-
gation in power grids. The proposed platform could successfully demonstrate the
failure propagation, which was useful to help people understand such complicated
cascading phenomena. We adopted the power grid around Bay Area, California,
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as the test benchmark, and investigated single-node failures. Briefly speaking,
we observed three different power grid network failures, and classified all nodes
into three different groups. Such classification could help people effectively and
efficiently protect power grids.
In the future, we plan to continue this work as follows. First, we will utilize
the proposed platform to study large-scale power grids, e.g. the entire North
America electrical infrastructure benchmark, where the key challenge is to improve
the loading speed. Second, we will extend the extended model to visualize the
consequence of link failures and study their features. Third, we will improve the
accuracy of cascading modeling by adopting pure power-flow models. The key
challenge is how to reasonably estimate more electrical features from the raw data.
Finally, we will also study some real blackout cases with the proposed platform.
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3.1 Abstract
Security issues in complex systems such as power grid, communication net-
work, Internet, among others have attracted wide attention from academic, gov-
ernment and industry. In this paper, we investigate the vulnerabilities of power
grid under a topology-based network model in the context of cascading failures
caused by physical attacks against substations and transmission lines. In particu-
lar, we develop attack strategies from the attackers’ points of view, aiming to cause
severe damage to the network efficiency, as a way to revealing the vulnerability of
the system. We propose a new and useful metric, load distribution vector (LDV),
to describe the properties of nodes and links. Based on the LDV, we develop a
multi-node attack strategy and a multi-link attack strategy, which are proved to be
stronger attacks than the traditional load-based attacks using the Western North
American power grid data. For example, the removal of only three critical nodes
in the grid can reduce more than 30% of the original network efficiency, and the
removal of only three critical links can reduce the network efficiency by 23%. In
the above cases, the traditional load-based schemes reduce the network efficiency
by 23.57% and 18.35%, respectively.
3.2 Introduction
With the continuous growing energy demand, accidents and natural disasters,
power outage has become more and more frequent within recent years. The four
largest power blackouts in the history occurred only within the recent 10 years [1].
This seriously affects economy and raises concerns from the homeland security
points of view.
The problem of large scale power system failure has attracted wide research
attention. In current literature, there are two prevalent types of analysis to power
system failures: power flow based analysis [2–8] and topology based analysis [9–
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15]. Power flow based analysis is rooted on the circuit theory with Kirchhoff’s
law to understand the power flows in the grid under system failures. Because
such approaches are built on the foundation of the physical laws governing the
electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and utilization, they can provide
the most critical insights and fundamental understanding of the grid behavior
under attacks or failures. IEEE Power and Energy Society (PES) has dedicated
task forces to understand the grid reliability, predict its failure propagation, and
restore electricity from cascading failures [2–5]. In addition to the power flow based
analysis, recent topology based analysis motived from complex systems research
has also been investigated to understand the power grid vulnerability and cascading
failure. In these approaches, simplified topology based models are considered, such
as the recoverable models and non-recoverable models to study the complex grid
behavior under physical or cyber attacks, or a failure due to natural disasters
such as hurricanes or snow storms. These approaches offer new possibilities for
understanding and monitoring power grid behavior by, for example, using existing
complex network analysis approaches. Our work presented in this paper is aligned
with this direction and adopts topology based analysis. We would also like to note
that most recently, a kind of hybrid approach with the integration of power flow
based analysis and topology based analysis, named extended topological approach,
has been proposed to study the power grid vulnerability [6–8]. This approach
incorporates several key features of power grid such as flow path, transmission line
limitation, and bus distribution together with topological models to assess the grid
vulnerability under attacks.
In the complex network literature, the large scale power outage can be referred
to as cascading failure, meaning when one of the components (substations and
transmission lines) in power grids completely or partially fails, shifts its load to
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nearby components and triggers the failure of successive components in the system.
Many works in this field can contribute to analyzing errors, failures, attacks, and
resilience of power grid systems. For instance, cascade-based attack on power grid
network was presented in [9–11]. In [9], two types of attack methods, random
removals and intentional removals, were compared and the latter was proved to be
much stronger than the former. This comparison is done in the context of the single
node attack, defined as only one node taken down by the attacker. In [10], multiple-
node attack, defined as multiple nodes taken down by the attacker simultaneously,
was presented. It was shown that the multiple-node attack can cause more severe
damage to the power grid than the single node attack. The work in [12] adopted a
model that calculates the load of a substation from local topology of the substation,
when studying the multiple node attacks. The results in the paper indicate that
attacking the nodes with small load can cause severe cascading failures under
certain circumstances.
Many existing work on cascading failure assumes attacks occur on nodes. On
the other hand, five out of six the largest power outage accidents (except 1999
Southern Brazil blackout) [1] were initially triggered by the damage to one or
more transmission lines, and finally spread to whole power grid system. Some
researchers studied the system behavior on basis of link removal [14, 15]. For
example, in [14], range-based attacks on link was investigated, showing that scale-
free networks were more sensitive to attacks on short-range than long-range links.
In [15], efficient link attack strategies and lower cost protections on links were both
investigated based on load model similar to [12].
In this paper, we develop a novel attack strategy. The motivation of our work
comes from the observation that the existing multi-node attack strategies in [11, 16]
are not the strongest attacks. Our goal is to investigate the vulnerabilities of power
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grid network under different attack strategies, node attack strategy (NAS) and link
attack strategy (LAS). We found that although load plays very important role
in attack strategies, it still does not represent the strongest strategy from both
attack and defense points of view. Instead, we discover a new metric, called load
distribution vector (LDV), which gives us a new way to identify the importance of
components in power grid network in the context of cascading failure. Utilizing
this load distribution vector, we develop a new and much stronger attack strategy
which can be used in both node and link attacks. The new attack strategy is tested
and compared with existing load-based attack strategy using the Western North
American power grid network data. The simulation results demonstrate that the
proposed attack strategy is much stronger than the existing schemes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.3 introduces the
network model and assessment metrics. Section 3.4 describes the proposed work
in details including load distribution vector, the proposed multi-node and multi-
link attack strategies. Simulation results will be shown in Section 3.5. Finally,
discussion and conclusion are made in Section 3.6.
3.3 System Model
3.3.1 Network Model
In practice, an power grid is an interconnected network for delivering electric-
ity from generators to customers. It consists of substations (generators, transmis-
sion substations and distribution substations) and transmission lines. The topology
of the power grid is often represented as an undirected and weighted graph, G,
with substations being as nodes and transmission lines being as links (or edges).
In the topology-based system models, there are several very important concepts.
The first concept is load. Adopting the definition of betweenness on complex
network [17], we define the load for nodes and links as betweenness. Specifically, the
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load of node ni, at time t, denoted by Lni(t), is the number of most efficient paths
(also known as the shortest paths) from generators to distribution substations that
pass through ni at time t. To obtain Lni(t), one needs to find the most efficient
paths between each pair of generators and distribution substations, and then count
how many of such paths pass ni. Here, the process of finding the most efficient
paths is closely related to the definition of link efficiency and path efficiency, which
will be introduced in Section 3.3.2. Similarly, the load of link lk, denoted by Llk(t),
is the number of the shortest paths passing through lk at time t. The definitions
are just slight extension from the concept proposed in [18].
The second concept is capacity, defined as the maximum load that a node (or
link) can carry. Let Cni (or Clk) denote the capacity of ni (or lk), and Lni(0) ( or
Llk(0) ) denote the initial load of ni ( or lk) before any attacks occur. It is usually
assumed that Cni (or Clk) is proportional to the initial load of node ni (or link
lk) [11], as
Cni = α ∗ Lni(0)
Clk = α ∗ Llk(0)
(3.1)
where α(> 1) is called the system tolerance parameter. Higher α means better
capability to resist perturbation in the system.
3.3.2 Assessment Metrics
How does the network respond to node or link failures? To model the cascad-
ing failures in power grid, a topology-based recoverable model was first employed
in [10], and then slightly modified and extended in [11]. Next, we briefly introduce
the key concepts of this model.
Load Redistribution: If a node (or link) is taken down (i.e. removed from the
network), some shortest paths between generators and distribution substations be-
come unavailable. For these generator-to-distribution-substation pairs, they need
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to find the new shortest paths, which will change the load of remaining nodes and
links, according to the definitions of load in Section 3.3.1. This process is called
the load redistribution.
Overloading occurs when the load exceeds the capacity of a node (or link).
That is, node ni is overloaded when Lni(t) > Cni , and link lk is overloaded when
Llk(t) > Clk . In the context of investigating cascading failures, overloading is
caused by load redistribution.
Link Efficiency represents how well a link can carry the power flow. Let elk(t)
denote the efficiency of link lk at time t. Initially, for each existing link, elk(0) = 1,
meaning that this link works properly. When a node is overloaded (say node ni),
the efficiency of all links that connect to node ni is reduced as [11],
elk(t+ 1) =
{
elk(0)
Cni
Lni (t)
if Lni(t) > Cni
elk(0) otherwise
(3.2)
When a link is overloaded (say link lk), the efficiency of this link is reduced, as
elk(t+ 1) =
{
elk(0)
Clk
Llk (t)
if Llk(t) > Clk
elk(0) otherwise
(3.3)
When the link efficiency is smaller than 1, it means that the link partially losses
its functionality and becomes less efficient. The amount of reduction in the link
efficiency is proportional to the overload extent: Cni/Lni(t) for node overloading
and Clk/Llk(t) for link overloading.
Path Efficiency is defined as harmonic composition of link efficiency [11]. From
node ni to nj, there exists many paths. The path that has the highest path
efficiency value is called as the most efficient path or the shortest path in this
paper. We use ij(t) to denote the efficiency of the shortest path at time t. It is
defined as ij = 1/(
∑P
p=1 1/xp(t)), where P is the number of links on the path and
xp(t) is the efficiency value of each link on the path.
Network Efficiency: Assume there are Ng generators and Nd distribution sub-
stations. Let set G contains all generators and set D contains all distribution
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substations. The network efficiency at time t, denoted by E(t), is defined as
E(t) =
1
NgNd
∑
ni∈G
∑
nj∈D
ij(t) (3.4)
3.4 Load Distribution Vector Based Attack Strategies
To understand the vulnerabilities of power grid systems, one effective method
is to study this problem from the attacker point of view. That is, to find the
strong attack strategies that cause large damage to the grid. In the context of
investigating cascading failure using topology-based model, the attacker’s goal is
to identify a set of victim nodes or links, whose failure will cause large reduction
of the network efficiency. The methods of selecting victim nodes are referred to
as Node Attack Strategies (NAS), and the method of selecting victim links are
referred to as Link Attack Strategies (LAS).
3.4.1 Load-based Attack Strategies and Their Limitations
In the existing literature [10, 11], the prevalent attack strategies choose victim
nodes/links according to their load, which can have different definitions in different
network models. In the topology-based model discussed in Section 3.3.1, load is
defined as betweennees. When the attacker aims to knock down M nodes or links,
the load-based attack strategies are as follows.
* NASMload : Selecting the top M largest load nodes as the victim nodes.
* LASMload : Selecting the top M largest load links as the victim links.
Although load-based attack strategies are widely used, they often are not the
strongest attacks. This has been shown in [13], which adopted a non-recoverable
network model using degrees to compute the load. In this subsection, we discuss
and demonstrate the intrinsic limitation of betweenness (ILB) (or load) as
the victim node or link selection criteria.
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If node A has large load (i.e. betweeness), it is highly likely that the nodes
around A also have large load, since the shortest paths passing A often pass its
neighbors too. According to NASMload, the victim nodes tend to be ”close” to each
other, residing in a small area in the network. In this case, attacking A and its
neighbors may not be much more damaging than attacking A alone.
To see this, let us examine a special example shown in Fig. 3.1. This power
grid contains a set of 10 generators (denoted by SG) and a set of 10 distribution
substations (denoted by SD). We find 100 shortest paths, and one path between
each pair of generator and distribution substation. Assume that SG and SD are
completely separated by a set of transmission substations, denoted by ST . We also
assume that 90 shortest paths pass through the A-G link and 10 shortest paths
are through the B-N link. Thus, the loads of node A, G, B, N are 90, 90, 10, and
10 respectively.
Now, if we launch the traditional load-based node attack strategy, NAS2load,
what will happen? The attacker should knock down node A and G, which will
cause severe load redistribution, make node B and N carry much higher load,
reduce link efficiency, and reduce network efficiency. However, is this the strongest
attack? Obviously not. A smart attacker should choose the first victim node as
either A or G, and the second victim node as either B or N . This new attack
will make the network efficiency reduce to 0. This simple example illustrates the
limitation of the betweenness (or load) as the sole metric in the selection of victim
nodes.
3.4.2 Primary Idea
The optimal multi-node attack strategy, denoted by NASMopt, surely exists and
can be found through an exhaustive search. For instance, for NAS3opt, the at-
tacker can run simulation for each three nodes combination as the victim nodes.
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Figure 3.1. Demonstrating the limitation of the load-based attack strategies
This approach, however, has two major problems. First, the simulation has to be
performed for a given system tolerance T value. The search results may not be gen-
eralized to different T values. Second, the computation complexity is prohibitively
high because (a) the network size (N) is a very large number in practice, (b) the
cost of finding all betweenness values in one round of iteration increases dramati-
cally with N , and (c) the number of M nodes combinations increases sharply with
N .
We propose a practical multi-node attack strategy. Here, load is still an
important metric. Besides load, as discussed in Section 3.4.1, we would like to
capture features such as (1) attacking both A and G in Fig. 3.1 has the similar
effect as attacking node A alone, and (2) attacking A and attacking B leading to
very different consequences. Our primary idea is to
* Select the nodes with reasonably large load as candidate nodes.
* Divide the candidate nodes into different groups. The nodes in the same
group should cause load-redistribution in a similar area in the network if
they are taken out of the network. The nodes in different groups should
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impact different areas in the network if they are taken out.
* Pick one node from each group, and compose the victim nodes selection.
This idea also works for LAS, as long as you replace ”node” with ”link” in the above
description. Obviously, the most challenging part is to determine how to divide
nodes into groups, which is addressed by our newly proposed load distribution
vector metric.
3.4.3 Load Distribution Vector
Before any attack, all nodes (or links) have their own load as between-
ness. We define the original node load distribution vector as ONLDV =
[Ln1(0), Ln2(0), ..., LnN (0)]
′
, and the original link load distribution vector as
OLLDV = [Ll1(0), Ll2(0), ..., LlK (0)]
′
, where ′ is vector transpose. If we remove a
node or link, the load distribution vector changes. We define the Lˆjni as the load
of node ni after node nj is removed, and the Lˆ
k
ls
as the load of link ls after link lk
is removed. Then, the node load distribution vector (NLDV) of node nj is defined
as
NLDVj = [Lˆ
j
n1
, Lˆjn2 , ..., Lˆ
j
ni
, ..., LˆjnN ]
′
. (3.5)
Similarly, the link load distribution vector (LLDV) of link lk is defined as
LLDVj = [Lˆ
k
l1
, Lˆkl2 , ..., Lˆ
k
ls , ..., Lˆ
k
lK
]
′
. (3.6)
Furthermore, for i = j, we set Lˆini = Lni(0), the original load of node ni. For
s = k, we set Lˆklk = Llk(0), the original load of link lk.
As a summary, a node’s NLDV is just the new load distribution of all re-
maining nodes after this node is removed, and a link’s LLDV is just the new load
distribution of all remaining links after this link is removed.
Given the definition of load distribution vectors, we compute the distance
between ni and nj, (denoted by dninj) and the distance between ls and lk (denoted
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by dlslk) as
dninj = Dist(NLDVi, NLDVj)
dlkls = Dist(LLDVk, LLDVs)
(3.7)
The function Dist(.) can be any distance definition, such as Euclidean distance,
Mahalanobis distance et al [19]. In the paper, we adopt the Euclidean distance.
From the definitions of load distribution vector and distance metric, we expect
that two nodes (links) with smaller distance cause similar impact to the network
if they are taken out, and vice versa.
3.4.4 Load Distribution Vector Based Multi-node Attack Strategy
Following the primary idea in Section 3.4.2, we propose a load distribution
vector based multi-node attack strategy, denoted by NASMLDV , which contains the
following steps.
 Step 1: Choose the top R (R > M ≥ 2) largest load nodes and put them
into a candidate set, denoted by Sc. The nodes in Sc are called the candidate
nodes.
 Step 2: For each node ni ∈ Sc, compute its load distribution vector NLDVi.
For each pair of nodes ni, nj ∈ Sc and i 6= j, compute the distance dninj .
 Step 3: Use the well-known hierarchical clustering algorithm, Ward’s algo-
rithm in [20], to get the hierarchical tree of candidate nodes and divide them
into M unique groups.
 Step 4: Select one candidate node in Sc such that its average distance to all
other candidate nodes is the largest. Put the selected node (say nx) into the
victim set, denoted by Sv. In order to make sure that only one node in each
group (see step 3) can be added to the victim set, we remove the candidate
nodes belonging to the same group as nx from the candidate set Sc.
55
Figure 3.2. Demonstration of node attack strategies and link attack strategies
under topology snapshot 1
 Step 5: For each remaining node in Sc, calculate its average distance to all
nodes in Sv. This average distance is called the to-Sv-distance. Select the
node in Sc that has the largest to-Sv-distance value, and put this node into
Sv. If some nodes are in Sc and belong to the same group as the selected
node, these nodes are deleted from Sc.
 Step 6: Repeat Step 5 until the candidate pool is empty. (There will be
M − 1 iterations.)
 Step 7: Finally, there are M nodes in Sv, which are the selected victim nodes.
In Fig. 3.2, we plot the local topology of top 20 largest load nodes under
topology snapshot 1 of Western North American power grid network. The details
of the data set can be found in Section 3.5. The selected victim nodes chosen by
NAS3load are marked with blue octagons, and victim nodes selected by NAS
3
LDV
are marked with red circles. It is clearly seen that the proposed scheme, NAS3LDV ,
is better in terms of finding victim nodes from different regions of the power grid
network. It is also a stronger attack, which will be demonstrated in Section 3.5.
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3.4.5 Load Distribution Vector Based Multi-link Attack Strategy
Most works in the current literature aim to model cascading failure of power
grid based on the removal of nodes (substations). On the other hand, transmission
lines can be more vulnerable [1]. We propose a link attack strategy (LAS), denoted
by LASMLDV , based on the concept of load distribution vector. The procedure to
selecting victim links of LASMLDV is very similar to the 7-step-procedure ofNAS
M
LDV
presented in Section 3.4.4. The only modifications are replacing (1) ”node” with
”link”, (b) ni with lk, (c) nj with ls, (d) NLDVi with LLDVk, (e) dninj with dlkls ,
and (f) nx with lx. In Fig. 3.2, we also demonstrate the selected victim links of the
proposed scheme (LAS3LDV ) and these of the load-based scheme (LAS
3
load). The
bold red lines represent candidate links. We clearly see that the victim links of
LAS3LDV (marked as L1, L13, and L18) are further apart than the victim links of
LAS3load (marked as L1, L2, and L3).
In summary, we propose the novel concept of load distribution vectors and
develop new attack strategies that have the following features. First, they cause
more damage than the traditional load based attacks. The comparison results will
be shown in Section 3.5. Second, the proposed attacks do not require extensive
search or pre-determined system tolerance value (T ).
3.5 Simulation Results
We use Matlab to simulate all attack strategies under recoverable model dis-
cussed in Section 3.3 and adopt the Western North American power grid network
data [21], consisting of 4941 substations and 6594 transmission lines, as the bench-
mark. Since the Western North American power grid data does not specify the
types of substations, we use the method in [22] to determine the generators and
distribution substations. Particularly, there are 1226 nodes that have only one
transmission line connected. Among those 1226 nodes, which are highly likely to
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be distribution substations, we randomly select 800 nodes as the distribution sub-
stations. From the remaining nodes, we randomly select 600 nodes as generators.
By doing so, we can create multiple snapshots of the power grid topology. In this
paper, we will use two different snapshots to do the simulations.
The simulation results for node attack strategies (NAS) and link attack stra-
gies (LAS) will be shown in Section 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 respectively, followed by a
comparison between them in Section 3.5.3.
3.5.1 Simulation Results for Multi-node Attack Strategies
In this subsection, we first demonstrate how the network efficiency (E(t))
changes after the proposed NAS is launched. In Fig. 3.3, the x-axis is the index of
iteration round, and the y-axis is network efficiency. In the simulation, we set the
system tolerance (α in Equ. 3.1) to be 1.2 and the number of victim nodes (M)
changes from 1 to 6.
When the iteration index is 0, the network is not under attack. When one
or multiple nodes (also called as the victim nodes) are taken down, the network
efficiency first drops sharply due to the overloading problem, then recovers a little
because the network tries to find the new shortest paths to increase its efficiency,
and finally starts to fluctuate. The reason for the occurrence of fluctuation is due
to the reversibility of effects of overload, which was clearly explained in [11].
We observe that the network efficiency converges very quickly (usually after 4
iterations) and has some fluctuations after its convergence. In the simulation, we
usually perform 12 rounds of iteration and compute the stabilized average network
efficiency (SANE), denoted by E(Gf ), as the average of E(t) from round 5 to 12.
Furthermore, we define η to measure the damage of the attack as η =
E(0)−E(Gf )
E(0)
.
Next, we compare the proposed load distribution vector based scheme with
the traditional load based scheme. In Figure 3.4, the x-axis is the number of victim
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nodes, and the y-axis is the E(Gf ) value. The curves marked with square represent
the proposed scheme, NASMLDV , and the curves marked with star represent the
load-based scheme, NASMload.
It is clearly shown that the proposed attack strategy is much more power-
ful than the load-based attacks. For instance, when M = 3 under the topology
snapshot 1, NAS3LDV reduces the network efficiency from 0.0594 to 0.0415 lead-
ing to η = 30.13%, whereas NAS3load reduces the network efficiency from 0.0594
to 0.0454 leading to η = 23.57%. We see that NAS3LDV chooses node 4220, 427
and 70 as victim nodes, and NAS3load chooses node 4220, 2544 and 4165 as victim
nodes. Obviously, the proposed attack chooses the victims that are further away
and conquers the limitation of the betweenness discussed in Section 3.4.1.
We performed simulation for different topology snapshots, and observed sim-
ilar results. Fig. 3.5 shows the results of another topology snapshot, which is
similar to Fig. 3.4. The similarity indicates that the advantage of the proposed
multi-node attack (from the attacker points of view) exists in different power grid
network topologies. We also performed simulations for different choices of R value,
which is the number of nodes selected in Step 1 of the proposed attack. We ob-
served that the attack performance for M ≤ 6 is not sensitive to R as long as
R > 30.
3.5.2 Simulation Results for Multi-link Attack Strategies
In this subsection, we compare the proposed link attack strategy, LASMLDV ,
with the traditional load strategy, LASMload. Fig. 3.6 shows the stabilized average
network efficiency (E(Gf )) under different numbers of victim links.
It is clearly shown that the proposed scheme is much more powerful than
the load-based attack scheme. For instance, when M = 3 under the topology
snapshot 1, LAS3LDV reduces the network efficiency from 0.0594 to 0.0458, leading
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Figure 3.3. Network efficiency of the proposed node attack strategy
to η = 22.9%, whereas LAS3load reduces the network efficiency from 0.0594 to
0.0485, leading to η = 18.35%. Furthermore, LAS3LDV chooses link L1, L13 and
L18 as victim links, and LAS3load chooses link L1, L2, and L3 as victim nodes.
From Fig. 3.2, we see that the proposed scheme chooses the victim links that
have not only relatively high load and but are further away from each other. The
load-based scheme, however, chooses the victim links that are connected together.
We also conduct the simulation on topology snapshot 2 and observe the similar
results. Due space limitation, we will not show that figure in the paper.
3.5.3 Multi-node Attack Strategies vs Multi-link Attack Strategies
In Fig. 3.7, we show an interesting comparison between node attacks and
link attacks, given different numbers of victim nodes/links. We make the following
observations.
 Given the same number of victim nodes/links, the node-based attacks (NAS)
are obviously stronger than link-based attacks (LAS). NAS not only cuts off
nodes themselves, but also links adherent to those nodes, whereas LAS only
cuts off victim links from the network which causes less damage. For exam-
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Figure 3.4. Comparison between the proposed node attack strategy and the com-
parison scheme on topology snapshot 1
ple, NAS2LDV , removing two critical nodes, can reduce the average network
efficiency by 29.12%, whereas the η of LAS6LDV , which cuts off six critical
links, is only 26.26%.
 Although weaker than NAS, the proposed LAS can cause severe damage
to power grid. For example, LAS1LDV , only removing one critical link, can
sharply reduce the network efficiency from 0.0594 to 0.0493, leading to η =
17%. This is only a little bit weaker than NAS1LDV with η = 20.54%.
 In practice, the attacker may choose to attack links because knocking down
links are usually considered easier than knocking down nodes. For example,
when the cost of attacking a transmission line is less than a third of the
cost of attacking a substation, the attacker should launch LAS3LDV , instead
of NAS1LDV . The former requires less resource, but causes severer damage.
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3.6 Conclusions and Discussions
In this paper, we studied the vulnerabilities of US power grid under a betwee-
ness based network model. After analyzing the intrinsic limitation of betweenness,
we found that the traditional load-based attacks cannot represent the strongest
attacks in the grid. Then, we propose a new metric, called load distribution vec-
tor (LDV), to measure the functionality of nodes in the network, and extend this
idea to links. Simulation results show that our proposed attack strategies generate
much stronger attacks.
There are several important future research directions along this topic. First,
the current work often investigates node failures and link failures separately. In
practice, attackers can surely attack several nodes and several links simultaneously.
It is highly desirable to study the vulnerability of power grids by joining node and
link attacks together. Second, as we discussed in Section I, power grid is a unique
complex system not only with complicated topological structure, more importantly
it has the fundamental circuit theory (i.e., Kirchhoff’s law) governing the electricity
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parison scheme on topology snapshot 1
generation, transmission and distribution in the grid. Therefore, it will be critical
to go beyond the pure topological vulnerability analysis with the consideration
of the physical laws governing the power systems. One natural extension is to
integrate our approach with the extended topological model as discussed in [6–8]
to see how our proposed method will perform with the consideration of several key
features in power flow analysis. Finally, the data set we investigated in this work
is based on the Western North American Power Grid data. It would be interesting
to analyze and validate the observations from our research presented in this paper
to other data sets, such as the IEEE-118-bus and IEEE-300-bus benchmarks, as
well as the entire North America Electrical Infrastructure data that we recently
obtained. We are currently investigating all these issues and the corresponding
results will be reported in future work.
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4.1 Abstract
Security issues related to power grid networks have attracted the attention of
researchers in many fields. Recently, a new network model that combines complex
network theories with power flow models was proposed. This model, referred to
as the extended model, is suitable for investigating vulnerabilities in power grid
networks. In this work, we study cascading failures of power grids under the
extended model. Particularly, we discover that attack strategies that select target
nodes (TNs) based on load and degree do not yield the strongest attacks. Instead,
we propose a novel metric, called the risk graph, and develop novel attack strategies
that are much stronger than the load-based and degree-based attack strategies.
The proposed approaches and the comparison approaches are tested on IEEE 57
and 118 bus systems and Polish transmission system. The results demonstrate
that the proposed approaches can reveal the power grid vulnerability in terms of
causing cascading failures more effectively than the comparison approaches.
4.2 Introduction
Power grid is considered as one of the most significant infrastructures on the
Earth. Within recent decades, several large-scale power outages around the world
seriously affected the livelihood of many people and caused great damage [1]. For
example, the well-known Northeast blackout in 2003 affected 55 million people and
caused an estimated economic loss between $7 billions and $10 billions [2].
Large-scale power outage is often caused by cascading failure. A cascading
failure refers to a sequence of dependent events, where the initial failure of one or
more components (i.e. substations and transmission lines) triggers the sequential
failure of other components [3, 4]. Triggers of the initial failures can be natural
damage (e.g. the fall of trees), aging equipment, human errors, software and
hardware faults, and so on. Within recent years, power grids are facing new threats,
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e.g. cyber-physical attacks [5, 6]. Therefore, malicious attacks become new and
potential triggers of cascading failures.
Many existing works have been proposed to investigate the vulnerability of
power grids from the attack perspective. Important challenges, however, still re-
main. First, developing reasonable models that can mimic cascading failures in
reality is still a critical challenge. In current literatures, there are three popular
models, pure topological models [7–9], pure power flow models [4, 10] and hybrid
models [11–13]. Each category has its own advantages and disadvantages. Second,
finding stronger malicious attack strategies is one of the key ways to investigate
cascading failures. Although the exhaustive search approach can yield the best
attack from the attack performance point of view, it is sometimes computationally
infeasible in practice [9]. Thus, practical and efficient attack strategies need to be
found. Finally, attackers might have different knowledge of power grids, such as
topological structures, electric features and real-time information. Under different
levels of knowledge, attackers may adopt different attack strategies.
In this work, we do not tackle the first challenge. Instead, we choose a hy-
brid model, called the extended model. Although hybrid models [11, 13] have been
adopted to study the vulnerability of power grids, few existing studies have dis-
cussed how cascading failures occur under hybrid models. A reasonable cascading
failure simulator (CFS) under the extended model will be introduced.
To address the second challenge, we study the node attack strategy (NAS)
under the extended model to address how to find stronger attacks. In this work,
an attack means an attacker knocks down one or more nodes (i.e. substations).
These removed nodes are referred to as target nodes (TNs). From the attacker’s
point of view, attackers need to carefully choose a few TNs, aiming to maximize
the damage. the node attack strategy describes how the attacker chooses TNs.
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In addition, a stronger attack means that the initial removal of the TNs could
yield larger percentage of drop in net-ability (PoDN), which will be discussed in
Section 5.4.4. If the attacker knows everything about a power grid and can model
how cascading failures occur, the exhaustive search node attack strategy can yield
the most serious damage. The exhaustive search, however, is often not practical
due to its huge search space on a large-scale, even moderate-scale, power grid
networks. Instead, we propose a reduced search space node attack strategy or RSS
node attack strategy in short. The RSS node attack strategy can sharply reduce the
search space and achieve comparable attack performance to that of the exhaustive
search node attack strategy.
We also investigate the third challenge. To adopt the proposed RSS node
attack strategy, an attacker needs to know the topology of power grid networks,
as well as the system tolerance factor that is defined as the capacity divided by
the initial load of a node. In practice, such tolerance factors may not be known to
attackers. Therefore, as the third task of this work, we investigate attack strate-
gies under the assumption that an attacker does not know the tolerance factors.
We propose a novel metric, called the risk graph (RG), to show the criticality
of important nodes in a grid network and the hidden relationship among them.
Using the risk graph, we develop the riskgraph-based node attack strategy. The
riskgraph-based node attack strategy is conducted on IEEE 118 bus system and
Polish transmission system, and compared with the load-based, the degree-based
and the proposed RSS node attack strategies. The simulation results demonstrate
the surprising strength of the riskgraph-based approach even if an attacker has
limited knowledge of power grids.
This work is structured as follows. The related work is presented in Section 4.3.
In Section 5.4 we set up the cascading failure simulator under the extended model.
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In Section 4.5 we describe the reduced search space node attack strategy, risk graph,
and the riskgraph-based node attack strategy in detail. In Section 6.7, the details
of simulation and observation are made. Discussions and conclusions are provided
in Section 6.8. Finally, the supplementary file of this published manuscript is
provided in Section 4.8.
4.3 Related Work
In this work, we study node attack strategies under the extended model con-
sidering two scenarios: attackers know or do not know the system tolerance factor.
We briefly summarize existing works as follows.
In the current literature, from the attack perspective, there are three prevail-
ing models in studying cascading failures, pure topological models, pure power flow
models and hybrid models. Pure topological models [7, 8] are rooted in complex
network theories, and useful to develop strong attack metrics, e.g. degree and load
in [14], percentage of failure (PoF) and risk if failure (RIF) in [9], and load distri-
bution vector (LDV) in [15]. Originating from circuit theories, e.g. Kirchoff’s and
Ohm’s Laws, pure power flow models provide the fundamental insights and under-
standing of cascading behaviors. Recently, hybrid models [11, 13] are proposed to
investigate the vulnerability of power grids by combining complex network theory
with basic features of power systems, e.g. power transmission distribution factors
(PTDFs). More discussions about existing cascading failure models are given in
Section 4.8, the supplementary file of this work.
Different models have different advantages and disadvantages. First, although
pure topological models are useful to develop malicious attack strategies, the re-
lated concepts and metrics are far from the physical characteristics of power grids.
Thereby, these models are far from reflecting the fundamental behaviors of cascad-
ing failures. Second, pure power flow models are more accurate to reveal vulnera-
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bility of power grids, and are mainly used to assess the security and reliability of
power grid networks [10, 16]. However, a detailed analysis of large-scale power grid
is usually computationally expensive due to its complexity, nonlinearity, and dy-
namics [4]. Finally, the extended model in [13] is a new angle in modeling cascading
failures. The power distribution under the extended model is based on PTDFs [12].
Thus, the extended model is more accurate than pure topological models in terms
of studying cascading failures. In addition, the calculation of PTDFs is less com-
plex than the detailed analysis of power flows in a power grid [17]. That is, the
extended model is less complex than pure power flow models.
When discussing about malicious attack strategies, we assume that attack-
ers might have certain information of power grid networks, such as topological
structures, electric features, and system tolerances. For instance, the topological
structure information can be purchased from companies (e.g. Platts [18]), the
electric features, such as impedance, can be estimated based on the topological
information. The system tolerances of real power systems are hard to be clearly
known by attackers due to various reasons [7–9]. Thus, the attack strategies in
prior studies can be divided into two categories: unknown system tolerance, e.g.
degree, load, RIF and LVD, and known system tolerance, e.g. PoF and the exhaus-
tive search approach. The more information attackers know about power grids,
the stronger attacks they might find.
4.4 The Extended Model for Cascading Failures Analysis in Power
Grids
4.4.1 Network Topology
Generally speaking, a power grid composes of substations (e.g. generators,
transmission and distribution substations) and transmission lines. In this work,
we model the power grid network as a directed graph, G = {B,L}, where B is the
set of nodes (i.e. substations) and L is the set of links (i.e. transmission lines).
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We put all generators and all distribution substations into different sets G and D,
respectively, where G ⊆ B and D ⊆ B. In addition, NB, NL, NG and ND are used
to represent the number of nodes, links, generation nodes and distribution nodes,
respectively.
4.4.2 Introduction of the Extended Model
The extended model was originally established in [12, 13]. The introduction
of the extended model and comparisons among different models can be found in
Section 4.8. We briefly summarize three important concepts about the extended
model as follows.
1. PTDFs : Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDFs) can represent the
sensitivity of power flow change in each transmission line for power injec-
tion/withdrawal at a pair of nodes [12, 17]. In reality, power is only trans-
mitted from generation nodes to distribution nodes. Under the extended
model, power flow on links is considered to be caused by the node pairs that
one node is generator and the other node is transmission node.
2. Extended Betweenness : The link extended betweenness is the summation of
power flows caused by each generation-distribution-node pair. The node
extended betweenness is defined as the summation of extended betweenness
on links that connect to a node. The extended betweenness is adopted as
the load definition of nodes/links in this work.
3. Net-ability : For a grid network G, the net-ability, denoted by E(G), is de-
fined as 1
NGND
∑
g∈G
∑
d∈D
Pgd
Zgd
, where Pgd represents power injection limi-
tation and Zgd represents the impedance between the generator g and the
distribution node d. Net-ability is the measure to evaluate how well a power
grid supplies power [12].
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4.4.3 Cascading Failure Simulator under the Extended Model
In the current literature [7–9], cascading failure simulators (CFSs) under pure
topological models are well established. However, few researchers have conducted
in-depth study on cascading failures under the extended model. In this subsection,
we setup the CFS under the extended model by introducing several important
concepts as follows.
 Load : We employ the extended betweenness as the definition of load. Dur-
ing cascading failures, the grid network is often broken into more than one
subnets after several rounds. At round t, the load of node i, or ni, is denoted
by Ani(t), and is updated by recalculating the extended betweenness of ni in
the subnet that contains ni. In this work, the load of a node (e.g. ni) before
an attack is called the initial load of ni and denoted by Ani .
 Capacity : The capacity of ni, denoted by Cni , is the maximum amount of
load that ni can carry.
 Overloading : When the load of a node exceeds its capacity, the overloading
will occur. Under the extended model, the overloaded nodes are assumed to
be removed from the power grid network immediately.
 System tolerance: The system tolerance, α (α > 1), is the parameter describ-
ing the relationship between the initial load of a node and its capacity. For
example, the capacity of ni is assumed to be α = Cni/Ani [7]. In general,
we assume α values for all nodes are the same, and calculate the capacity as
Cni = α× Ani .
 Load redistribution: When the topology of a grid network changes due to the
removals of nodes, the load on nodes will be redistributed by recalculating
the extended betweenness for all surviving nodes. If the entire grid network
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is broken into more than one subnets, the calculation will be conducted in
each subnet separately.
The CFS under the extended model includes three parts: (1) initializing the
CFS and removing the TNs; (2) starting the cascading failures process till it stops;
(3) measuring the damage using assessment metrics. A similar CFS under the
extended model can be found in our previous work [19].
4.4.4 Assessment Metric
In this work, the primary assessment metric is percentage of drop in net-ability
(PoDN), which is defined as follows.
η =
E(G)− E(G′)
E(G)
(4.1)
where E(G) and E(G
′
) represents the net-ability of power grids before and after
the occurrence of cascading failures. The larger η is, the stronger the attack is.
The second and third assessment metrics are average inverse geodesic length
(AIGL) [20] and connectivity loss (CL) [21]. Geodesic length is the shortest path
between a pair of nodes in a graph [20]. When a pair of nodes are in different
subnets, the geodesic length between this pair is ∞ (i.e. infinity). The metric
AIGL, denoted by `−1, is defined as `−1 = 1
NB(NB−1)
∑
ni∈B
∑
nj 6=ni∈B
1
d(ni,nj)
, where
B is the node set and d(ni, nj) is the geodesic length between ni and nj. The
metric CL represents the connectivity between generators and distribution nodes
in a power grid. The definition of CL is 1 − 〈NkG
NG
〉
k
, where NG is the number of
generators and NkG is the number of generators connected to the distribution node
k. The averaging, 〈•〉, is done over all surviving distribution nodes after cascading
failure. Referring to AIGL, the smaller `−1 represents the stronger attack, while
by using CL a stronger attack is with larger CL.
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4.5 Attack Strategies under the Extended Model
In this section, we investigate malicious attack strategies by discussing node
attack strategy (NAS). The similar link attack strategy (LAS) is introduced in
Section 4.8. From the attack perspective, the biggest challenge is to find the attacks
that can cause larger damage. In the context of studying cascading failures, an
attacker’s goal is to identify a set of TNs, whose simultaneous failures could yield
as large PoDN as possible.
4.5.1 Complexity Measure of Attack Strategies
In this work, the complexity analysis of different attack strategies is based on
the size of search space for each attack strategy. In order words, it is the calculation
of how many times an attack strategy needs to launch CFS before finding its best
attack. O(CFS) is adopted to represent the time of launching CFS once and as
the unit to compare the complexity of different attack strategies. Theoretically,
it is very hard to precisely analyze the computational complexity of CFS, due to
different power grid network sizes, network topologies, system tolerances, attack
strategies, and so on. However, the network size and topology are the major factors.
For instance, in order to compute the extended betweenness, CFS needs to examine
each pair of generation-distribution nodes. For each pair, it needs to determine the
sensitivity value of each link. Roughly speaking, assume there are NG generators,
ND distribution nodes, and NL links in a grid network. The number of sensitivity
values needed to be computed is close to NG × ND × NL. After obtaining all
sensitivity values, summation operation is performed for each node, in order to
obtain the extended betweenness (i.e. load) for all nodes. The above operation
is performed in each round of cascading failure. From the above discussion, we
can see that it is very difficult to have a closed-form expression of O(CFS), because
it depends on the network size and topology, as well as how a cascading failure
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occurs. We do not address how to reduce the computation complexity of CFS
itself. Instead, we focus on analyzing the complexity of different attack strategies
based on the number of times launching CFS before making decision. For instance,
if an attack strategy needs to launch (NB)
M times of CFS in order to find its best
attack, the complexity of this attack strategy is (NB)
M × O(CFS), or (NB)M in
short.
4.5.2 Load-based and Degree-based Node Attack Strategies
In this subsection, we introduce the well-studied load-based and degree-based
approaches [9, 20]. The load of a node is defined as the node extended betweenness,
discussed in Section 4.8.1, while the degree of a node is defined the number of the
links connecting to this node [20]. When an attacker aims to knock down M target
nodes (TNs), the load-based and degree-based node attack strategies, denoted by
NASMload and NAS
M
degree, respectively, are shown as follows,
* NASMload: Choose nodes with the top M largest load values as TNs.
* NASMdegree: Choose nodes with the top M largest degree values as TNs.
Let CMdegree and C
M
load denote the complexity of NAS
M
degree and NAS
M
load. Be-
cause these approaches do not need to launch CFS before selecting TNs. Both
CMdegree and C
M
load are 0.
4.5.3 Exhaustive Search node Attack Strategy
For an attacker, the strongest node attack strategy is no doubt the exhaustive
search. The exhaustive search NAS is denoted by NASMES and conducted below,
* NASMES: Find the M TNs, whose simultaneous failure yields the largest
PoDN under a given α.
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Table 4.1. The strongest target node combinations on IEEE 118 bus system
Index
NAS1ES NAS
2
ES NAS
3
ES
TNs PoDN(%) TNs PoDN(%) TNs PoDN(%)
1 65 64.5 30,68 81.3 30,65,80 88
2 38 55.7 30,80 79.2 30,65,96 87.8
3 68 52.9 30,65 77.9 30,68,96 87.2
4 30 48.2 65,69 77.8 30,68,94 86.8
5 80 46.7 38,68 77.4 30,68,103 86.2
6 81 42.3 38,80 77.1 38,69,94 85.9
7 77 33.4 38,69 76.1 30,65,94 85.5
8 49 31.1 17,65 76.1 38,69,96 85.2
9 64 30.8 38,77 75.9 30,66,68 85.2
10 17 30.6 30,81 75.3 30,68,92 85
Let CMES denote the complexity of NAS
M
ES. Theoretically, the complexity is,
CMES =
(
NB
M
)
×O(CFS) (4.2)
where
(
NB
M
)
= NB(NB−1)×···×(NB−M+1)
M !
. Therefore, CMES is the same order as (NB)
M ,
which increases as a power function with NB and explodes as an exponential func-
tion with M .
The exhaustive search is very time-consuming, and often computationally in-
feasible. Numerically, take IEEE 118 bus system as an example. Running CFS
once on IEEE 118 bus system needs an average time of 0.06 second by using Matlab
under Window 7 OS with 4 GB memory and dual-core i5 CPU (2.4GHz each). The
time for simulating
(
118
5
)
= 174, 963, 438 node combinations is roughly 4 months.
Note that, the real power grid networks are often much bigger than IEEE 118 bus
system. Even if parallel computing is available, adopting NASMES on large-scale
networks is still impractical.
4.5.4 Reduced Search Space Node Attack Strategy
It is the goal to develop practical attack strategy in this work. Although the
exhaustive search is often infeasible, it is still doable at small M values on the
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moderate-scale grid network, and can provide some useful insights. We conducted
experiments on IEEE 118 bus system by using NASMES, where M is set to be 1,
2 and 3 and α is set to be 1.5. The node combinations of the top ten strongest
attacks are shown in Table 5.3.
There is a helpful observation made from Table 5.3. For instance, in NAS2ES,
at least one TN in the two-node combination is from the TNs of the top ten
attacks in NAS1ES. In NAS
3
ES, all three-node combinations contains the two-
node combinations that in NAS2ES. In Table 5.3, the highlighted nodes or node
combinations illustrate such observation.
This observation is easy to understand. If a M -TN combination can result in
severe damage to a power grid, adding another TN to this combination will most
likely be a strong attack. It is important to point out that the new (M+1)-TN
combination may not be the strongest attack of NASM+1ES . However, as long as
the resulted PoDN is large enough, the new combination will be a strong attack of
NASM+1ES .
Inspired by the above discussions, we propose a novel search based attack
strategy, called reduced search space attack strategy or RSS attack strategy in short,
which can be applied to both nodes and links. The RSS node attack strategy is
denoted by NASMRSS. Before discussing in detail about the algorithm procedure
of NASMRSS, we need to give some explanations. First, the procedure of searching
TNs is an iterative process, which includes one initial round and M − 1 successive
rounds. Second, the criticality of a node combination (or a node) is determined by
PoDN. The larger the PoDN is, the more critical the node combination is. Third, in
each iterative round, e.g. mth round (1 ≤ m ≤M), the top R critical combinations
are chosen as the round recommended combination set (RRCS), denoted by SmRRC .
Those
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Procedure 1 Initialize the iterative process and obtain the TN for NAS1RSS
1: Set up a system tolerance, e.g. α = 1.5, and initialize a vector x with all values
as 0.
2: //The indices of nodes are consecutive from 1 to NB.
3: for i = 1 : NB do
4: Conduct one-node attack by knocking down node i under given α. Cal-
culate the PoDN after the cascading failure and set the value of xi as the
corresponding PoDN value.
5: end for
6: Choose the node with the largest PoDN in x as the TN for NAS1RSS.
7: Choose the nodes with the top P largest PoDNs in x as candidate nodes, and
put them into SC .
8: Choose the nodes with the top R largest PoDNs in x as the 1st round recom-
mended combination, and put them into S1RRC .
There are three procedures working together to select TNs for NASMRSS. Pro-
cedure 1 shows the steps to obtain the TNs for NAS1RSS. When M = 1 (launching
one-node attack), attackers only need to use Procedure 1, without considering
the other two procedures. When M > 1 (launching multi-node attack), attackers
need to first use Procedure 1 to initialize the iterative process, then use Procedure
2 to complete the iterative process, and finally use Procedure 3 to find TNs for
NASMRSS.
Let CMRSS denote the complexity of NAS
M
RSS. Searching TNs for NAS
M
RSS is
performed in M rounds. In the 1st round, Procedure 1 needs to run CFS NB
times. In mth round (2 ≤ m ≤ M), Procedure 2 needs to run CFS P × R times.
Therefore, the theoretical complexity is,
CMRSS = {P ×R× (M − 1) +NB} ×O(CFS) (4.3)
where P and R are set to limit the search space. At the worst case, when P = R =
NB, C
M
RSS equals to (M − 1) × (NB)2, the same order as M × (NB)2. Therefore,
CMRSS increases as a power function with NB and increases linearly with M .
From the above discussions, we know that NASMRSS has three advantages.
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Procedure 2 Find the Sm+1RRC under given S
m
RRC
1: Perform the Procedure 1, and obtain SC .
2: Initialize a candidate combination set, SCC , and a vector y with all values as
0.
3: //Construct the candidate combinations in (m+ 1)th round.
4: for i = 1 : R do
5: Get the ith node combination in SmRRC , denoted by Ci.
6: for j = 1 : P do
7: Get the jth candidate node in SC , denoted by nj.
8: Combine Ci and nj to get a new candidate combination, and put it into
SCC .
9: end for
10: end for
11: //Conduct multi-node attack for each candidate combination in SCC .
12: for kth combination in SCC do
13: Conduct multi-node attack by knocking down all nodes in the kth combina-
tion under given α. Calculate the PoDN when CFSor stops, and set yk to
the corresponding PoDN.
14: end for
15: Choose the candidate combinations with the top R largest PoDNs in y as the
(m+ 1)th round recommended combination, and put them into Sm+1RRC .
Procedure 3 Find TNs for NASMRSS under given S
M
RRC
1: There are R node combinations in SMRRC . The nodes in the combination that
can cause the largest PoDN are the TNs for NASMRSS.
First, compared with NASMES, NAS
M
RSS has sharply-reduced complexity (or search
space). CMRSS is approximate to M × (NB)2, which is much lower than (NB)M
of CMES. Given the available computing resources, NAS
M
RSS can analyze a much
bigger network than NASMES. In other words, NAS
M
RSS scales much better than
NASMES. Furthermore, we can adjust the parameters P and R to achieve a good
balance between the complexity and the attack performance. For example, sup-
pose NASMES and NAS
M
RSS are both tested on IEEE 118 bus system, where M = 5
for both schemes, and NB = 118, P = 118, R = 16 for NAS
M
RSS. NAS
5
ES needs to
launch 174, 963, 438 times of CFS and its calculation probably needs four months;
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whereas NAS5RSS only needs to launch 7, 670 times of CFS, which needs 7.8 min-
utes. The improvement about the complexity of NASMRSS is a big step. Second, the
performance of NASMRSS is comparable to that of NAS
M
ES, which will be shown in
Section 6.7. Finally, during the procedures to find the best attacks, NASMRSS keeps
the track of the round recommended combination set, which is useful to construct
the risk graph. The details of the risk graph will be discussed in subsection 4.5.6.
4.5.5 Limitations of Reduced Search Space Attack Strategy
Although NASMRSS can sharply reduce the complexity of NAS
M
ES and reach
comparable attack performance, which will be discussed in Section 4.6.1, it still
has limitations.
First, NASMRSS relies on the system tolerance (α). As shown in Procedure
1, if attackers adopt NASMRSS to launch attacks, they must first estimate the
system tolerance. In reality, system tolerances of power grids are rarely known by
attackers due to various reasons, e.g. security concerns. Furthermore, although
many existing works assume that the capacity of a node is defined as the initial load
multiplying α, and assume that α is the same for all nodes, these assumptions could
be over-simplifying the case. The nodes in a power grid surely can have different
tolerance factors. It is surely not an easy task for an attacker to estimate the
tolerance factors for all nodes in a power grid. Therefore, from the attack point of
view, requiring the knowledge of system tolerance is a drawback.
Second, although NASMRSS has greatly reduced the complexity, it is still a
search based approach and not suitable for real-time attacks. For example, if an
attacker knows that a few substations are currently down due to some reasons, e.g.
a winter storm, the attacker wants to determine TNs in this situation and launch
an attack. Similarly, the defense side may also want to know the vulnerability
of the power grid network in this situation. Recall that the worst case of the
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complexity of NASMRSS is M×(NB)2, which is still much higher than 0 of NASMdegree
and NASMload, discussed in Section 4.8.2. Further reduction in the complexity of
NASMRSS is desirable.
In summary, a practical real-time attack strategy should have two features:
fast and not depending on system tolerances.
4.5.6 Construction of Risk Graph
Is it possible to obtain an attack strategy without knowing the information of
system tolerances? We find the “relationship” among nodes in a power grid and
can conduct strong attacks based on such relationships. This is particularly useful
to choose multiple TNs. In this subsection, we propose a novel metric, called the
risk graph (RG), to describe such relationship. Here, we demonstrate the procedure
of building the risk graph for nodes, called the node risk graph (NRG).
In the procedures to search the strongest attack for NASMRSS, we keep a track
of the top R strongest node combinations in each round, called RRCS and denoted
by S1RRC , S
2
RRC , ..., S
M
RRC . One realization of the RRCS are shown in Table 6.2, from
which we have basic observations. First, several nodes, e.g. nodes 30, 38, 68, 65 and
80, appear more frequently than others. Second, several node combinations, e.g.
{30, 68}, {38, 69, 96}, happen frequently. These observations demonstrate there
probably are some fixed node combinations, the failure of which may seriously
threaten the safety of the power grid. Studying these fixed node combinations or
the relationship among nodes is helpful to find strong malicious attack strategy.
To demonstrate such relationship of nodes, we construct NRG according to
the intermediate results of NASMRSS under a given system tolerance. Furthermore,
we merge single NRGs under different system tolerances into an node integrated
risk graph (NIRG) to describe such relationship among nodes. If several nodes are
closely related in NIRG, their combination is expected to cause severe damage to
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the power grid network.
Next, we describe the procedure of constructing single NRG under a given
system tolerance value α.
* Step 1: Given an α, performing the procedures of NASMRSS and obtain
S1RRC , ..., S
M
RRC .
* Step 2: Examine those sets (an example is shwon in Table 6.2), and find how
many times a node appears in such sets. If a node appears at least once, this
node becomes a vertex of the risk graph. In addition, each vertex has a vertex
occurrence frequency (VOF), defined as the number of the corresponding
node appears in those sets.
* Step 3: Add an edge between each pair of vertices and assign the weight
of this edge as zero. The edge weight is referred to as the edge occurrence
frequency (EOF).
* Step 4: Examine the node combinations in each SkRRC (k = 1, 2, · · · ,M). If
a pair of nodes, say node i and node j, appears in the combination with m
nodes, increase the EOF of the edge between node i and j by adding 2
m(m−1) .
For example, for the combination {30, 80, 65}, we increase the EOF of three
edges, edge30−80, edge80−65, edge30−65, by 1/3. If the pair of nodes appear
in more than one node combinations, the final EOF of the edge between
this pair of nodes is to summarize all EOF values from the combinations
this pair of nodes are in. For another example, assume nodes 30 and 80
appear simultaneously in {30, 80}, {30, 80, 65} and {30, 80, 65, 94}, the EOF
of edge30−80 is 1 + 1/3 + 1/6 = 3/2.
* Step 5: Remove the edges having EOF values as zero.
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Table 4.2. An realization of RRCS on 118 bus system.
S1RRC S
2
RRC S
3
RRC S
4
RRC S
5
RRC S
6
RRC
65 68,30 30,80,65 38,69,96,17 38,69,96,17,103 38,69,96,17,103,66
38 30,80 65,30,96 38,69,94,17 38,69,94,17,103 30,80,65,94,11,56
68 65,30 68,30,96 30,80,65,94 38,69,96,17,66 38,69,94,17,103,83
30 65,69 68,30,94 30,80,65,96 38,69,96,17,23 38,69,96,17,66,92
80 38,68 68,30,103 38,69,94,30 30,80,65,94,11 30,80,65,94,11,103
81 38,80 38,69,94 30,80,65,103 38,69,96,17,92 38,69,94,17,103,82
77 38,69 65,30,94 68,30,94,66 38,69,96,17,105 38,69,96,17,66,94
49 65,17 38,69,96 38,69,96,30 38,69,96,17,94 38,69,94,17,103,98
64 38,77 68,30,66 30,80,65,92 38,69,94,17,89 30,80,65,94,11,54
17 30,81 68,30,92 30,80,65,89 30,80,65,94,7 30,80,65,94,7,56
96 65,80 68,30,80 38,69,94,5 30,80,65,96,11 38,69,94,17,98,66
94 68,17 65,30,103 68,30,96,63 38,69,94,17,98 38,69,94,17,99,66
63 65,96 65,17,80 68,30,96,66 38,69,94,17,83 30,80,65,96,11,56
8 65,38 65,17,96 65,30,96,68 38,69,94,17,97 38,69,94,17,103,66
100 38,81 65,69,96 65,30,96,81 30,80,65,94,103 30,80,65,94,103,56
37 65,37 30,80,64 68,30,96,11 38,69,94,17,99 30,80,65,94,11,105
* Step 6: Remove the vertices that are not connected with other vertices.
This occurs when some nodes are in S1RRC but not in other round recommend
combination sets.
A NRG of IEEE 118 bus system, built directly from Table 6.2, is shown in
Fig. 4.1(a). The size and color of a vertex is decided by its VOF. And the width
and color of an edge is determined by its EOF. The bigger (wider) and redder
of a vertex (or an edge), the larger its VOF (EOF). Fig. 4.1(a) is visualized by
Gephi [22]
There are two important factors affecting the construction of risk graphs, the
system tolerance (α) and the parameters (P and R). The former is the major
factor and the latter is the minor factor. Different values of the parameters, P
and R, may slightly change the nodes in the RRCS; whereas different values of the
system tolerance, α, could probably lead to major changes of nodes in the RRCS.
In other words, single risk graphs are sensitive to the system tolerance.
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(a) Node Risk Graph (b) Node Integrated Risk Graph
Figure 4.1. The node risk graphs on IEEE 118 bus system
Risk Graph Additivity : The risk graphs constructed under different system
tolerances of the same power grid network are additive. If two NRGs are added
together, the vertices and edges in the new NRG are obtained as, (1) all vertices
in the two NRGs will be in the new NRG, and the VOF of vertices in the new
NRG is calculated as either adding the corresponding VOF of the vertex in the
two NRGs, if the vertex appears in both NRGs; or keep its own VOF, if it just
appears in one NRG; (2) for edges, the procedure is the same as vertices.
By adding single NRGs, we can obtain NIRG. As discussed above, single
NRG is sensitive to α, while the NIRG is more robust in terms of reflecting the
relationship between candidate nodes. Based on prior knowledge and construction
restrictions of power grids [7, 8], the range of the system tolerance is set to be
1 < α ≤ 2. Without losing the generality, the NIRG here is generated by adding
20 NRGs, where α is from 1.05 to 2 with an interval 0.05. The NIRG of IEEE 118
bus system is shown in Fig. 4.1(b).
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4.5.7 Risk-Graph Based Node Attack Strategy
The NIRG provide a good way to find stronger attack strategy, which is not
sensitive to system tolerances. Suppose attackers have already had the NIRG of a
power grid, they can launch node attacks as follows,
* NASMriskgraph: The riskgraph-based node attack strategy. IfM equals 1, select
the node with the largest VOF in the NIRG as the TN for NAS1riskgraph. Oth-
erwise, we choose the M nodes from the NIGR as the TNs for NASMriskgraph
by meeting two requirements. First, each pair of nodes should have a di-
rect edge in the NIGR. In total, there are M(M−1)
2
edges among these M
chosen nodes. Second, the summation of all EOF of those M(M−1)
2
edges is
the largest among these of all other M nodes selections. In other words, we
select the M TNs, whose summation of EOF is maximal.
Although the nodes with large VOF often have more impact on the power grid,
their combination does not necessarily yield strong attacks. For instance, in Fig.
4.1(b) the vertices marked with labels as 17 and 30 are important candidate nodes,
which have large VOF values and are represented by bigger circles. However, there
is no direct edge between them. This means the node combination {17, 30} is not
a strong two-node attack. Therefore, the basic idea of NASMriskgraph is to find
the set of M nodes with the strongest connection. The rationale behind the first
requirement is to avoid including nodes that never appear together in any node
combinations in RRCS. The rationale behind the second requirement is to choose
the nodes, whose pair combinations appear most frequently in RRCS.
Let CMriskgraph denote the complexity of NAS
M
riskgrph. C
M
riskgrph includes two
parts: the construction of the NIRG and the selection of TNs. The former has
the similar complexity as that of NASMRSS, because single risk graphs are based
on the intermediate results of NASMRSS. It is important to point out that this
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Table 4.3. The summary of different node attack strategies
Attack
Strategy
NASMdegree NAS
M
load NAS
M
riskgrph NAS
M
RSS NAS
M
ES
O(CFS) 0 0 0 M × (NB)2 (NB)M
Effectiveness Low Low High High High
System
tolerance
No No No Yes Yes
computation can be done “oﬄine”: first obtain single risk graphs under a set of
representative system tolerances, and then construct the NIGR. The latter is to
find TNs from the NIGR. This procedure does not rely on CFS, which means its
complexity is 0, similar to that of the load-based and the degree-based approaches.
This can be done in “real-time”. For example, if an attacker has observed that
n103, node 103, in Fig. 4.1(b) is down for some reasons (e.g. nature disaster), the
attacker can quickly identify an attack strategy adding one more TN, e.g. n38, to
the already-down n103. Therefore, considering on-line attacks, C
M
riskgraph is 0.
In summary, the comparison of the real-time complexity of different node
attack strategies is CMdegree ≈ CMload ≈ CMriskgraph  CMRSS  CMES. More comparisons
among different node attack strategies are shown in Table 4.3.
4.6 Simulation Results
In this section, the simulations and observations are presented in detail. The
simulation experiments are conducted in Matlab, including the setup of power
grid network, PDTFs calculation and the process of CFSor. The proposed attack
strategies are tested on the well-known IEEE 57 and 118 bus systems [23], and
Polish transmission system [17]. The details of the three benchmarks are listed in
Table 6.3. Here, we will give our major experiment results and observations, and
additional results are given in Section 4.8.
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Table 4.4. The summary of different test benchmarks.
Test Benchmarks NB NL NG ND
IEEE 57 bus system 57 80 7 42
IEEE 118 bus system 118 179 54 99
Polish transmission system 2383 2896 327 1817
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Figure 4.2. The performances versus M between the ES and RSS attack strategies
on IEEE 57 bus system.
4.6.1 Performance Comparisons between the Exhaustive Search NAS
and the Reduced Search Space NAS
In this subsection, the proposed RSS node attack strategy, NASRSS, is com-
pared with the exhaustive search node attack strategy, NASES. Both node attack
strategies are tested on IEEE 57 bus system. Due to the huge search space of the
exhaustive search, we conducted experiments for NASMES with M ≤ 5. The maxi-
mum M for NASMRSS is set to 6. The comparisons between NAS
M
ES and NAS
M
RSS
are shown in Fig. 4.2. In the subplots, x-axis represents the number of TNs
(M), while y-axis represents PoDN, AIGL, and CL, respectively. In each subplot,
the solid blue-hexagram curves represents NASMES, and the dashdotted red-plus
curves represents NASMRSS. The system tolerance (α) is set to 1.5. Theoretically,
it is very difficult to analyze how close the attack performance of NASMRSS is to
that of NASMES. The CFSor under the extended model is too complex to yield
theoretical bounds for the attack performance. Therefore, researchers often judge
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Figure 4.3. The performances versus M among four node attack strategies on
IEEE 118 bus system.
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Figure 4.4. The performances versus M among four node attack strategies on
Polish transmission system.
the efficiency of different approaches based on numerical evaluation [7, 21, 24–26].
Several important observations are made from Fig. 4.2.
First, the attack performance of NASMRSS can compete with that of NAS
M
ES.
Within these subfigures, the dashdotted red-plus curves match the blue-square
solid curves in terms of the three measurement metrics. The match is reasonable,
because the TNs selected by NASMRSS are often the same as those of NAS
M
ES. We
do expect a small gap between those two approaches when M is large. Such results
are not included because performing the exhaustive search for a large M value is
computationally prohibitive.
Second, from the attackers point of view, launching attacks on a few critical
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Figure 4.5. The performances versus α among four node attack strategies on IEEE
118 bus system.
nodes will cause serious damage to power grid networks. In power grid networks,
usually there are a few critical nodes, the failure of which will cause serious enough
damage. The prior study shows that cascading failures have the power-law dis-
tribution of blackout sizes in both theoretical models and empirical blackouts [4].
Thus, from the attack perspective studying cascading failures by initially triggering
a few TNs is practicable and meaningful.
Finally, NASMRSS is an ideal substitution of NAS
M
ES. As discussed above,
the attack performance of NASMRSS is very close to that of NAS
M
ES. In addition,
it is important for attackers to determine the number of TNs (i.e. M). When
M is small, the attacker may not be able to cause serious damage to power grid
networks. When M is large, the attacker needs to take down more nodes, which
makes the attack difficult to be launched. Furthermore, increasing M will not
significantly increase the attack performance if the smaller M value already causes
large damage to power grids. More important, with appropriate parameter values,
P and R, NASMRSS has sharply-reduced complexity and is doable.
4.6.2 Comparison among Different Node Attack Strategies
In this subsection, comparisons are made among NASMriskgraph, NAS
M
load,
NASMdegree, and NAS
M
RSS on IEEE 118 bus system and Polish transmission system.
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The comparisons among these four node attack strategies are shown in Figs. 4.3,
4.4 and 4.5. In simulations, there are two important parameters for all approaches,
the number of TNs (M) and the system tolerance (α). Figs. 4.3 and 4.4 show the
change of attack performance against M , while Fig. 4.5 shows the performance
change against α. In addition, there are three subplots in each figure, which shows
the results evaluated by the three different metrics. The y-axis noted by (a), (b)
and (c) represents percentage of drop in neb-ablity, average inverse geodesic length
and connectivity loss, respectively; the x-axis represents the number of TNs in
Figs. 4.3 and 4.4, and the system tolerance in Fig. 4.5. In each subplot, the dash-
dotted red-plus curve, solid magenta-pentagram curve, solid blue-square curve and
solid green-star curve represent NASMRSS, NAS
M
riskgraph, NAS
M
load and NAS
M
degree,
respectively. For example, Fig. 4.3(a) demonstrates the comparison among the
four node attack strategies on IEEE 118 bus system, when M is set from 1 to 6, α
is set to 1.5, and results are measured by PoDN. From these figures, we have the
following observations and discussions.
First, the attack performances of NASMriskgraph are a little weaker than that of
NASMRSS, but much stronger than those of NAS
M
load and NAS
M
degree. As discussed
in Section 4.6.1, NASMRSS could be employed as the substitution of the exhaustive
search node attack strategy. From all subplots in Figs. 4.3 and 4.4, the attack
performance against M , the solid magenta-pentagram curves are very close to the
dashdotted red-plus curves, which means the attack performances of NASMriskgraph
are close to those of NASMRSS. In addition, the solid green-star curves are far from
the dashdotted red-plus curves, while the solid blue-square curves are closer than
those green-star curves, but still are not comparable with the magenta-pentagram
curves. Similar observations are made in Fig. 4.5, the attack performance against
α. In conclusion, from the attack performance perspective NASMRSS is the best
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achievable node attack strategy, and NASMdegree is the worst; while the NAS
M
riskgraph
is very close to NASMRSS, and much better than NAS
M
load and NAS
M
degree.
Second, as M increases, the regression on the attack performance of
NASMriskgraph, NAS
M
degree and NAS
M
load might occur. Such examples could be found
in Figs. 4.3 and 4.4. The reason of the regression happens is that the cascading
failure under the extended model quickly stop when the whole power grid network
is broken into more than one balanced subnets. NASMdegree and NAS
M
load do not
consider this fact and select their TNs according to the degree or load distribu-
tion. The failure of those high-degree or high-load nodes might quickly break the
whole power grid network into several subnets. For the NASMriskgraph, the regression
sometimes occurs, when the number of TNs is large, e.g. M ≥ 3. The reason is
that the NIRG is mainly reflecting the hidden relationship between a pair of nodes.
Thus, when the number of TNs increases, the TNs selected from NIRG might not
represent the strongest attacks, and then the attack performances downgrade a
little.
As a summary, when the system tolerance value is unknown, NASMriskgraph
is much stronger than NASMdegree and NAS
M
load. Furthermore, NAS
M
riskgraph has
similar performance to that of NASMRSS, but do not require performing search in
real time. In other words, after the NIRG is established, there is no need to launch
CFSor before making attacks. The major advantages of NASMriskgraph are: (a) not
requiring the knowledge of system tolerance, (b) low real-time complexity, and (c)
comparable attack performance with that of NASMRSS. Detailed comparisons are
given in Table 4.3.
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this work, we investigated cascading failures of power grids under the ex-
tended model. The major contributions are summarized as follows,
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 Proposed a new search based node attack strategy, called the reduced search
space node attack strategy, which can sharply reduce the complexity of the
exhaustive search node attack strategy, and yields the attack performance
very close to that of the exhaustive search. By using the proposed approach,
we can analyze a much bigger network than using the exhaustive search.
Furthermore, we can adjust the parameters in the proposed approach to
achieve a good balance between the complexity and the attack performance.
 Proposed a novel metric, called the risk graph, to describe the hidden re-
lationship among potential TNs in terms of causing cascading failures. In
other words, if several nodes are closely tied together in the NIRG, the si-
multaneous failure of these nodes is more likely to raise serious cascading
failures.
 Proposed a practical node attack strategy, called the riskgraph-based node
attack strategy, whose attack performance is comparable to that of the reduce
search space node attack strategy, but its complexity is extremely low when
used in real-time situations.
Although we investigated cascading failures from the attack perspective, the
results can be very useful for the research on defense side. In particular, the risk
graph is a concise and effective way to describe the criticality of nodes in power
grids. Furthermore, the RSS node attack strategy can be used to evaluate the
effectiveness of defense approaches by finding the strong attacks after a certain
defense approach is applied.
In the future work, the proposed approaches can be further improved from
several aspects. First, the risk graph shows the hidden relationship of node pairs.
The risk graph may not accurately describe the relationship among a group of
nodes, when the group size is larger than 2. We have seen the degradation of
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attack performance when M > 5. In the future, the risk graph construction proce-
dure may consider more than two-node combinations. Second, the riskgraph-based
NAS can handle the situation when each node has different tolerance factors. The
next step may be evaluating its performance after being given some practical data,
describing the distribution of tolerance factors. Third, the proposed node attack
strategies can also work on links. Therefore, the proposed approaches can be
extended to address joint-node-link attacks. Fourth, investigating the cascading
failures in large-scale power grids, e.g. the entire North America power grid bench-
mark, will be more meaningful. Fifth, the RSS node attack strategy in this work
is pretty intuitive and straightforward. As an interesting future research direc-
tion, more advanced methods could be used to improve the search efficiency and
results. For instance, dynamic programming (DP) [27] and approximate dynamic
programming (ADP) [28, 29] are the popular techniques in solving the problems
that have the properties of overlapping subproblems. Integrating them with the
search-based approach here will be an interesting and possible direction to improve
the proposed approach. Finally, we plan to investigate the risk-graph idea in as
stochastic models [30] and temporal features of cascading failures [31].
4.8 Supplementary File
4.8.1 Models for Investigating Cascading Failures
In current literatures, many simulation methods have been proposed to inves-
tigate the vulnerability of power grids [4]. Generally speaking, high-level statistical
models, e.g. the CASCADE model [32], provide some statistical and probabilistic
methods to study cascading failures; historical data methods try to find failure pat-
terns from the historical blackout records [33]; deterministic models are the most
important and prevalent models in studying the vulnerability of power grids, within
which N−x contingency analysis [10] is the biggest family; network models mainly
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employ the topological properties of power grid networks, e.g. “betweenness” and
“degree”, to mimic the power distribution in power grids.
In addition, network theory models are widely adopted to study the malicious
attack strategies against power grids. There are two prevailing network models,
the recoverable model [24] and the non-recoverable model [8]. The major difference
between them is the assumption of load definition and load redistribution after
occurrences of failures or overloading of nodes/links [9]. Under the recoverable
model, the load of each node/link is defined as betweenness [24]. To calculate the
betweenness of nodes/links, we need to find the shortest path between each pair
of generator and distribution substations. For example, if there are NG generator
and ND distribution substations, there are NG ×ND generator-distribution pairs.
The betweenness of a node/link is then defined as the number of such shortest
paths going through this node/link. When one or more nodes/links are knocked
down, the shortest paths that originally pass through them need to be detoured,
and then the load of surviving nodes/links is redistributed by recalculating the
betweenness. Compared to the recoverable model, the load of a node/link under
the non-recoverable model is defined as the multiplication of its degree with the
summation of its neighbor’s degree [8]. While a node/link is knocked down or
overloaded, the load it holds will be proportionally redistributed to its surviving
neighbors.
The Extended Model
The extended model is first discussed in [12], where net-ability was proposed
to replace the network efficiency as the measure to evaluate how well a power grid
supplies electricity. Then, the extended beteweenness was introduced in [13] to
replace the betweennees as load of nodes/links. Generally speaking, the extended
model is similar to the recoverable model [9]. We briefly summarize how to use
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the extended model to investigate the vulnerability of power grids as follows.
1. First, the DC model of power grids [17] is adopted to calculate Power Transfer
Distribution Factors (PTDFs), which represent the sensitivity of power flow
change in each transmission line for power injection/withdrawal at a pair of
nodes. In this work, PTDFs are denoted by H , a NL × NB matrix. Each
element in H , e.g. hlj (i.e. the element at lth row and jth column), reflects
the change of real power flow in link l given per unit power injection at node
j and withdrawal at the slack node. In this work, the MATPOWER [17],
a well-known Matlab based tool for solving power flow analysis problems, is
adopted to calculate PTDFs of power grids.
2. Second, power is only transmitted from generators to distribution substations
in power grids. The power flow change on link l for power injection at the
generator node (g) and withdrawal at the distribution node (d) is presented
as hgdl = hlg − hld, where hlg and hld are the elements in H at row l with
column g and d, respectively. Due to the stability and security concerns of
power grids, each transmission line has its power limitation. Thus, for each
generator-distribution node pair, the power injection at the generator side is
limited. Under the extended model, the power injection limitation of each
pair, denoted by Pgd, is defined as minl∈L(
Pmaxl
|hgdl |
), where Pmaxl is set to be 1
(p.u.).
3. Each generator-distribution node pair can raise power change more or less
in all transmission lines, which represents the power distribution under the
extended model. The accumulation of the power changes on each node/link
is the extended betweenness, including the node extended betweenness and
the link extended betweenness. In this work, the extended betweenness is
adopted as the load of nodes/links.
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4. Finally, the net-ability of a power grid network (i.e. G), denoted by E(G),
is defined as 1
NGND
∑
g∈G
∑
d∈D
Pgd
Zgd
, where Zgd is the electric distance, equiv-
alent to the impedance between the generator g and the distribution node d.
Compared with the recoverable model in [24], the electric distance replaces
the concept of the shortest path, and the net-ability replaces the concept of
the global efficiency. If the failure of nodes/links occurs, the comparison of
net-ability between before and after the failure will show how serious the fail-
ure is. In other words, the strength of an attack is measured as the reduction
in the net-ability of the power grid network caused by the attack.
To interested readers, an example on the six-bus power system in [34] is shown
here. The six-bus power system has six nodes and eleven links. In this power
system, generators have indices of 1, 2, 3 and distribution nodes have indices of
4, 5, 6. In addition, MATPOWER includes this six-bus power system as one of
its test cases. The original PTDFs of the six-node power system are shown in
Table 4.5, where n1, node 1, is selected as the slack bus. Take the generator-
distribution node pair, n2 and n4, as an example. The power flow change in l1,
link 1, caused by this pair is: hn2n4l1 = hl1n2−hl1n4 = −0.1557. Similarly, the power
flow changes in l2, l3, · · · , l11 caused by this node pair are 0.1895, -0.0338, 0.0384,
0.6904, 0.0701, 0.0453, 0.0439, -0.0055, -0.1201, -0.0399, respectively. Thus, the
power injection limitation for (n2, n4) is Pn2n4 = minl∈L(
Pmaxl
|hgdl |
) = 1.4483 (p.u.).
The original net-ability, before an attack, of this six-bus system is around 21.2.
Comparison with Other Models
IEEE PES CAMS Task Force on Understanding, Prediction, Mitigation, and
Restoration of Cascading Failures has listed a bunch of criteria in comparison of
different risk assessment methodologies to power grids [4]. Those criteria include
the accuracy of reproduction of real phenomena, the degree of dependency on large
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Table 4.5. PTDFs of the six-bus power system
Link Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 Node 6
1 0 -0.4706 -0.4026 -0.3149 -0.3217 -0.4064
2 0 -0.3149 -0.2949 -0.5044 -0.2711 -0.2960
3 0 -0.2145 -0.3026 -0.1807 -0.4072 -0.2976
4 0 0.0544 -0.3416 0.0160 -0.1057 -0.1907
5 0 0.3115 0.2154 -0.3790 0.1013 0.2208
6 0 0.0993 -0.0342 0.0292 -0.1927 -0.0266
7 0 0.0642 -0.2422 0.0189 -0.1246 -0.4100
8 0 0.0622 0.2890 0.0183 -0.1207 0.1526
9 0 -0.0077 0.3695 -0.0023 0.0150 -0.3433
10 0 -0.0034 -0.0795 0.1166 -0.1698 -0.0752
11 0 -0.0565 -0.1273 -0.0166 0.1096 -0.2467
volumes of data, the accuracy of modeling of the power system (AC or DC power
flow), and so on. From the attack perspective, we will compare the extended model
and other models based on those criteria.
From the above discussions, we know the biggest difference between the pure
topological models and the extended model is that the former are completely from
the network theory without considering the features of power systems, whereas
the latter partly root itself in electric circuit theories. For example, the definition
of the load of a node/link under the non-recoverable model [8] only considers the
degree distribution of nodes/links. If a node/link fails, its load is only redistributed
to its neighbors. This model is far from the reality in power transmission systems.
In addition, the load definition and redistribution under the recoverable model [24]
are related to the shortest paths. This model is closer to the reality than the non-
recoverable model, but still does not consider the features of power transmission
systems. Compared with the above two representative pure topological models, the
power distribution under the extended model is governed by using PTDFs following
the basic circuit theories. This means that the extended model is more accurate in
representing power distribution in power grids than the purely topological models.
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Table 4.6. The summary of different models
Network
model
Pure topological models Extended
model [13]
Pure power
flow models [10]Non-recover-
able [8]
Recover-
able [24]
Accuracy Low Low
Relatively
accurate
Accurate
Information
needed
Topology Topology
Topology
& PTDFs
Comprehensive
structure
& electrical
features
On the other side, the pure power-flow models [10] are based on circuit theo-
ries, but they are too complex to analyze cascading failures from the attack per-
spective. First, those models require more information about power grids than
other models. They not only need the topological structure of power grids, but
more electrical features, e.g. the admittance matrix and voltage distribution. Such
information is not easy to be known by attackers. Second, to analyze the vulner-
ability of power grids, pure power flow models require high computation cost.
Sometimes, this kind of analysis is computationally infeasible for a simulator with
any fidelity [4]. Meanwhile, the extended model makes several simplifications, with
which it is less complex than the pure power flow models and more suitable for cas-
cading failures analysis. In addition, there are an increasing number of researchers,
who believe that the extended model is useful in identifying critical components
in power grids [35]. The summation of different models is shown in Table 4.6.
4.8.2 Link Attack Strategies
In this section, we introduce the link attack strategy (LAS), which is similar
to node attack strategy (NAS). The links that are initially removed are referred
to as target links (TLs). Here, we will discuss the load-based LAS, the degree-
based LAS, the exhaustive search LAS, the reduced search space LAS and the
riskgraph-based LAS.
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Load-based and Degree-based Link Attack Strategies
The definition of “degree of a link” is not straight forward. We adopt the
definition in [20], in which the degree of a link is the summation of the degrees of
the two nodes that this link connects. When an attacker aims to knock down M
TLs, the degree-based LAS, denoted by LASMdegree, is shown as follows,
* LASMdegree: Select links with the top M largest degree as TLs.
We adopt the link extended betweenness as the load definition of links. The
load-based LAS, denoted by LASMload, is shown as follows,
* LASMload: Choose links with the top M largest load as TLs.
The complexity of the load-based LAS and the degree-based LAS are both 0,
because these approaches do not need to launch CFSor before selecting TLs.
Exhaustive Search Link Attack Strategy
From the attackers’ point of view, the strongest LAS is obtained by adopting
the exhaustive search, denoted by LASMES,
* LASMES: Find the M TLs, whose simultaneous failure yields the largest PoDN
under a given α.
The complexity of LASMES is (NL)
M , which is similar to (NB)
M of NASMES.
Proposed Link Attack Strategies
The proposed iterative procedures (i.e. Procedures 1, 2 and 3 in the main
manuscript) can also be adopted to investigate the attack strategy on links. The
reduced search space link attack strategy or RSS link attack strategy in short is
denoted by LASMRSS. The procedures of selecting TLs for LAS
M
RSS are similar to
selecting TNs for NASMRSS. The changes are to substitute the concepts related to
nodes with those of links. The complexity of LASMRSS is M × (NL)2.
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(a) Single Link risk graph (b) Link integrated risk graph
Figure 4.6. The link risk graphs on IEEE 118 bus system.
Similarly, the procedures for finding TLs for NASMRSS will keep a record of
round recommended combination set (RRCS), which can be used to construct link
risk graph (LRG). The procedure of constructing single LRG is similar to the
procedure of building single NRG. Instead of using link indices as labels, the labels
of vertices in the LRG are the corresponding directed links, e.g. 30→ 80. Attackers
can conduct single LRGs under different system tolerance values and combine them
to generate link integrated risk graph (LIRG). The LRG and LIRG of IEEE 118
bus system are demonstrated in Fig. 4.6.
When attackers have already obtained the LIRG of a power grid, they can
launch attacks based on the LIGR. This attack strategy is called the riskgraph-
based link attack strategy, denoted be LASMriskgraph. The procedure to select TLs
for LASMriskgraph from the LIRG is similar to that of selecting TNs for NAS
M
riskgraph
from the NIRG. In addition, the real-time complexity of LASMriskgraph is 0, because
choosing TLs from the LIRG does not require to launch CFSor.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.7. A scale-free synthetic network and its node risk graph
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Figure 4.8. The performances versus M among four node attack strategies on the
scale-free synthetic network.
4.8.3 Experiments on Synthetic Network
The scale-free complex network, which follows the power-law distribution of
nodes and has the topological similarity to real man-made networks, is one of
the important types of synthetic network [36]. A 300-node scale-free network was
generated as the test benchmark of synthetic network. Its topological structure is
shown in Fig. 4.7(a).
From the perspective of attack, the scale-free network is vulnerable to ma-
licious attacks [24]. The proposed concepts and approaches are not restricted to
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cascading failure models and types of complex networks. Due to the lack of electric
features of the synthetic networks, we could not adopt the extended model and
the corresponding measurement metrics in the main manuscript to simulate cas-
cading failures and measure the damage of attacks. Instead, we adopted another
cascading failure model, the recoverable model [24], to set up the simulations. In
addition, the network efficiency was adopted as the measure metric. The details of
the recoverable model and the network efficiency measure could be found in [9, 24].
The procedures of conducting NASMRSS and constructing risk graphs are sim-
ilar to that in the main manuscript. The difference is that the system tolerance
values for this synthetic network were chosen between 1 and 1.1. Due to the simi-
larity of experiments on nodes and links, we only conducted experiments on node
attacks. The node risk graph of the 300-node synthetic network is shown in Fig.
4.7(b). The comparison among NASMdegree, NAS
M
load, NAS
M
riskgraph and NAS
M
RSS
on the synthetic network is shown in Fig. 4.8, in which the horizontal and vertical
axes represent the number of target nodes and the network efficiency, respectively.
From the perspective of the attack performance measured by network efficiency,
the lower the network efficiency is, the stronger the attack is. The dashdotted red-
plus curve, the solid magenta-pentagram curve, the solid blue-square curve and the
solid green-star curve represent NASMRSS, NAS
M
riskgraph, NAS
M
load and NAS
M
degree,
respectively. In Fig. 4.8, we could make similar observations from the comparison
among the four node attack strategies as follows.
 The proposed NASMRSS and NAS
M
riskgraph are stronger than NAS
M
degree and
NASMload. In addition, the solid magenta-pentagram curve entirely overlaps
the dashdotted red-plus curve in Fig. 4.8, which means NASMriskgraph and
NASMRSS have the same performance on this synthetic network.
 As the number of target nodes (i.e. M) increases, the increase of the attack
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Table 4.7. Complexity analysis between the exhaustive search and the reduced
search space attack strategies
P M = 1 M = 2 M = 3 M = 4 M = 5
16  = 0  = 0  = 0.0625  = 0  = 0
32  = 0  = 0  = 0.0625  = 0.0313  = 0
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Figure 4.9. The performances versus α among the ES and RSS attack strategies
on IEEE 118 bus system.
performance becomes slow and slow. From the attackers’ perspective, choos-
ing a few critical nodes will cause serious damage to the scale-free network.
4.8.4 Additional Experiments on Power Grid networks
Additional Comparison between the Exhaustive Search NAS and the
Reduced Search Space NAS
In this subsection, we continue to compare the proposedNASMRSS withNAS
M
ES
on IEEE 118 bus system. Due to the huge search space of the exhaustive search,
we conducted experiments for NASMES with M ≤ 3. The maximum M for NASMRSS
is set to 6. The results are shown in Fig. 4.9. Based on the subplots, it is clearly
seen that the dashdotted red-plus curves, representing NASMRSS, exactly match the
blue-square solid curves, representing NASMES, in terms of the three measurement
metrics. The match demonstrate that The TNs of NASMRSS, when M = 1, 2, 3,
are the same as those of NASMES, which can be verified from Table I and Table II
in the main manuscript. In other words, from the perspective of performance the
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Figure 4.10. The performances versus α among four node attack strategies on
IEEE 300 bus system
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Figure 4.11. The performances versus M among four link attack strategies on
IEEE 118 bus system
proposed NASMRSS is comparable to NAS
M
ES.
In addition, let SetMES denote the set of M -node combination, identified as
top R strongest attacks by NSAMES, and Set
M
RSS denotes the set of M -node com-
binations, identified as top R strongest attacks by NSAMRSS. We compare Set
M
ES
with SetMRSS. We define R
′ as the number of elements that are in SetMRSS but not
in SetMES. In other words, the reduced space search attack strategy would miss R
′
strong attacks, which would otherwise be found by the exhaustive search attack
strategy. Then, we define metric  as,
 =
R′
R
(4.4)
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Figure 4.12. The performances versus α among four link attack strategies on IEEE
118 bus system
When  = 0, the NSAMRSS did ont miss any top R strongest attacks. The
larger  is, the more attacks are missed by the NSAMRSS. On IEEE 57 bus system,
we obtained  through simulations, when M is set to be 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, and R is
set to be 16 and 32, respectively. The results of  are shown in the following Table
4.7.
We made two observations according to Table 4.7. First,  is small, meaning
that the NSAMRSS captures most strong attacks. Second,  is not necessarily larger
for larger M values. Recall that NSAMRSS is conducted in M rounds, and the top
M -node combinations are based on the top (M − 1)-node combinations. Take
M = 4 as an example. In third round, assume the strong 3-node combination
{a, b, c} is missed by the NSAMRSS. In fourth round, will the NSAMRSS surely miss
the combination {a, b, c, d}, assuming {a, b, c, d} is a strong 4-node combination?
The answer is sometimes no. This is because a subset of {b, c, d} could be included
in Set3RSS, and {a, b, c, d} can still be discovered in round 4.
Table 4.8. Description of IEEE 300 bus system.
Test benchmark NB NL NG ND
IEEE 300 Bus System 300 411 69 191
106
Additional Comparison Among Node Attack Strategies
By adjusting the two parameters, P and R, the proposed node attack strate-
gies can be used to launch attacks on different sizes of power grid networks.
Here, we choose a moderate-scale power grid network, IEEE 300 bus system, to
test the four node attack strategies, which are NASMRSS, NAS
M
riskgraph, NAS
M
load
and NASMdegree. The description of IEEE 300 bus system, included in MAT-
POWER [17], is shown in Table 4.8. The experiment results are demonstrated
in Fig. 4.10. The observations from Fig. 4.10 are consistent with those in the
main manuscript.
Comparisons among Link Attack Strategies
In this subsection, comparisons are made among LASMRSS, LAS
M
riskgraph,
LASMload and LAS
M
degree on IEEE 118 bus system. There are two important pa-
rameters for comparing different link attack strategies, the number of TNs (M)
and the system tolerance (α). Fig. 4.11 demonstrates the change of attack per-
formance against M , while Fig. 4.12 shows the change of attack performance
against α. In addition, there are three subplots in each figure, which shows the
results evaluated by the three different metrics, percentage of drop in neb-ablity,
average inverse geodesic length and connectivity loss. In each subplot, the dash-
dotted red-plus curve, solid magenta-pentagram curve, solid blue-square curve and
solid green-star curve represent LASMRSS, LAS
M
riskgraph, LAS
M
load and LAS
M
degree, re-
spectively. According to these figures, we have the following observations and
discussions on link attack strategies.
First, the performance of the proposed LASMriskgraph is close to that of LAS
M
RSS,
and much better than those of the LASMdegree and LAS
M
load. In addition, LAS
M
riskgraph
can represent one of the best performances availably by adopting search-based
approaches.
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Second, as the number of TLs (i.e. M) increases, fluctuations occur in the
performances of LASMriskgraph, LAS
M
load and LAS
M
degree. The reason for the latter two
is that the metrics, degree and load, only explore the information of grid networks
before cascading failures. However, cascading failures are very complex and can
not easily predicted by these simple metrics. While, the reason of LASMriskgraph is
that the construction of link risk graphs only considers the relationship between a
pair of links. However, when M ≥ 3, the TLs from LIRG might not stand for the
strongest attacks, therefore the attack performance downgrades a little.
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5.1 Abstract
The smart grids are often run near the operational limits because of increas-
ing electricity demand, where even small disturbances could possibly trigger major
blackouts. The attacks are the potential threats to trigger large-scale cascad-
ing failures in the smart grid. Specifically, the attacks mean to make substa-
tions/transmission lines lose functionality by either physical sabotages or cyber
attacks. Previously, the attacks are investigated from node-only/link-only per-
spectives, assuming attacks can only occur on substations/transmission lines. In
this work, we introduce the joint-substation-transmission-line perspective, which
assumes attacks can happen on substations, transmission lines, or both. The
introduced perspective is a nature extension to substation-only and transmission-
line-only perspectives. Such extension leads to discovering many joint-substation-
transmission-line vulnerabilities. Furthermore, we investigate the joint-substation-
transmission-line attack strategies. In particular, we design a new metric, the
component interdependency graph (CIG), and propose the CIG-based attack strat-
egy. In simulations, we adopt IEEE 30 bus system, IEEE 118 bus system and
Bay Area power grid as test benchmarks, and use the extended degree-based and
load attack strategies as comparison schemes. The CIG-based attack strategy has
stronger attack performance.
5.2 Introduction
The U.S. power grid has been developing over a century and becomes to a
extremely complicated system that has more than 55,000 substations and nearly
500,000 kilometers of transmission lines. Such a complex system likely experi-
ences severe blackouts, which cause catastrophe to modern societies. For instance,
Northeastern blackout of 2003 left more than 55 million people in dark for days
and resulted in estimated 10 billion economic loss [1, 2]. The emergence of the
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“Smart Grid”, the next-generation power transmission system [3], can significantly
increase the risks of system failures caused by errors from computer software and
hardware [4], cyber intrusions [5], and so on.
Generally speaking, large-scale blackouts are resulted from the cascading fail-
ure in power transmission systems [4, 6]. The triggers of cascading failures are
various and mainly include random causes and malicious attacks. First, there are
a wide variety of exogenous causes that can trigger cascading failures. Such causes
include natural disasters [7] (e.g., earthquakes, storms, blizzards, tornadoes, etc.),
errors from computer hardware and software [4], misoperation from operators,
vegetation sagging [1], increasing energy demand [8], and so on. In existing power
systems, although the failures resulted from random causes have been considered,
major blackouts are still inevitable.
Second, different from random causes, malicious attacks can be manipulated.
The well-designed attack strategies can choose a few critical components (i.e.,
substations and transmission lines) as targets. Successfully attacking these tar-
gets can trigger large-scale failures and severely weaken power transmission sys-
tems [9, 10, 14]. People who want to conduct attacks are referred to as attackers,
including computer hackers, terrorist groups, disgruntled individuals, or hostile
countries. Malicious attacks can be initiated by physical sabotages [20] or cyber
intrusions [5, 21]. In reality, physical sabotages includes individual attacks on
high-voltage transmission lines [22] and powerful EMP attacks from hostile coun-
tries [20]. Cyber intrusions are prevailing in smart grids [5] and can intentionally
destroy targets. Examples include “Aurora Generator Test” [23]. Conducted by
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2007, this simulated cyber attack suc-
cessfully damaged a $ 1 million dollar large diesel-electric generator. The destroyed
generator is similar to many now in use throughout the U.S., which demonstrates
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the high possibility of cyber threats to the U.S. power grid. Although malicious
attacks have not yet resulted in large-scale blackouts, such attacks are greatly
potential to trigger big events [24].
In this work, we study malicious attacks against the power transmission sys-
tem. In particular, we introduce a new perspective to investigate the vulnerability
of power grids.
In the current literatures [9–11, 14], substations are referred to as nodes ;
transmission lines are referred to as links. Attacks against power systems have been
mainly investigated from node-only perspective [13, 16] and link-only perspective
[17, 25, 26], which assume attacks occur on nodes and links individually. It is
obvious that existing studies miss an important perspective: joint-node-link, which
assumes attacks can occur on nodes and links concurrently. This perspective is a
nature extension of node-only and link-only perspectives and has great impact on
investigating power grid vulnerabilities.
The advantages of joint-node-link perspective are threefold. First, such per-
spective can reveal the complex mechanisms of failure propagation in power sys-
tems. In existing major blackout cases [1, 8], tripping of transmission lines can
shut down power plants; failures of substations can trip transmission lines. Second,
vulnerability analysis from the joint-node-link perspective can discover new vulner-
abilities. Finally, from the attack’s point of view, the joint-node-link perspective
is insightful to find strong attack strategies.
In this work, we introduce the joint-node-link perspective to conduct the vul-
nerability analysis of power systems. In particular, we have done the following
works.
 Adopt the extended model [18] to set up the cascading failure simulator
(CFS) that can mimic the failures on both nodes and links.
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 Conduct the vulnerability analysis from the joint-node-link perspective, and
find extensive number of joint-node-link combinations that can yield severe
damage.
 Design a new metric, called component interdependency graph (CIG), to re-
veal the relationship among critical nodes and links from the attack’s per-
spective.
 Propose a novel joint-node-link attack strategy, called the CIG-based attack
strategy. The proposed scheme can choose both nodes and links as target
components (TCs).
 Perform extensive simulations to demonstrate the proposed CIG-based attack
strategy. Specifically, we adopt IEEE 30 bus system, IEEE 118 bus system
and Bay Area power grid as test benchmarks, and the extended degree-based
and load-based attack strategies as comparison schemes. Experiment results
show the CIG-based attack strategy has stronger attack performances.
The major contributions are (1) revealing many vulnerabilities that are not
previously demonstrated; (2) designing a new metric, CIG; (3) proposing the CIG-
based joint-node-link attack strategy.
This work is organized as follows. The related work is given in Section 5.3. In
Section 5.4, we briefly introduce the system model, including the extended model
and the cascading failure simulator. In Section 5.5, we demonstrate joint-node-
link vulnerabilities. In Section 5.6, we construct a new metric, called component
interdependency graph (CIG), and propose the CIG-based attack strategy. Section
5.7 includes all experiments and performance comparisons, followed by concluding
this work in Section 6.8.
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5.3 Related Work
In existing works, investigating attacks on power systems is mainly addressed
from three angles: cascading failure models, metrics development, target selection
on nodes or links.
Roughly speaking, cascading failure models include three categories, topo-
logical models [9, 10, 12, 14], power-flow models [16, 17, 26, 27] and the hybrid
model [18]. Although topological models are useful to study new attack strate-
gies [16], these models are far from mimicking power dynamics in power transmis-
sion systems, because they largely ignore the electric engineering properties [28].
Power-flow models, including ac and dc models, are accurate to mimic cascading
failures. Such models, however, require the detailed information of power systems
and need intensive computation [4]. The hybrid model is set up by combining
complex network theory and power flows [18]. This model is less complex, as well
as needing less information, than power-flow models, and more accurate than topo-
logical models. We compare this work with some representative works in Table
5.1. The first three columns show the models using in each work. In this work, we
adopt the hybrid model in [18] to study cascading failures.
Many metrics have been developed to help attackers identify target compo-
nents (i.e., target nodes or target links). Two metrics, degree and load, are pre-
dominant [9, 14–16, 16, 29]. They are developed by employing the structure or
initial load information of power grids. Complicated metrics include risk if failure
(RIF) [10], load distribution vector (LDV) [12], geographic information [13], risk
graph [19], etc. Although complicated metrics are useful to find strong attack
strategies, they are not prevailingly validated under different models. In Table 5.1,
we show the metrics investigated in each work from the fifth column to the twelfth
column. In this work, we compare the proposed metric, CIG, with the metrics,
117
T
ab
le
5.
1.
S
u
m
m
ar
y
of
ty
p
ic
al
w
or
k
s
in
st
u
d
y
in
g
at
ta
ck
s
on
p
ow
er
gr
id
s
R
ef
er
en
ce
C
as
ca
d
in
g
fa
il
u
re
m
o
d
el
s
M
et
ri
cs
T
ar
ge
t
co
m
p
on
en
ts
T
op
ol
og
ic
al
m
o
d
el
s
P
ow
er
-fl
ow
m
o
d
el
s
H
y
b
ri
d
m
o
d
el
s
R
an
d
om
se
le
ct
io
n
d
eg
re
e
lo
ad
R
IF
L
D
V
G
eo
gr
ap
h
ic
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
R
is
k
gr
ap
h
C
IG
N
o
d
e
L
in
k
N
o
d
e
&
li
n
k
[9
]
X
X
X
[1
0]
X
X
X
X
X
[1
1]
X
X
X
X
X
[1
2]
X
X
X
X
X
[1
3]
X
X
X
X
[1
4]
X
X
X
X
X
[1
5]
X
X
X
X
X
[1
6]
X
X
X
X
X
[1
7]
X
X
X
[1
8]
X
X
X
X
[1
9]
X
X
X
X
P
ro
p
os
ed
w
or
k
X
X
X
X
X
118
degree and load, in terms of studying joint-node-link attack strategies.
As discussed in Introduction, lots of studies focus on node-only investiga-
tion [9–11, 13, 14, 29]; many studies highlight link-only investigation [17, 25, 26];
only a few studies discuss the investigation on both nodes and links [12, 15, 18, 30],
but individually. It is obvious that existing works are not comprehensive, because
they miss an important direction, which is conducting vulnerability analysis from
the joint-node-link perspective. The last three columns in Table 5.1 clearly demon-
strate one significant difference between this work and existing works.
5.4 System Model
5.4.1 Grid Network
In this work, the grid is represented as a network H, where H = {N ,L}. N
is the set of nodes (i.e., substations); L is the set of links (i.e., transmission lines).
Nodes are divided into three groups, generation nodes (supplying power), demand
nodes (delivering power to customers), and transmission nodes. Let G denote the
set of generation nodes (G ⊆ N ); let D denote the set of demand nodes (D ⊆ N ).
Let KN , KL, KG and KD represent the number of nodes, links, generator nodes
and demand nodes, respectively. In addition, let ni denote node i (ni ∈ N ) and lj
denote link j (li ∈ L).
5.4.2 The Extended Model
The hybrid model in [18] is referred to as the extended model in this work.
This model was originally developed in [18, 31]. Generally speaking, using the
extended model to mimic the load distribution in the power grid is conducted as
follows.
 Inputs : the topology, the admittance matrix of links and the types of nodes.
For IEEE standard benchmarks [32], these information is included. For the
Bay Area power grid, these information can be estimated from the raw GIS
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data (discussed in Section 5.7.1).
 Outputs : the extended betweenness and the net-ability. The extended be-
tweenness is used to model the load of nodes/links; the net-ability represents
how well the system works to supply power.
We briefly introduce the extended model as follows. For interested readers,
more details can be found in [18, 31].
First, power transfer distribution factors (PTDFs) matrix is one of dc power-
flow analysis methods [33]. Let F denote the PTDFs matrix, whose size is KL ×
KN . Each element in F, e.g., fji, represents the power change in lj when a unit
power is injected at ni and withdrew at the reference node [32].
Second, the extended betweennes (EB) is developed to model the load of a
node/link, which is calculated as follows.
 In power systems, power is transmitted from generation nodes to demand
nodes. Therefore, each generation-demand-node pair can cause power change
in links. Let g denote a generation node (g ∈ G); let d denote a demand node
(d ∈ D). Let f jgd denote the power change in lj (link j) caused by the pair
of g and d. f jgd is defined as,
f jgd = fjg − fjd (5.1)
where fjg and fjd are the elements in F at lj row gth column and lj row dth
column, respectively.
 Each link, e.g., lj, has its own power flow limit, denoted by P
max
lj
. For the
pair of g and d, let Pgd denote the capacity of power transmission between
them. In order to secure all links, Pgd is defined as,
Pgd = min
lj∈L
(
Pmaxlj
|f jgd|
) (5.2)
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 The overall power distribution is determined by all generation-demand-node
pairs. For a link, e.g., lj, let EBlj denote its EB. EBlj is defined as,
EBli = max(EB
+(li), |EB−(li)|) (5.3)
where EB+(li) represents the positive EB of li and EB
−(li) represents neg-
ative EB of li,
EB+(lj) =
∑
g∈G
∑
d∈D Pgdf
j
gd iff
j
gd > 0
EB−(lj) =
∑
g∈G
∑
d∈D Pgdf
i
gd iff
j
gd < 0
For a node, e.g., ni, let EBni denote its EB. EBni is defined as,
EBni =
1
2
∑
g∈G
∑
d∈D
Pgd
∑
lj∈L
|f jgk|, nj 6= g 6= k (5.4)
EBni is half of the summation of power flows in the links connecting ni.
Finally, the net-ability is used to evaluate how well the power system can
supply power. Let E(H) denote the net-ability of the power system H. E(H) is
defined as [31],
E(H) = 1
KG ×KD
∑
g∈G
∑
d∈D
Pgd
Zgd
(5.5)
where Zgd is the electric distance, equivalent to the impedance between the gener-
ation node g and the demand node d.
5.4.3 Cascading Failure Simulator
In our previous works [19, 34], we set up cascading failure simulator (CFS) for
node-only failures in the extended model. In this work, we extend the CFS in [34]
to study failures on both nodes and links. The extended CFS is demonstrated in
Algorithm 1. We briefly explain it as follows.
1. Load : We adopt the EB to model the load of nodes/links. The EB before
removals (or attacks) is called the initial load. After the occurrence of re-
movals, the entire grid might be broken into subgrids. We recalculate the
EB for all nodes/links in each subgrid separately, and update the load.
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Function CFS(H, α, RL)
Input: Input parameters
H: the Power grid network, with KN nodes and KL links
α: system tolerance
RL: the list of target components
Output: PoDN, CL
/* Obtain the initial load for all components */
Calculate initial extended betweenness for all components in H;
EBinitN ← Nodes’ initial extended betweenness ;
EBinitL ← Links’ initial extended betweenness ;
/* Calculate the capacity for all components */
CN ← α×EBinitN ;
CL ← α×EBinitL ;
/* Failed Component List: FCL */
FCL ← RL ;
overloading ← 1 ;
while overloading do
overloading ← 0 ;
H′ ← H by removing all components in FCL ;
Calculate new extended betweenness for all components in H′ ;
EBnewN ← Nodes’ new extended betweenness ;
EBnewL ← Links’ new extended betweenness ;
for i = 1, ...,KN do
if EBnewN (i) > CN (i) then /* Node i is overloaded. */
overloading ← 1 ;
FCL ← FCL ∪ node i ;
end if
end for
for j = 1, ...,KL do
if EBnewL (j) > CL(j) then /* Link j is overloaded. */
overloading ← 1 ;
FCL ← FCL ∪ link j ;
end if
end for
end while
/* Cascading failures stop and measure the damage. */
Measure the damage caused by the initial removals in terms of PoDN and
CL.
end
Algorithm 1: Cascading Failure Simulator
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2. System Tolerance: We assume each substation/transmission line has the
capacity, i.e., the maximum load it can tolerate [14]. The capacity of a
node/link is proportional to its initial load. We introduce α to denote the
proportional rate or system tolerance. For simplicity, α is assumed to be the
same for all components [9, 14, 15].
3. Overloading : In the CFS, we check the overloading round by round. Within
each round, we do the following steps. First, update the load for all com-
ponents. Second, check the overloading for each node/link. If the load of a
node/link in this round exceeds its capacity, this node/link is overloaded. If
a link is overloaded, remove this link; if a node is overloaded, remove this
node and all links connecting this node. Third, if there are not overloaded
components in this round, the CFS stops; otherwise, the CFS continues for
next round.
5.4.4 Assessment Measures
In this work, we adopt two measures to evaluate the damage caused by the
attack. The primary measure is percentage of drop in net-ability (PoDN), which
is defined as [18],
PoDN =
E(H)− E(H′)
E(H) (5.6)
where E(H) represents the net-ability before the attack and E(H′) represents the
net-ability after the attack. The larger PoDN is, the stronger the attack is.
The secondary measure is connectivity loss (CL), which is defined as [11],
CL = 1− 〈K
d
G
KG
〉
d
(5.7)
where KG is the number of total generation nodes, and KdG is the number of gen-
eration nodes connecting the demand node d. The averaging, 〈•〉, is conducted
over all remaining demand nodes after cascading failures. CL can evaluate how
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Table 5.2. Joint-node-link vulnerability analysis on IEEE 30 bus system
M -component
combination
Node-only Link-only Joint-node-link
# of
combinations
% of
vulnerabilities
# of
combinations
% of
vulnerabilities
# of
combinations
% of
vulnerabilities
M = 2 435 18.91% 820 33.13% 1,230 47.95%
M = 3 4,060 7.61% 10,660 18.59% 42,435 73.8%
M = 4 27,405 2.94% 101,270 10.35% 842,960 86.71%
well demand nodes structurally connect to generation nodes. The larger CL is, the
stronger the attack is.
5.4.5 Summary
In this work, attacking/removing a node/link means to disconnect it from
the entire grid. Investigating the strength of attacking targets (i.e., nodes, links,
or both) is conducted through the CFS by removing targets to trigger cascad-
ing failures. The CFS adopts the extended betweenness to represent the load of
nodes/links. Cascading failures occur when the load of a node/link exceeds its ca-
pacity, which is calculated by multiplying the system tolerance (α) with the initial
load of the node/link. When the CFS stops, the damage is evaluated in terms of
PoDN and CL.
5.5 Joint-node-link Vulnerability Analysis
5.5.1 Concepts of Combinations and Vulnerabilities
Before demonstrating joint-node-link vulnerabilities, we briefly introduce sev-
eral concepts as follows.
 A multiple-component combination is referred to as a group of nodes, links
or both. We conduct vulnerability analysis based on such combinations.
 In simulations, we perform the removals for a multiple-component combina-
tion to possibly trigger cascading failures. The strength of this combination
is referred to as the damage, e.g., measured by PoDN in Equ. 5.6, after the
cascading failure.
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 The vulnerability of the power grid has broad meanings. In particular, we
define vulnerabilities as the multiple-component combinations that can yield
large strength.
 Node-only vulnerabilities are referred to as the node-only combinations with
large strengths.
 Link-only vulnerabilities are referred to as the link-only combinations with
large strengths.
 Joint-node-link vulnerabilities are referred to as the joint-node-link combina-
tions with large strengths.
5.5.2 Demonstration of Joint-node-link Vulnerabilities
We adopt IEEE 30 bus system [32] as the test benchmark for demonstration.
This power system consists of 30 nodes (i.e., KN = 30) and 41 links (i.e., KL = 41).
There are in total 71 power network components (i.e., nodes and links). We label
the nodes from n1 to n30 and the links l1 to l41 for discussion.
For demonstration, referring to the combination consisting of M components,
there are in total
(
KN+KL
M
)
M -component combinations. We divide these combina-
tions into three categories as follows.
 Node-only combination: The combination consists of nodes only. There are
in total
(
KN
M
)
such node-only combinations.
 Link-only combination: The combination consists of links only. There are in
total
(
KL
M
)
such link-only combinations.
 Joint-node-link combination: The combination includes at least one node
and at least one link. In other words, except node-only and link-only com-
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Table 5.3. Top Ten strongest combinations in IEEE 30 bus system
Index Two-component Three-component Four-component
1 n6,l37 l6,l22,l29 n5,n12,n21,l3
2 n6,l38 n5,n6,l37 n5,n12,l3,l28
3 n5,n6 n5,n6,l38 n5,n18,l6,l29
4 n6,n7 n6,n7,l37 n5,n21,l6,l22
5 n6,l5 n6,n7,l38 n7,n12,l3,l29
6 n6,l8 n6,l5,l37 n9,n13,n30,l2
7 n6,l39 n6,l5,l38 n9,n30,l2,l16
8 l6,l29 n6,l8,l37 n11,l6,l22,l29
9 n6,n9 n6,l8,l38 n12,n21,l3,l5
10 n6,n11 n6,n9,l37 n12,n21,l3,l8
binations, the remaining combinations are the joint-node-link combinations.
There are in total
(
KN+KL
M
)−(KN
M
)−(KL
M
)
such joint-node-link combinations.
In particular, we study all two-component, three-component and four-
component combinations, i.e., M = 2, 3, 4. Take M = 2 as an example. In
IEEE 30 bus system, there are in total
(
71
2
)
= 2,485 two-component combinations.(
30
2
)
= 435 of them are node-only combinations;
(
41
2
)
= 820 of them are link-only
combinations; the reminding 1,230 of them are joint-node-link combinations.
Furthermore, for each two-component combination, we remove these two com-
ponents in the CFS to possibly trigger cascading failures. When the CFS stop, the
strength is evaluated in terms of PoDN. We introduce the threshold η to quantify
the strong attack. Specifically, when PoDN ≥ η, the multiple-component combi-
nation yields strong attack performance. We are interesting in these combinations
yielding strengths. Numerically, we set η to be 0.2 (20% drop in net-ability is an
important sign of system failure [30]). Among all 2,485 two-component combina-
tions, there are 1,606 strong attacks, where joint-node-link vulnerabilities account
for 47.95%, node-only vulnerabilities account for 18.91%, and link-only vulnerabil-
ities account for 33.13%.
We conduct similar study for all three-component combinations and four-
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component combinations, respectively. The analytical results are showed in Table
5.2. In addition, in Table 5.3 we show these combinations that yield top ten largest
PoDN values. These combinations represent the strongest attack performances.
Based on Tables 5.2 and 5.3, we have the following observations regarding joint-
node-link vulnerability analysis.
 The joint-node-link perspective can significantly enlarge the number of
multiple-component combinations. In Table 5.2, it is apparent that the num-
ber of joint-node-link combinations is much larger than those of node-only
combinations and link-only combinations. For instance, when M = 4, there
are 842,960 joint-node-link combinations. This number is much larger than
27,405 node-only combinations and 101,270 link-only combinations.
 Joint-node-link vulnerabilities contribute to a big portion of entire vulnera-
bilities. Seen from Table 5.2, joint-node-link vulnerabilities account for the
biggest portion and increase sharply, from 47.95% at M = 2 to 86.71% at
M = 4.
 Joint-node-link combinations can yield top strongest strengths. In Table 5.3,
for instance, 6 out of 10 two-component combinations, 9 out of 10 three-
component combinations and all 10 four-component combinations consist
of both nodes and links. In other words, joint-node-link combinations can
yield large strengths, even larger than those of the strongest node-only and
link-only combinations.
In summary, joint-node-link combinations are of importance to investigate
vulnerabilities and attack strategies in power transmission systems.
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Input: H = {N ,L}, α, P , and Q
SetCNs ← ∅ , SetCLs ← ∅
Set1RCC ← ∅
xi ← 0 , 1 ≤ i ≤ KN
yj ← 0 , 1 ≤ j ≤ KL
for i = 1, ...,KN do
PoDN = CFS( G, α, RL = [node i])
xi = PoDN
end
for j = 1, ...,KL do
PoDN = CFS( H, α, RL = [link j])
yj = PoDN
end
N ′ ← sort N descendingly according to x
L′ ← sort L descendingly according to y
SetCNs ← first P nodes in N ′
SetCLs ← first P links in L′
Set1RCC ← first Q nodes in N
′ ∪ first Q links in L′
Algorithm 2: Iteration initialization
5.6 Joint-node-link Attack Strategy
In this section, we introduce joint-node-link attack strategies, which are re-
ferred to as the methods that can select both nodes and links together as target
components (TCs). In particular, we design a new metric, called the component
interdependency graph (CIG), and propose the joint-node-link attack strategy.
We introduce the design of CIG in Section 5.6.1 and the CIG-based joint-node-
link attack strategy in Section 5.6.2.In Section 5.6.3 we extend existing load-based
and degree-based node-only/link-only attack strategies to the load-based/degree-
based joint-node-link attack strategies.
5.6.1 Introduction to Component Interdependency Graph
In our previous works [19, 34], we introduced the metric, risk graph (RG),
which could be adopted to design strong node-only/link-only attack strategies.
Previously, RGs of nodes and links were constructed separately. These RGs cannot
accurately reveal the relationship among nodes and links in terms of finding joint-
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Input: H = {N ,L}, α, P , Q, SetCNs, SetCLs, and Setm−1RCC
SetmRCC ← ∅
/* Temporary combination set Settmp. */
Settmp ← ∅
for i = 1, ...,m×Q do
RCCi ← the ith combination in Setm−1RCC
for j = 1, ..., P do
cnj ← the jth candidate node in SetCNs
/* Obtain a new component combination */
newCombination← RCCi ∪ cnj
Settmp ← Settmp ∪ newCombination
end
for j = 1, ..., P do
clj ← the jth candidate link in SetCLs
/* Obtain a new component combination */
newCombination← RCCi ∪ clj
Settmp ← Settmp ∪ newCombination
end
end
/* There are m×Q× 2P new combinations in Settmp. */
zo ← 0 , 1 ≤ o ≤ m×Q× 2P
for o = 1, ...,m×Q× 2P do
RL ← the oth combination in Settmp
PoDN = CFS( H, α, RL)
zj = PoDN
end
Set
′
tmp ← sort Settmp descendingly according to z
/* Determine m+ 1 groups for SetmRCC. */
for k = 1, ...,m+ 1 do
SetmRCC ← SetmRCC∪ first Q combinations in Set
′
tmp, each of which consists
of k − 1 nodes and m− k + 1 links.
end
Finally, SetmRCC includes (m+ 1)× P combinations.
Algorithm 3: Find SetmRCC under given Set
m−1
RCC (2 ≤ m ≤M)
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node-link combinations with strong strengths. In this work, we generalize the idea
of RG to the idea of CIG for specifically investigating the joint-node-link attack
strategy.
Iterative Procedure
The iterative procedure in [34] is very useful to obtain node-only/link-only
combinations that can yield strong strengths. This rationale can be generalized
to obtain joint-node-link combinations that can yield strong strengths. Briefly
speaking, we make two modifications. First, we extend the procedure of finding
node-only/link-only combinations to obtain joint-node-link combinations. Second,
we change the conditions to keep the required multiple-component combinations.
The new conditions are (1) the strengths of the kept combinations are as large as
possible, (2) the number of links in final combinations should be equal to that of
nodes, the goal of which is to balance numbers of links and nodes.
The modified procedure is presented in Algorithms 2 and 3. In particular,
Algorithm 2 is to initialize the iteration; Algorithm 3 shows the details of one-
round iteration. Introduction of the iterative procedure is given as follows.
 Suppose the power network has KN nodes and KL links, where there are in
total KN +KL grid components.
 Suppose the iterative procedure has M rounds, including an initial round
(i.e., 1st round) and M − 1 iteration rounds (i.e., from the 2nd round to the
M th round). In each round, the task is to choose the multiple-component
combinations that meet the two aforementioned conditions. The chosen com-
binations are referred to as round chosen combination set (RCCS), denoted
by SetRCC . The combinations chosen in each round, e.g., the m
th round
(1 ≤ m ≤M), is denoted by SetmRCC .
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Table 5.4. An realization of RCCS on IEEE 30 bus system
Index Set1RCC Set
2
RCC Set
3
RCC Set
4
RCC Set
5
RCC Set
6
RCC
1 n6 n6,n7 n6,n7,n9 n5,n6,n7,n9 n5,n6,n7,n9,n11 n3,n6,n7,n9,n11,n18
2 n9 n5,n6 n5,n6,n7 n6,n7,n9,n11 n6,n7,n9,n11,n18 n3,n5,n6,n7,n9,n18
3 n10 n6,n9 n6,n7,n11 n5,n6,n7,n11 n5,n6,n7,n9,n18 n3,n5,n6,n7,n11,n18
4 n15 n6,n21 n5,n6,n9 n5,n6,n9,n11 n5,n6,n7,n11,n18 n5,n6,n7,n9,n11,n18
5 l6 n6,l37 n6,n7,l37 n6,n7,n9,l37 n5,n6,n7,n9,l37 n5,n6,n7,n9,n11,l37
6 l11 n6,l6 n5,n6,l37 n5,n6,n7,l37 n6,n7,n9,n11,l37 n5,n6,n7,n9,n11,l6
7 l14 n6,l11 n6,n9,l37 n6,n7,n11,l37 n5,n6,n7,n11,l37 n5,n6,n7,n9,n11,l11
8 l3 n6,l14 n6,n21,l37 n5,n6,n9,l37 n5,n6,n9,n11,l37 n5,n6,n7,n9,n11,l14
9 l6,l29 n6,l6,l37 n6,n7,l6,l37 n6,n7,n9,l6,l37 n5,n6,n7,n9,l6,l37
10 l3,l11 n6,l11,l37 n6,n7,l11,l37 n6,n7,n9,l11,l37 n5,n6,n7,n9,l11,l37
11 l3,l14 n6,l14,l37 n6,n7,l14,l37 n6,n7,n9,l14,l37 n5,n6,n7,n9,l14,l37
12 l6,l36 n6,l3,l37 n6,n7,l3,l37 n6,n7,n9,l3,l37 n5,n6,n7,n9,l3,l37
13 l6,l22,l29 n11,l6,l22,l29 n6,n7,l6,l11,l37 n6,n7,n9,l6,l11,l37
14 l6,l29,l35 n6,l6,l11,l37 n6,n7,l6,l14,l37 n6,n7,n9,l6,l14,l37
15 l6,l29,l32 n6,l6,l14,l37 n6,n7,l3,l6,l37 n6,n7,n9,l3,l6,l37
16 l6,l26,l29 n6,l3,l6,l37 n6,n7,l6,l29,l37 n6,n7,n9,l6,l29,l37
17 l6,l19,l22,l29 n6,l6,l11,l14,l37 n6,n7,l6,l11,l14,l37
18 l6,l22,l29,l35 n6,l3,l6,l11,l37 n6,n7,l3,l6,l11,l37
19 l6,l16,l29,l35 n6,l6,l11,l29,l37 n6,n7,l6,l11,l29,l37
20 l6,l26,l29,l35 n6,l6,l11,l28,l37 n6,n7,l6,l11,l28,l37
21 l6,l16,l29,l35,l37 n13,l6,l16,l29,l35,l37
22 l1,l6,l22,l29,l35 n11,l6,l16,l29,l35,l37
23 l3,l6,l16,l29,l35 n29,l3,l6,l16,l29,l35
24 l6,l16,l29,l35,l41 n6,l3,l6,l11,l14,l37
25 l6,l16,l29,l35,l37,l41
26 l6,l16,l26,l29,l35,l37
27 l3,l6,l16,l28,l29,l35
28 l3,l6,l7,l16,l29,l35
 In the 1st round, the procedure is initialized, which is shown in Algorithm 2.
The initialization process is conducted as follows. First, set up the system
tolerance α and conduct all one-node and one-link attacks. Second, among
all one-node attacks, select P nodes with top largest attack strengths as can-
didate nodes, denoted by SetCNs; among all one-link attacks, select P links
with top largest strengths as candidate links, denoted by SetCLs. (Briefly
speaking, we select these critical nodes and links as candidate nodes and
links.) Finally, we determine Set1RCC by selecting Q nodes with top largest
attack strengths among all nodes, as well as selecting Q links similarly.
 In the following each found, e.g., the mth round, SetmRCC is determined, which
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is shown in Algorithm 3. In particular, SetmRCC includes (m+ 1) groups, and
each group includes Q multiple-component combinations. In other words,
there are in total Q × (m + 1) combinations in SetmRCC . In the kth group
(1 ≤ k ≤ m + 1), the combination consists of k − 1 nodes and m − k + 1
links. For instance, when m = 4 and k = 2, Set4RCC has 5 groups, and the
combination in the 2nd group consists of 2 nodes and 2 links. The rationale
behind this design is to ensure that the number of links is the same as that
of nodes in SetmRCC .
 When the iterative procedure stops, the determined SetRCC includes
{Set1RCC , Set2RCC , ..., SetMRCC}.
In particular, based on the aforementioned discussions, the proposed iterative
procedure in this work is different from that in [34] in two aspects. First, we
initialize the iteration, in the first round, by selecting both candidate nodes and
candidate links, denoted by SetCNs and SetCLs, respectively. Also, Set
1
RCC includes
equal numbers of first round chosen nodes and links. Previously, we only considered
the scenario of node-only/link-only combinations [34]. Second, we keep Q×(m+1)
combinations in each iteration round, which increases as m increases. Nodes and
links can cause different damages to the power system, and the new procedure can
balance the numbers of links and nodes appearing in SetmRCC . In [34], however,
we kept a constant number (i.e., Q) of node-only/link-only combinations in each
iteration round.
In Table 5.4, we present a realization of RCCS (i.e., SetRCC) on IEEE 30 bus
system, where α = 1.5, M = 6, P = 30 and Q = 4. Take m = 3 (the third found)
as an example. Set3RCC includes 4 (i.e., m+ 1) groups, and each group has 4 (i.e.,
Q) three-component combinations. In the first group, the combination consists of
3 nodes; in the second group, the combination consists of 2 nodes and 1 link; in the
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third group, the combination consists of 1 node and 2 links; in the fourth group,
the combination consists of 3 links.
There are four parameters, α, M , P and Q. First, α represents the system
tolerance. This parameter has big effect on the nodes and links kept in Table 5.4,
which will be discussed late in Section 5.6.1. Second, M represents the maximum
number of nodes/links that the attacker wants to remove from the power system.
Because of the orderly network structure, the power system has critical grid com-
ponents, removing a few of which can collapse the entire grid [35]. Therefore, in
practical attack scenario, M can be a small number, e.g., M = 6 in Table 5.4.
Finally, P and Q are of importance to limit the search space in Algorithm 3. For
P , its value is determined according to the scale of power systems (i.e., KN ). For
the small-scale system, P can be set to KN . For the large-scale grid, P can be a
number that is much smaller than KN . That is to select critical nodes and links as
candidate nodes and links. For Q, its value is not necessary to be large, e.g., Q = 4
in Table 5.4, because choosing a few strongest multiple-component combinations
within each iteration round are enough to find strong attacks.
Construction of Component Interdependency Graph
With the availability of RCCS (a realization is shown in Table 5.4), we can
construct a new metric, component interdependency graph (CIG). The procedure of
constructing CIG is similar to that of constructing RG in [34]. We briefly introduce
the construction idea. For interesting readers, the details are included in [19, 34].
 The nodes and links in SetRCC (or Table 5.4) become the vertexes individ-
ually in CIG. For the repetitive ones, merge them together as one vertex.
Assign the weight for each vertex, referred to as vertex occurrence frequency
(VOF). The VOF value is the number of times that the vertex appears in
SetRCC .
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 Add an edge between each pair of vertexes in CIG and assign the weight for
each edge, referred to as edge occurrence frequency (EOF). Initially, EOF
value is 0.
 Examine each combination in SetRCC and update EOF. Take the combina-
tion {n6, n7, l37} in Table 5.4 as an example. Assign the overall weight of the
combination as 1, and add the EOF of three edges by 1
3
, which are edgen6−n7 ,
edgen6−l37 and edgen7−l37 .
 Delete the edges, whose EOF value equals to 0, and obtain CIG.
Construction of CIG highly depends on RCCS. For a given power system, the
system tolerance α is the major factor of generating RCCS, as well as constructing
CIG. In other words, CIG is sensitive to α. In reality, however, system tolerance
values are rarely known by attackers [15]. In existing studies [9, 14], researchers
usually assume that all components have the same α, and choose representative
values.
In this work, we choose three representative α values, 1.2, 1.5 and 1.8, to sim-
ulate the “low”, “middle” and “high” system tolerance scenarios, respectively. Un-
der each chosen system tolerance, we construct one CIG. Then, we merge the three
CIGs together to generate integrated component interdependency graph (ICIG).
Compared with single CIG, ICIG is more robust and representative. The ICIG on
IEEE 30 bus system is demonstrated in Fig. 5.1, where sizes and colors of vertices
(edges) are determined by VOF (EOF) values. For simplification of demonstra-
tion, we use the index of a node to represent the node and two endpoints of a link
to represent the link. In Fig. 5.1, for instance, n6 is shown as 6 and l29 is shown
as 21-22.
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Figure 5.1. The integrated component interdependency graph of IEEE 30 bus
system
5.6.2 CIG-based Attack Strategy
In ICIG, the criticality of single node/link is determined by the VOF, high-
lighted by the size and color of the vertex in Fig. 5.1. The bigger and darker a
vertex is, the more critical the corresponding node/link is. The relationship of a
pair of components is decided by the EOF, highlighted by the size and color of
the edges. The wider and darker an edge is, the higher possibility this pair of
components can yield large strength against the power system. Such information
is useful to design strong attack strategy.
Based on ICIG, we propose the CIG-based attack strategy, denoted by ASCIG.
Suppose the attacker wants to choose U nodes and V links as target components
(TCs). U and V are both integers and U + V ≥ 1, where 0 ≤ U ≤ M and
0 ≤ V ≤ M . (Recall M is one of parameters to construct CIG in Section 5.6.1.)
ASCIG is conducted as follows.
 Construct ICIG for a power system. M is chosen to be larger than both U
and V .
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 If U + V = 1, a TC is chosen from ICIG. There are two cases, U = 1 &
V = 0 (i.e., single-node attack) or U = 0 & V = 1 (i.e., single-link attack).
For the first case, the node with the largest VOF value in ICIG is selected
as target node (TN). For the second case, the link with the largest VOF in
ICIG is selected as target link (TL).
 If U + V > 1, multiple TCs are chosen from ICIG. These TCs are deter-
mined as follows. First, find all multiple-component combinations in ICIG.
Each combination consists of U nodes and V links, and each pair of these
components should have a direct edge. Second, for each combination, the
summation of EOF on all edges is computed. The combination that has the
largest EOF summation is chosen as TCs.
According to Fig. 5.1, for instance, the attacker can choose node 6 as TC
for single-node attack and link 21-22 as TC for single-link attack. If the attacker
wants to two TCs, a node and a link, node 6 and link 21-22 are together chosen
as TCs.
The rationale behind choosing single TC or multiple TCs is different. When
launching single-component attack, the TC is recommended by using VOF, similar
to the functionality of the metrics, degree and load. When launching multiple-TC
attack, these TCs are determined by EOF, because these TCs are tightly connected
in ICIG, which means their pairs appear most frequently in RCCS (or in Table
5.4).
5.6.3 Degree-based and load-based Attack Strategies
In existing works [14–16, 36], two metrics, degree and load, have been pre-
vailingly studied for the node-only/link-only attack strategies. In this section, we
extend existing load-based and degree-based node-only/link-link attack strategies
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to load-based and degree-based joint-node-link attack strategies.
In power networks, “node degree” is defined as the number of links connecting
with the node [14]. Definition of “link degree” is related to the definition of “node
degree” [15]. Specifically, the degree of a link is defined as the summation of two
nodes’ degrees that this link connects. Let ASdegree denote the degree-based attack
strategy. When the attacker wants to choose U nodes and V links as TCs, ASdegree
is conducted as follows,
 Sort all nodes descendingly according to their degrees, and select top U
nodes; sort all links descendingly according to their degrees, and select top
V links.
In this work, we adopt the extended betweenness as the load definition of
nodes/links (discussed in Section 5.4). Let ASload denote the load-based attack
strategy. ASload is conducted similarly as ASdegree, by replacing “degree” with
“load”.
Although we mainly discuss the joint-node-link attack strategy in this work,
these three aforementioned attack strategies, i.e., ASCIG, ASdegree and ASload, can
be specialized to node-only/link-only attack strategies as follows.
 When V = 0, the joint-node-link attack strategy turns to the node-only
attack strategy.
 When U = 0, the joint-node-link attack strategy turns to the link-only attack
strategy.
5.7 Performance Evaluations and Discussions
In this work, we conduct all simulations in MATLAB environment. Three
power systems are employed as test benchmarks, IEEE 30 bus system, IEEE 118
bus system and Bay Area power grid in California, United States. The first two are
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included in MATPOWER [32]; the last one is the power system that are currently
in use. We purchased the raw power system data from Platts [37]. The brief
description of three test benchmarks is given in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5. Brief description of test benchmarks
Test Benchmarks KN KL KS KD
IEEE 30 bus system 30 41 6 20
IEEE 118 bus system 118 179 54 99
Bay Area power grid 603 846 146 184
5.7.1 Construction of Bay Area Power Grid
In this section, we introduce the construction of Bay Area power grid from
the raw data. The original data format is provided with GIS shapefiles, including
substation layer, transmission line layer, generator unit layer and power plant layer.
Generally speaking, building the grid from the raw GIS data includes three aspects,
(1) chipping the grid raw data, (2) constructing the grid topology, (3) identifying
the electric features, such as substation types and transmission line reactance. We
briefly introduce the construction of Bay Area power grid according to [38] and [39]
as follows.
 Chipping the grid raw data: Bay Area power grid data is chipped from
the entire North American power network in ArcGIS desktop [40].
 Building the grid topology: The topology of Bay Area power grid is
constructed mainly according to raw data in the transmission line layer.
Transmission lines are viewed as links; the endpoints of transmission lines
are viewed as nodes. The raw power network include one large-scale network
and a few small-scale networks. After manually eliminating the small-scale
ones, Bay Area power grid topology is set up.
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 Determining electric features: In this work, we adopt the extended model
to set up CFS. This model needs the electric information about substation
types (i.e., generation substation, demand substation and transmission sub-
station) and the reactance of transmission lines. We estimate those infor-
mation as follows. First, the type of nodes is determined by exploiting the
information in raw data. According to the explanations from Platts [39],
two types of nodes are identified to be generation nodes, (1) the node is
associated with a 10 KV (kilovolt) transmission line, (2) the node is geo-
graphically close to a power plant (within 1 KM in this work). According
to the introduction of North American power transmission system [38], the
nodes, whose maximum voltage is less or equal to 69 KV but more than 0
KV, are considered to be demand nodes. Other nodes are viewed as trans-
mission nodes. Second, the reactance of a transmission line is determined
by its physical properties. There is a linear relation between the length and
the reactance. According to [41], we set the ratio between the length and
the reactance as 0.4Ω/KM(ohm/kilometer). That is, the reactance of a 20
KM length transmission line is 8Ω. With the availability of the length of
transmission lines in raw data, we can simply estimate the reactance.
In summary, Bay Area power grid has 846 transmission lines and 603 nodes,
where there are 146 generation nodes and 184 demand nodes.
5.7.2 Comparison Set-up
When discussing the joint-node-link attack strategy, a question comes out
naturally that how to balance between choosing nodes and links as TCs. In reality,
attacking substations and transmission lines are both highly possible [42, 43]. In
this work, it is not our focus to specifically discuss how hard for attackers to fail a
substation or a transmission line. Instead, we conduct the comparison as follows.
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 It is a fact that attacking substations or transmission lines both needs the
resource from the attacker. Specifically, we assume that attacking a substa-
tion needs γ1 units resource and attacking a transmission line needs γ2 units
resource.
 Also, the attacker has the overall resource to launch attacks. Suppose the
attacker has in total Γ units resource. In particular, we assume that γ1, γ1
and Γ are all integers, where 1 ≤ γ1, γ2 ≤ Γ.
 Having Γ units resource, the attacker can make different decisions, depending
on how to use the resource. For instance, the attacker can fully or partially
utilize these Γ units resource, aiming to obtain the maximum damage to the
power system. When the attacker wants to choose U nodes and V links as
TCs under given γ1, γ2 and Γ, pairs of U and V are calculated as follows.
Find : (U, V )
s.t.

U ∗ γ1 + V ∗ γ2 ≤ Γ
U + V ≥ 1
U ≥ 0
V ≥ 0
(5.8)
 Recall U and V are non-negative integers, presenting the number of
nodes and links chosen by the attacker. We can search for all quali-
fied pairs of (U ,V ) and put them into a set, denoted by Λ. Take Γ =
4, γ1 = 2 and γ1 = 1 as an example. Λ includes eight pairs, i.e.,
{(0, 1), (0, 2), (0, 3), (0, 4), (1, 0), (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 0)}. Take the pair (1, 2) as
an example. This pair mean that the attacker chooses 1 node (i.e., U = 1)
and 2 links (i.e.,V = 2) as TCs. Specifically choosing which node and links
depends on different attack strategies. For instance, ASdegree will choose the
node with the largest node degree and two links with top two largest link
degrees as TCs (discussed in Section 5.6.3).
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Figure 5.2. Performance comparisons among three attack strategies on IEEE 30
bus system, where γ1 = 1 and γ2 = 1
 Under given γ1, γ2 and Γ, an attack strategy, e.g., ASCIG, might have multiple
choices, i.e., the pairs in Λ. We conduct the simulation for all pairs and can
obtain the maximum attack performance in terms of PoDN for ASCIG. We
do similar simulations and operation for ASload and ASdegree, and conduct
performance comparison among these attack strategies.
5.7.3 Performance Comparison among CIG-based, degree-based and
load-based attack strategies
We specialize performance comparisons as follows. First, we adopt IEEE 30
bus system, IEEE 118 bus system and Bay Area power grid as test benchmarks.
Second, we assume the attacker has limited resource. In particular, Γ is set to
be 1, 2, ..., or 8 (i.e., 1 ≤ Γ ≤ 8). Finally, in order to mimic different ways of
distributing resource on selecting TNs and TLs, we set γ1 and γ2 as the following
two scenarios,
 Scenario I : γ1 = 2 and γ2 = 1. Attacking a node needs 2 units resource;
attacking a link needs 1 unit resource.
141
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Resource
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f D
ro
p 
in
 N
et
−a
bi
lity
 
 
ASCIG
ASload
ASdegree
(a) Measured By PoDN
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Resource
Co
nn
ec
tiv
ity
 L
os
s
 
 
ASCIG
ASload
ASdegree
(b) Measured By CL
Figure 5.3. Performance comparisons among three attack strategies on IEEE 30
bus system, where γ1 = 2 and γ2 = 1.
 Scenario II : γ1 = 1 and γ2 = 1. Attacking a node or a link both needs 1 unit
resource.
The meaning of Scenario I is straightforward. Substations are harder to be at-
tacked. In reality, substations are complicated and under well protection; transmis-
sion lines usually spread in very long distances (typically hundreds of kilometres),
which can be easily found and attacked. In 2013, for instance, it was reported that
a man in Arkansas launched a series of attacks on local high-voltage transmission
lines [22]. The emergence of the Smart Grid, however, can dramatically increase
the chances of cyber intrusions [21], which make substations possibly as vulnerable
as transmission lines. Therefore, Scenario II is likely with consideration of cyber
attacks in smart grids.
It is definite that the attacker can have more resource and the values of γ1
and γ2 can be others. We select the group of Γ values and two scenarios of setting
γ1 and γ2 for demonstration purpose only.
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Figure 5.4. Performance comparisons among three attack strategies on IEEE 118
bus system, where γ1 = 1 and γ2 = 1.
Performance comparisons among ASdegree, ASload and ASCIG are shown in
Figs. 5.2 and 5.3 on IEEE 30 bus system, in Figs. 5.4 and 5.5 on IEEE 118
bus system and in Figs. 5.6 and 5.7 on Bay Area power grid. In each figure,
there are two subfigures, which represent the performances are measured in terms
of percentage of drop in net-ability (PoDN) and connectivity loss (CL). In each
subfigure, x-axis represents the amount of resources (i.e., Γ); y-axis represents
PoDN or CL. The green-star curve, blue-square curve, and magenta-pentagram
curve represent the attack performance of ASdegree, ASload and ASCIG, respectively.
In addition, in Table 5.6 we demonstrate the target components (TCs) that result
in the performances for ASdegree, ASload and ASCIG in Fig. 5.6(a).
Based on Figs. 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 and Table 5.6, we have the
following observations and discussions.
First, ASCIG can obtain better performance than ASdegree, ASload. In Figs.
5.2(a), 5.3(a), 5.4(a), 5.5(a), 5.6(a) and 5.7(a), the performances are measured
in terms of PoDN. It is apparent that the magenta-pentagram curves are higher
than the green-star curves and the blue-square curves. In Figs. 5.2(b), 5.3(b),
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Figure 5.5. Performance comparisons among three attack strategies on IEEE 118
bus system, where γ1 = 2 and γ2 = 1.
5.4(b), 5.5(b), 5.6(b) and 5.7(b), the performances are measured in terms of CL.
The magenta-pentagram curves are still higher than the green-star curves and
only lower than the blue-square curves at some cases, e.g., Γ = 4 in Fig. 5.6(b).
These observations are reasonable. The proposed metric, CIG, is specifically de-
signed and can be used to find these joint-node-link combinations that yield large
strengths. The metrics, degree and load, are not carefully designed for investigat-
ing joint-node-link attack strategies. From the performance’s point of view, ASCIG
is stronger than ASdegree, ASload.
Second, from the attack’s perspective, attacking a few pivot components can
trigger severe cascading failures in power systems. Take IEEE 30 system as an
example. Only attacking one component ASCIG can obtain the performance
PoDN = 0.98, which is shown in Fig. 5.2. Similar observations can be made
in Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.6, i.e., the results on IEEE 118 bus system and Bay Area
power grid, respectively. Generally speaking, there are some components that are
critical to the power transmission system [35]. Attacking a few, even one, of criti-
cal components can collapse the entire grid. Because, power transmission systems
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Figure 5.6. Performance comparisons among three attack strategies on Bay Area
power grid, where γ1 = 1 and γ2 = 1.
have the characteristic of self-organized criticality [26]. If they are operating closely
to limitations, the disturbances caused by removing critical components are severe
enough to trigger large-scale cascading failures and result in serious power outage
in the grid.
Third, as the network size increases, the number of TCs should increase, if the
attacker wants to entirely paralyze the grid. For instance, suppose the attacker
wants to obtain more than 90% drop in net-ability (i.e., PoDN ≥ 0.9). By using
ASCIG, the attacker needs to attack 1 TC on IEEE 30 bus system, at least 3
TCs on IEEE 118 bus system and at least 5 TCs on Bay area power grid. The
observation is consistent with that in [24]. In order to cause national blackout, it
is necessary to attack at least 9 substations in the U.S. power grid, which has in
total 55,000 substations.
Finally, the joint-node-link attack strategy is the generalization of the node-
only and link-only attack strategies. In Table 5.6, we show the combinations of
TCs for ASdegree, ASload and ASCIG on Bay Area power grid. It is apparent that
these combinations include three groups, node-only, link-only and joint-node-link.
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Figure 5.7. Performance comparisons among three attack strategies on Bay Area
power grid, where γ1 = 2 and γ2 = 1.
Previously, the node-only/link-only attack strategies only select nodes/links as
TCs [10, 11]. The joint-node-link attack strategies are the general cases, in which
TCs can be nodes, links or both. In addition, there are in total 24 TC combina-
tions in Table 5.6, including 10 node-only combinations, 2 link-only combinations
and 12 joint-node-link combinations. The joint-node-link TC combinations are of
importance to find strong attack performances.
5.8 Conclusions and Future Works
In this work, we introduced the joint-node-link perspective to investigate
the power grid vulnerabilities and attack strategies . In particular, it was found
that the power system had many joint-node-link vulnerabilities. In addition, we
proposed the CIG-based joint-node-link attack strategy based on the specifically-
designed metric, CIG. Through intensive experiments, it was shown that the pro-
posed scheme shew better attack performances than comparison schemes.
In future, there are a few interesting directions along this topic. First, it is
likely that multiple attacks are launched sequentially on substations and transmis-
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sion lines, but not simultaneously. Second, the CFS can be further improved by
introducing the stochastic analysis. Finally, validating existing blackouts is useful
for the society to understand the cascading failure and major blackouts.
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6.1 Abstract
The modern society has increasingly relied on electrical service, which also
brings risks of catastrophic consequences, e.g., large-scale blackouts. In the current
literature, researchers reveal the vulnerability of power grids under the assump-
tion that substations/transmission lines are removed or attacked synchronously.
In reality, however, it is highly possible that such removals can be conducted se-
quentially. Motivated by this idea, we discover a new attack scenario, called the
sequential attack, which assumes substations/transmission lines can be removed
sequentially, not synchronously. In particular, we find the sequential attack can
discover many combinations of substation whose failures can cause large black-
out size. Previously, these combinations are ignored by the synchronous attack.
In addition, we propose a new metric, called the sequential attack graph (SAG),
and a practical attack strategy based on SAG. In simulations, we adopt three
test benchmarks and five comparison schemes. Referring to simulation results and
complexity analysis, we find that the proposed scheme has strong performance and
low complexity.
6.2 Introduction
Electric grids have been developed over decades and become increasingly inter-
connected and complex. Although mechanisms and regulations have been applied
to maintain the stability and security of power transmissions, large-scale blackouts
are still not inevitable. In the past decade, large-scale blackouts have caused catas-
trophic results. Examples include 2003 Northeast American blackout affecting 55
million customers [1] and 2012 India blackout leaving 700 million people without
power [2]. In these cases, initial failures of one or a few power grid components
(i.e., substations and transmission lines) can trigger the successive failures of other
components. In other words, a sequence of dependent failures of individual com-
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ponents successively weakens power grids, which is referred to as the cascading
failure [3].
The triggers of cascading failures can be diverse, such as natural reasons,
aging of equipment, and human errors [4]. Recently, malicious attacks become
significant and potential triggers of cascading failures. For instance, there are
increasing evidences of malicious intention and actions that aim to destruct the US
power systems [5–7]. To understand the vulnerability of power grids, an important
approach is to investigate malicious attacks, in terms of possible attack strategies,
features, and consequence. Such investigation would also facilitate the study on
mitigating or even preventing cascading failures in the future.
In the current literature [8–12], designing attack strategies is an important
direction to investigate malicious attacks on power grids. In particular, attackers
can obtain information of the power grid, choose a set of nodes (i.e., substations),
referred to as victim nodes (VNs), or a set of links (i.e., transmission lines), referred
to as victim links (VLs), and assume to remove these VNs/VLs through either
cyber penetration [7] or physical sabotages [6, 13]. In reality, attackers can collect
the power grid information in different ways, e.g., purchasing the entire North
American power grid from commercial companies [14]. In addition, both cyber and
physical attacks on power grids are highly possible. A simulated cyber attack on
the U.S. power grid has shown power grid’s components can be remotely accessed
and destroyed by hackers [15]. Physical attacks can be conducted in easy ways,
such as cutting down a tree to trip transmission lines [1], or in complex ways, such
as using electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to destroy substations and transmission
lines [16, 17].
Attack strategies in existing works [8–12, 18–25] can be classified from different
angles. The first angle is the number of VNs/VLs. Single-node/link attacks are
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studied in [8, 18, 19]; many industry reliability criteria require power grids can
tolerate failure of single node/link [4]. Multiple-node/link attacks often cause
larger damage and receive more research attention [10–12, 21, 22, 24, 26]. The
second angle is whether nodes, links, or both are removed. There are some studies
that investigate attacks on links [10, 18, 22, 23], whereas many investigate attacks
on nodes [8–12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24–26]. Very few studies address attacks on both
together [27]. The third angle differentiates attack strategies according to the
underlying cascading failure models they assumed. Some attack strategies are
only meaningful for a given model [9, 24, 26], whereas others are useful under
various assumptions [8, 11, 21].
We argue that the above three classification angles are not sufficient. An im-
portant classification angle is missing. In the current literature, the investigation
of multiple-node/link attacks assumes that VNs/VLs are removed synchronously.
This assumption, however, omits the fact that multiple removals can occur sequen-
tially. In other words, the attacker can remove VNs/VLs according to a carefully
designed time sequence.
Furthermore, cascading failures in real life involved the sequences of various
events, such as voltage collapse, generators shunt down, and transmission lines
tripping [4]. The cascade process lasts probably minutes, or even hours [1, 2].
Thus, time domain is an essential dimension to cascading failures. The assump-
tion of synchronous removals has apparent limitations to comprehensively exploit
the characteristics of cascading failures. In this work, we discover a new attack sce-
nario, called the sequential attack. From the perspective of the new angle, attack
strategies can be divided into newly-discovered sequential attack strategy (SeqAS)
and existing synchronous attack strategy (SynAS).
Is the sequential attack more dangerous than the synchronous attack? Can the
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new attack scenario reveal new vulnerabilities of power grids? Are existing metrics
useful to design the SeqAS? In this work, we answer these questions by investigat-
ing the sequential attack and the SeqAS on nodes. The major contributions are
summarized as follows.
 First, we find strong sequential attacks by using the exhaustive search on
IEEE 39 bus system. On this small-scale power grid, we discover that the
sequential attack generally cause more severe cascading failures, measured
by the blackout size, than the synchronous attack.
 Second, we propose a novel metric, called the sequential attack graph (SAG).
Compared with existing metrics, e.g., degree and load, this metric can intu-
itively capture the combination of vulnerable nodes and indicate the order
of their removals, which would lead to stronger sequential attacks.
 Third, we design a new SeqAS based on SAG, called the SAG-based SeqAS,
which can achieve good attack performance with low complexity.
 Finally, we perform extensive testing to demonstrate the features of the se-
quential attack, the proposed metric, SAG, and the proposed SeqAS. Briefly
speaking, we adopt three different power grids as test benchmarks. The pro-
posed SAG-based SeqAS is compared with five other schemes. The compari-
son schemes include the straightforward degree-based SeqAS and load-based
SeqAS, and three existing synchronous attack strategies. The results demon-
strate that the proposed SeqAS strategy yield strong attacks against power
grids. The complexity of the proposed scheme and the comparison schemes
are also analyzed.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Related work is discussed in Sec-
tion 6.3. In Section 6.4, the cascading failure simulators (CFS) used in this work
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are presented in detail. In Section 6.5, we define the sequential attack and demon-
strate the new vulnerabilities. In Section 6.6, we propose a new metric, called
sequential attack graph (SAG), and the SAG-based sequential attack strategy. Ex-
periments and discussions are given in Section 6.7, followed by the conclusion in
Section 6.8.
6.3 Related Works
Traditionally, investigating the attack strategy is from the perspective of the
SynAS. We briefly summarize the existing attack strategies as follows.
The random removal, randomly choosing VNs, is to mimic unintentional fail-
ures, e.g., vegetation sagging, earthquakes, lightening, or software and hardware
faults. Power grids have been proven to be insensitive to random removals [21, 25].
The search-based approaches provides attackers a possible way to search for
a set of VNs whose synchronous removals can yield the strongest performance.
However, the exhaustive search [9], or called contingency analysis in the power
society [4], usually has extensive search space and is computationally infeasible
[4, 9]. In order to improve search efficiency, some heuristic approaches [11, 22] are
proposed to reduce the search space. The key problem of search-based approaches
is that they can not make quick attack decisions because of the large search space.
The metric-based approaches are prevailing in studying attack strategies.
Many metrics have been proposed. Some metrics are straightforward, e.g., de-
gree [25], load [8] and risk if failure (RIF) [9]. These metrics directly exploit the
features of power grids, e.g., the topology and initial power flows. Other metrics
are more complex, such as load distribution vector (LDV) [10], risk graph (RG) [11]
and geographic information [12]. These metrics can find stronger attacks than the
straightforward metrics. Existing metrics, however, are specifically designed for
the SynAS. It is unknown for whether the existing metrics can yield SeqAS.
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Table 6.1. Comparison between the proposed work and some existing studies
Attack Strategy
Single-node
Synchronous
Multiple-node
Synchronous
Multiple-node
Sequential
Random removal [25] X X
Search-based
approaches [4]
X X
Attack
metrics
Degree [25] X X
Load [21] X X
RIF [9] X X
LDV [10] X
Geographic
information [12]
X
RG [11] X X
Proposed
work
X
Furthermore, a few recent works have studied the vulnerability of power grids
from the perspective of time domain [28, 29]. Cascading failures in power grids can
have dramatically different intermediate processes, which reveals various evolution
of cascading failures [28]. In addition, multiple triggers can be applied consecu-
tively [29], with intervening time between two consecutive removals.
In this work, we consider the time domain in revealing the vulnerability of
power grids and developing practical and strong attack strategy. Particularly, we
are interested in investigating the sequential attack. A brief summary is shown in
Table 6.1.
6.4 Cascading Failure Simulator
In this work, we use two types of cascading failure simulator (CFS), the se-
quential attack CFS and the synchronous attack CFS. Our CFSs are modified from
the CFS in [22], based on the DC power-flow model. Briefly speaking, we conduct
the modifications as follows.
 In our CFSs, multiple removals can be conducted either sequentially or
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Figure 6.1. The diagram of sequential attack CFS.
synchronously; in the CFS from [22], multiple removals are conducted syn-
chronously.
 Our CFSs will stop when there is no more attacks and no overloading links;
the CFS from [22] will terminate when 10% of the nodes are no longer con-
nected to the largest island.
 In our CFSs, we adopt the blackout size (defined in Equ. 6.4) to measure the
damage of the attack; in the CFS from [22], there is no such measurement.
We first introduce the sequential attack CFS. Fig. 6.1 illustrates its flow
diagram; the description of each step is given as follows.
CFS Step 1: Suppose an attack strategy has determine M victim nodes
(VNs) and the order to remove them, e.g., {V N1, V N2, ..., V NM}, where V Ni
represents ith VN (1 ≤ i ≤ M). These M removals are performed individu-
ally at M different times, e.g., {T1, T2, ..., TM}, during cascading failures.
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CFS Step 2: Initialize CFS, e.g. set up timer T and calculate initial power
lows.
CFS Step 3: Remove one VN each time at time T to mimic the sequential
attack. That is, remove V Ni at time Ti. After each removal, update the
topological and electrical features of the power grid. The calculation of Ti
will be discussed below.
CFS Step 4: Check whether CFS needs to stop. If yes, quit CFS and goto
CFS Step 11. The criterion to terminate CFS include (1) all removals are
finished, (2) there is no overloaded link.
CFS Step 5: If the power grid is broken into additional subgrids due to
removals of VNs or trips of links from CFS Steps 3 to 9, re-dispatch genera-
tion and shed load to meet power supply/demand balance in each subgrid as
follows. First, ramp up or down the supply of generators to meet the demand
as closely as possible. These adjustments are restricted by the capacity of
generators and ramping time [22]. Second, after re-dispatching generators
in a subgrid, if the generation is surplus (η = (
∑
g∈G(Pg)−
∑
d∈D(Pd)) > 0,
where G and D represent the sets of generation nodes and demand nodes in
the subgrid, respectively), trip the generators sequentially, beginning from
the smallest one, until η ≤ 0 [22]. Third, after ramping the generation and
tripping the surplus generators, if the supply is insufficient (i.e., η < 0), trip-
ping the demand nodes sequentially, beginning from the smallest one, until
η ≥ 0. Then, if η > 0, recover the last tripped demand node partially to
the demand η to meet supply/demand balance. When a subgrid reaches the
balance, DC power-flows are recalculated to check the overloading on links.
CFS Step 6: Check link overloadings. If there is (are) overloaded link(s),
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go through CFS Steps 7 to 9 to deal with the overloading; otherwise go to
CFS Step 10 to check next possible removal.
CFS Step 7: Update relays. For the link(s) with overloading, use the time-
delayed overcurrent relay to determine whether/when next link is tripped
[22]. Here, the “relay modeling” is to mimic a number of processes by which
links may shut down, such as the overheating of a transmission line due to
sagging into vegetation. If a link is overloaded at time T, the timer begins
to count the overloading time. We assume that each link can tolerate the
overloading for certain time, denoted by τ . The τ for link j, denoted by τj,
is defined as,
τj =
{
Oj
fj−Fj iffj > Fj
0 otherwise
(6.1)
where fj is the current power flow, Fj is the flow limit, andOj is the threshold,
which is chosen such that link j can tolerate 5 seconds of being 50% above
its power flow limit. For instance, suppose the flow limit of link j is 45 (i.e.,
Fj = 45), the threshold Oj is calculated as 0.5∗ 45∗ 5 = 112.5. If the current
flow in link j is 55 (i.e., fj = 55), τj is 11.25 =
112.5
55−45 s. The definition
indicates that how fast a link is tripped depends how seriously this link is
overloading. Among all overloaded links, the link(s) with the smallest τ value
is chosen to be tripped in CFS Step 9. The corresponding τ value is referred
to as τmin.
CFS Step 8: Update the timer to when next trip happens, as T = T +
τmin, the smallest τ in CFS Step 7.
CFS Step 9: Trip the chosen link(s) in CFS Step 7, and update the topo-
logical structure and the electrical features of the power grid network.
CFS Step 10: Check whether all removals are finished. If not, current time
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T is the “time” for next removal.
CFS Step 11: When CFS stops, evaluate the damage by exploiting the
blackout size, defined in Equ. 6.4.
In CFS Step 3, Ti is calculated as follows. First, when i = 1, T1 = 0, meaning
the first removal, V N1, occurs at the beginning of cascading failures. Second,
when 2 ≤ i ≤ M , Ti is obtained depending on whether there are overloaded links
after removing V Ni−1 at Ti−1. If there exist overloaded links, Ti = Ti−1 + τmin,
where τmin is decided in CFS Step 7. That is, the removal of V Ni at Ti occurs
after tripping an overloaded link in CFS Step 9. Otherwise, Ti = Ti−1 +  ( is a
small interval, e.g., 0.001.). That is, the removal of V Ni at Ti occurs just after the
removal of V Ni−1 at Ti−1.
Note that if we use different policies to determine Ti, the sequential attack
performances may be different. In this work, we specifically use the above policy
to demonstrate the sequential attack. In the future works, we will surely consider
to further investigate various policies in determining the removal time.
The procedures of the synchronous attack CFS is similar to that of the se-
quential attack CFS. The only difference is that in CFS Step 3 all M VNs are
removed simultaneously at the begging of cascading failures. That is, T1 = T2 =
· · · = TM = 0.
6.5 The Sequential Attack and New Vulnerabilities
Before introducing the sequential attack scenario, we introduce several con-
cepts as follows.
 The removal of a node means physically disconnecting this node from the
power grid by removing its incoming and outgoing links. In reality, such
removals can be conducted by either cyber attacks or physical attacks [13].
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 A multiple-node combination is referred to as a set of nodes. An attack
strategy is to select one such multiple-node combination as its VNs.
 For a multiple-node combination, we can perform the removals either sequen-
tially or synchronously. Either attack strategy can cause damage (in terms
of blackout size defined in Equ. 6.4) to the power grid. The strength of the
multiple-node combination for the SeqAS (or SynAS) is referred to as the
damage caused by sequentially (or synchronously) removing these nodes.
 The vulnerability of the power grid can have broad meanings in the current
literature. In this work, the vulnerability analysis is to specifically find these
multiple-node combinations that have large strengthes.
 Known vulnerabilities are referred to as strong multiple-node combinations
found by the synchronous attack.
 New vulnerabilities are referred to as strong multiple-node combinations that
are discovered by the sequential attack, but are not found by the synchronous
attack.
In the rest of this section, we first introduce the formal definition of the se-
quential attack in Section 6.5.1, then introduce several concepts related to setting
up the demonstration in Section 6.5.2, and finally discuss the new vulnerability of
the power grid in Section 6.5.3.
6.5.1 The Sequential Attack
For a multiple-node combination with M nodes, suppose the removals of them
occur at T1, T2, ..., TM . If all removals happen at the same time (i.e., usually at
the beginning of cascading failures or time 0), this attack scenario is referred to as
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Figure 6.2. The sequential attack versus the synchronous attack.
the synchronous attack in this work. That is,
T1 = T2 = · · · = TM (6.2)
If Equ. 6.2 dose not satisfy, this attack scenario is referred to as the general
definition of the sequential attack. In particular, in this work we are interested in
the special case that all removals occur at different times. That is,
T1 < T2 < · · · < TM (6.3)
The definition of the sequential attack in Equ. 6.3 is assuming to remove one
node each time. This definition is extensible. In Fig. 6.2, we demonstrate the two
attack scenarios in this work. Roughly speaking, under the synchronous attack
scenario M removals are conducted simultaneously at T1 = 0, while under the
sequential attack scenario the first removal occurs at T1 = 0 and the rest removals
(i.e., M − 1 removals) occur sequentially at T2 till TM during cascading failures.
6.5.2 Concepts Related to Demonstration Setup
We show the features of the sequential attack through demonstrations, and
explain some concepts for the demonstration as follows.
 Grid Network : A power grid is viewed as a network, where substations and
transmission lines are viewed as nodes and links, respectively. The set of
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nodes is denoted by B; the set of links is denoted by L. Due to different
functionalities, nodes are generally categorized into three sets, generation
nodes (or generators that produce electricity), transmission nodes, and de-
mand nodes (delivering electricity to customers) [9]. The set of generation
nodes is denoted by G; the set of demand nodes is denoted by D. The num-
ber of nodes, links, generation nodes and demand nodes are represented as
NB, NL, NG and ND, respectively.
 Test Benchmark : We adopt IEEE 39 bus system [26] as the test benchmark to
demonstrate new vulnerabilities. IEEE 39 bus system consists of 39 nodes (10
generation nodes and 29 demand nodes) and 46 links, which means NB = 39,
NL = 46, NG = 10 and ND = 29.
 Blackout Size: We adopt the blackout size to measure the strength of a
multiple-node attack. Blackout size is defined as [21],
∆ = 1−
∑
d∈D P
′
d∑
d∈D Pd
(6.4)
where Pd and P
′
d represent the power on the demand node before and after the
attack, respectively. This definition, similar to that in [21], is the normalized
power loss, which means 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1. The larger ∆ is, the stronger the
multiple-node attack is.
 Strong Attack : We define a threshold, η. Numerically, if the strength of a
multiple-node attack, denoted by ∆, is larger or equal to η (i.e., ∆ ≥ η), this
multiple-node attack is called a strong attack; otherwise it is called a weak
attack (i.e., ∆ < η).
 Sequential Attack CFS : Cascading failure simulator (CFS) is employed to
mimic the occurrence of removing nodes and the evolution of cascading fail-
ures. The sequential attack CFS in this work is modified from the CFS
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in [22]. In Section 6.4, we give the detailed discussion on both the sequential
attack CFS and the synchronous attack CFS adopted in this work.
Next, for a multiple-node combination with M nodes, we perform both the
synchronous attack and the sequential attack. The strength of the M -node syn-
chronous attack is denoted by ∆Msyn; the strength of the M -node sequential attack
is denoted by ∆Mseq. They are obtained as follows.
 ∆Msyn: Perform the synchronous attack on M nodes in the synchronous attack
CFS. ∆Msyn is measured in terms of blackout size when the synchronous attack
CFS stops.
 ∆Mseq: There are M ! orders of the M -node combination. Perform the se-
quential attack for each order in the sequential attack CFS, and record all
strengthes in terms of blackout size. The largest strength value is ∆Mseq.
6.5.3 Demonstration of New Vulnerabilities
We conduct two-node attacks (i.e., M = 2) on IEEE 39 bus system. There
are in total
(
39
2
)
= 741 two-node combinations. For each two-node combination,
we obtain two strength values, ∆2syn and ∆
2
seq. The relation between the sequential
attack and the synchronous attack is demonstrated in Fig. 6.3 by plotting ∆2seq
versus ∆2syn. There are 741 dots in Fig. 6.3, each of which represents a two-node
combination. The relation between ∆2seq and ∆
2
syn is not straightforward based on
Fig. 6.3, because the dots are scattered in the plane. For demonstration purpose,
we conduct two classifications among all dots.
First, we compare both ∆2seq and ∆
2
syn with η (i.e., the threshold of defining a
strong attack). If ∆2seq ≥ η (or ∆2syn ≥ η), the two-node sequential attack (or the
two-node synchronous attack) is strong; otherwise, this attack is weak. By setting
η = 0.2 (20% power loss is a big enough event for a power grid [21, 22]), we divide
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Figure 6.3. The correlation between the sequential attack and the synchronous
attack.
the 741 dots in Fig. 6.3 into four types as follows.
 Type I : Both the sequential attack and the synchronous attack are strong.
That is, ∆2seq ≥ η and ∆2syn ≥ η.
 Type II : The sequential attack is strong, while the synchronous attack is
weak, which means ∆2seq ≥ η and ∆2syn < η.
 Type III : The sequential attack is weak, while the synchronous attack is
strong, which means ∆2seq < η and ∆
2
syn ≥ η.
 Type IV : Both the sequential attack and the synchronous attack are weak.
That is, ∆2seq < η and ∆
2
syn < η.
Type II is particularly interesting. From the perspective of the synchronous
attack (i.e., according to x-axis), dots belonging to Type I and Type III are strong
attacks, while dots in Type II and Type IV are weak attacks. However, if refer
to y-axis, from the sequential attack’s point of view, dots in Type II are viewed
as strong attacks. It is clearly seen from Fig. 6.3 that there are a considerable
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number of dots belonging to Type II. In particular, the dots in Type II are of
importance to reveal new vulnerability of power grids, which are not discovered in
previous works.
Second, from Fig. 6.3, we see that the sequential attack can not only dis-
cover new vulnerabilities but improve the strength of many two-node attacks. We
compare ∆2seq with ∆
2
syn and categorize these 741 dots into three groups.
 Group 1 : The performances of the sequential attack and the synchronous
attack are similar. If the difference between ∆2seq and ∆
2
syn is less or equal
to the threshold θ (i.e., |∆2seq −∆2syn| ≤ θ), we put this dot (i.e., a two-node
combination) into group 1.
 Group 2 : The sequential attack is stronger than the synchronous attack. If
∆2seq −∆2syn > θ, the dot is put into group 2.
 Group 3 : The synchronous attack is stronger than the sequential attack. If
∆2syn −∆2seq > θ, the dot is put into group 3.
For the dots in Group 2, the sequential attack reaches better strength than
the synchronous attack. We set θ to be 0.1. Among the 741 dots in Fig. 6.3,
75.44% belong to Group 1, 22.94% belong to Group 2, and only 1.62% belong to
Group 3. This statistic demonstrates the sequential attack can find more strong
attacks.
More demonstrations and analysis on the features of the sequential attack are
discussed in Section 6.7.
6.6 Sequential Attack Strategy
The sequential attack strategy (SeqAS) is referred to as the method to identify
multiple VNs and the order of sequentially removing. In this section, we extend
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three existing synchronous attack strategies to the sequential attack scenarios in
Sections 6.6.1 and 6.6.2, and propose a new SeqAS in Section 6.6.3.
6.6.1 Degree-based and Load-based Sequential Attack Strategies
Two metrics, degree and load, have been widely used in the SynAS [8, 9,
17, 21, 24, 25, 30, 31]. We straightforwardly extend the degree-based and load-
based synchronous attack strategies to obtain the degree-based and load-based
sequential attack strategies. The degree of a node is defined as the number of the
links connecting to this node [9]; the load of a node is defined as the summation of
the absolute values of power injection into this node by all generation-demand-node
pairs [21]. This load definition is similar to the functionality of other definitions,
e.g., betweenness in [8] and extended betweenness in [18].
We present the degree-based SeqAS with M VNs, denoted by SeqASMdegree as
follows. There are two steps. In the first step, select M nodes with maximum
degrees as the VNs. This is the same as the degree-based SynAS in [8, 21, 24].
In the second step, we determine the order of removal of these VNs. We study
two orders: (1) from higher degree to lower degree, and (2) from lower degree to
higher degree. We choose the order that yields the stronger attack strength. In
other words, we need to perform twice the sequential attack CFS to determine the
order of removal.
The specific time of removing these M VNs is presented in Section 6.4 and
briefly described as follows. The first removal is conducted as at the beginning.
The mth, 2 ≤ m ≤ M , removal is conducted either after the (m − 1)th removal
or after tripping an overloaded link. Take removing two VNs as an example.
Removing the first VN occurs at the beginning. After the removal, if there exists
overloaded link(s), removing the second VNs will be conducted after tripping an
such overloaded link; otherwise, the second removal is conducted after the first
169
removal.
The load-based SeqAS with M VNs, denoted by SeqASMload, uses the same
procedure, except replacing “degree” by “load”.
6.6.2 Exhaustive Search Based Sequential Attack Strategy
The strongest multiple-node sequential attack can be found through the ex-
haustive search. Let SeqASMES denote the exhaustive search based SeqAS with M
VNs. In a power grid with NB nodes, SeqASMES needs to launch
(
NB
M
)×M ! times
of the sequential attack CFS. Obviously, for a large-scale power grid, SeqASMES is
computationally infeasible. We use SeqASMES as the comparison scheme to analyze
the complexity of other attack strategies, which will be discussed in Section 6.7.5.
6.6.3 Proposed Sequential Attack Strategy
In this substation, we present a practical and strong SeqAS with three steps.
The first step is to use the iterative procedure (Section 6.6.3) to search multiple-
node combinations that yield strong sequential attacks. The second step is to
construct the sequential attack graph (SAG) (Section 6.6.3). The final step is to
determine the VNs and removal order based on the SAG (Section 6.6.3). This
proposed scheme is called the SAG-based SeqAS, denoted by SeqASMSAG.
Iterative Procedure
The iterative procedure in [11] is an effective and efficient way to find node
combinations that yield strong synchronous attacks. The rationale behind is that
if a m-node combination can yield strong synchronous attack, by combining these
m nodes with another important node, the new (m + 1)-node combination likely
become another strong synchronous attack. Here, the important node refers to
these nodes that has strong single-node attack performance; the selection of im-
portant nodes (also referred to as candidate nodes) is discussed in the following
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Table 6.2. The realization of RRCS on IEEE 39 bus system.
Index Set2RRC Set
3
RRC Set
4
RRC Set
5
RRC
1 21,33 21,33,39 26,31,39,20 26,31,39,20,21
2 31,21 24,33,39 26,31,39,3 26,31,39,20,27
3 6,21 26,31,39 6,33,39,34 26,31,39,20,24
4 24,33 6,33,39 31,35,39,20 26,31,39,20,6
5 31,24 31,22,39 31,22,39,20 26,31,39,20,2
6 6,24 31,35,39 31,33,39,20 26,31,39,20,11
7 6,33 31,33,39 31,36,39,20 26,31,39,20,14
8 2,31 31,36,39 21,33,39,34 26,31,39,20,16
9 27,6 6,24,39 21,33,39,20 26,31,39,20,38
10 26,31 31,21,39 24,33,39,20 26,31,39,20,29
11 14,39 27,6,39 24,33,39,34 26,31,39,20,15
12 31,22 14,39,24 14,39,8,19 26,31,39,20,3
13 31,35 14,39,8 21,33,39,8 26,31,39,20,35
14 31,33 24,33,31 21,33,39,4 26,31,39,20,22
15 31,36 31,21,20 24,33,39,8 26,31,39,20,33
16 31,23 31,21,7 24,33,39,4 26,31,39,20,19
part of this section. We extend this rationale to exploit node combinations that
yield strong sequential attacks.
Next, we briefly introduce the iterative procedure used in this work. This brief
introduction focuses on the main idea of the procedure. For interesting readers,
more details can be found in [11, 32].
 Assume the power grid has NB nodes, and the total number of iteration
rounds is Mˆ .
 The rationale is to design a Mˆ -round iterative process to search the node
combinations that yield strong sequential attacks. We consider two restric-
tions. First, we select P nodes as candidate nodes, denoted by SetC . Second,
in each round we select R node combinations as round recommended com-
bination set (RRCS). The mth RRCS (1 ≤ m ≤ Mˆ) is denoted by SetmRRC .
The parameter P and R will be introduced later.
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 The strength of a node or a node combination is measured in terms of the
blackout size defined in Equ. 6.4. Stronger nodes or node combinations yield
larger blackout size.
 In the 1st round, the iteration is initialized. We first conduct NB one-node
attacks, then select the top P strongest nodes as candidate nodes and put
them into SetC , and finally select the top R strongest nodes as 1
th RRCS
and put them into Set1RRC .
 In the following each round, e.g., mth round, we do three steps. First, combine
each candidate node in SetC with each node combination in Set
m−1
RRC to obtain
P × R m-node combinations. Then, conduct the sequential attack using
nodes in each m-node combination as VNs. Finally, select top R strongest
combinations, out of P × R combinations, as mth RRCS and put them into
SetmRRC .
 The set-up of parameters R and P are of importance to limit the search space.
For R, we choose a small value, e.g., 16 in this work, because selecting a few
strongest node combinations within each round are enough to find strong
attacks [11]. For P , it can vary according to the scale of a power grid (i.e.,
NB). For a small-scale power grid, e.g., IEEE 39 bus system, P can be NB.
For a large-scale power grid, e.g., Polish transmission system with NB = 2383
nodes, P can be a value that is much smaller than NB, e.g., P = 150. Because
these most vulnerable nodes are more critical than others in finding strong
attacks [8, 9, 21].
Referring to multiple-node attacks, node combinations in
{Set2RRC , Set3RRC , ..., SetMˆRRC} are the strong sequential attacks found. Take
IEEE 39 bus system as an example, when the parameters P , R and Mˆ are set to
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Figure 6.4. The demonstration of constructing SAG
be 39, 16 and 5, respectively, a realization of {Set2RRC , Set3RRC , Set4RRC , Set5RRC}
is shown in Table 6.2. It is seen that the iterative procedure identifies top R
strongest node combinations within each iteration round.
Sequential Attack Graph
We specifically design a new metric, called sequential attack graph (SAG), to
find VNs and their removal order. The SAG metric is constructed according to
RRCS obtained in Section 6.6.3. The construction of SAG includes the following
steps.
 Step 1: For a given power grid, set up parameters P , R and Mˆ and obtain
RRCS (i.e., {Set2RRC , ..., SetMˆRRC}). An example of RRCS is demonstrated in
Table 6.2.
 Step 2: Generate the combination-SAG for each node combination. Take
the combination {b1, b2, b3} as an example. First, add three vertexes, labeled
as b1, b2 and b3. Second, for each pair of nodes in this combination, add
a directed edge with the direction pointing from the node at front to the
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node behind. That is, b1 → b2, b1 → b3 and b2 → b3. Finally, assign the
weight to each edge, referred to as the edge occurrence frequency (EOF). If a
combination has m nodes, there are m(m−1)
2
edges and the EOF of each edge
is 2
m(m−1) , such that the total weight introduced by this combination is 1.
Referring to the example, m equals to 3 and the EOF of each edge is 1
3
. Figs.
6.4(a), 6.4(b) and 6.4(c) demonstrate the examples of the combination-SAG.
 Step 3: Merge all combination-SAGs to generate the SAG. We give an ex-
ample of merging two combination-SAGs as follows. First, put all vertexes
in both combination-SAGs into a new combination-SAG, and merge the re-
peated vertexes. Second, put all edges in both combination-SAGs into the
new combination-SAG. For the repeated edges, merge them and sum their
EOF as the new EOF; for the non-repeated edge, keep this edge and its EOF.
Figs. 6.4(d) and 6.4(e) demonstrate the results of merging two combination-
SAGs. Fig. 6.4(d) is generated by merging Fig. 6.4(a) and Fig. 6.4(b); Fig.
6.4(e) is generated by merging Fig. 6.4(c) and Fig. 6.4(d).
The SAG of IEEE 39 bus system, for example, is constructed based on Ta-
ble 6.2 and demonstrated in Fig. 6.5, where the width and color of an edge is
determined by its EOF. The wider and darker an edge is, the larger the EOF is.
SAG-based Sequential Attack Strategy
The direction and weight of an edge in SAG convey important information.
The higher the weight of an edge is , the more likely the pair of nodes connected
by this edge is a strong sequential attack. The direction represents the removal
order of these two nodes.
Recall that SAG is constructed base on RRCS, {Set2RRC , ..., SetMˆRRC}. This
SAG can be used to find strong sequential attacks, as long as the number of VNs
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Figure 6.5. The sequential attack graph of IEEE 39 bus system.
(i.e., M) is no larger than Mˆ (i.e., M ≤ Mˆ).
We propose a sequential attack strategy, called the SAG-based SeqAS. Let
SeqASMSAG denote the SAG-based SeqAS with M VNs. SeqAS
M
SAG is conducted
as follows.
 Construct the SAG, where Mˆ ≥M .
 Find all interesting M -VN combinations in SAG. Each interesting combina-
tion, e.g., {b′1, b′2, ..., b′M}, satisfies the condition that for any pair of i and j,
1 ≤ i < j ≤M , there exists an edge between b′i and b′j, and the direction is
b′i → b′j.
 For each interesting combination, compute the summation of EOF for all
edges. The combination that yields the largest EOF summation is chosen
as the VNs for SeqASMSAG. In this combination, the removal order already
exists. That is, b′i is removed earlier than b′j, if i < j. The corresponding
removal order is 1, 2, · · · ,M .
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For instance, according to SAG in Fig. 6.5, if attackers want to choose three
VNs (i.e., M = 3) for SeqAS3SAG, the VNs chosen by the above procedure is
{26, 31, 39}. The removal order is first node 26, then node 31, and finally node 39.
Determining removal time is discussed in Section 6.4. For example, the node 26
is initially removed, which might cause some links to be overloaded. The second
removal, removing node 31, occurs either after removing node 26 or after tripping
an overloaded link caused by removing node 26. The time to remove node 39 is
similarly determined.
The basic idea behind SeqASMSAG is to find these VNs whose node pairs occur
most frequently in RRCS. Obviously, it is not guaranteed that the above proce-
dure can discover the strongest M -node sequential attack, which can be found
by SeqASMES. The complexity of SeqAS
M
SAG, however, is much lower than that of
SeqASMES, as demonstrated in Section 6.7.5.
6.7 Simulations and Discussions
We investigate the sequential attack on three different test benchmarks, IEEE
39 and 300 bus systems and Polish transmission system, which are all available
in MATPOWER [33]. The brief description of these test benchmarks is given in
Table 6.3. IEEE 39 bus system, a small-scale power grid, is used to demonstrate
new vulnerabilities discovered by the sequential attack. All test benchmarks are
adopted to compare the proposed SAG-based SeqAS with comparison schemes.
Simulations are conducted in Matlab environment.
Table 6.3. Description of test benchmarks
Test Benchmarks NB NL NG ND
IEEE 39 bus system 39 46 10 21
IEEE 300 bus system 300 411 69 191
Polish transmission system 2,383 2,896 327 1,817
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6.7.1 Further Demonstration of the Sequential Attack
In this subsection, we extend the demonstration of the sequential attack. In
Section 6.5 we have demonstrated the new vulnerabilities discovered by the sequen-
tial attack. Here, we extend the demonstration by conducting three-node attacks
and four-node attacks on IEEE 39 bus system.
Similar to the discussion in Section 6.5.3, we conduct both the sequential
attack and the synchronous attack for each three-node/four-node combination,
obtain two strength values, and perform two types of classifications. Take three-
node attacks as an example. There are in total 9,139 three-node combinations. For
each combination, we obtain ∆3seq and ∆
3
syn. By comparing both ∆
3
seq and ∆
3
syn
with the threshold η (i.e., η = 0.2), we divide these 9,139 combinations into four
types (i.e., Type I, Type II, Type III and Type IV). Note that the combinations
in Type II represent the new vulnerabilities. Recall that new vulnerabilities refer
to the strong multiple-node combinations that are individually discovered by the
sequential attack. If only the synchronous attack is used in vulnerability analysis,
these new vulnerable combinations will not be recognized as critical ones, in terms
of causing cascading failures. In addition, we can divide these combinations into
three groups (i.e., Group 1, Group 2 and Group 3). The combinations in Group 2
lead to sequential attacks that are stronger than synchronous attacks.
There are 82,251 four-node combinations; similar classifications are conducted.
Comparison results are shown in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5, respectively. We have
the following observations.
 As M increases, the number of multiple-node combinations belonging to
Type II increases sharply, which is highlighted in bold in Table 6.4. This
means that the sequential attack can discover more new vulnerabilities.
 As M increases, the percentages of Group 2, highlighted in bold in Table 6.5,
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Figure 6.6. Comparisons between the sequential attack and the synchronous attack
go up quickly, which means the sequential attack can exploit more strong
attacks.
Table 6.4. The number of node combinations belonging four types on IEEE 39 bus
system.
M−node removals Type I Type II Type III Type IV
Two-node 415 93 21 212
Three-node 7,307 1,342 99 391
Four-node 76,136 5,742 117 256
Table 6.5. The percentage of node combinations belonging three groups on IEEE
39 bus system.
M−node removals Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Two-node 75.44% 22.94% 1.62%
Three-node 51.15 47.18% 1.66%
Four-node 34.17% 65.43% 0.40%
6.7.2 Comparison Between the Sequential Attack and the Synchronous
Attack in terms of Attack Strength
Although we focus on studying the attack in the work, we want to understand
the attack strength under simple defense scheme. It is reasonable to assume that
some critical nodes in a power grid have strong physical and/or cyber protection
such that the attacker cannot successfully remove them [6, 34]. In this subsection,
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Figure 6.7. Blackout size versus the number of victim nodes
we compare the sequential attack with the synchronous attack in terms of the
average strength, under the condition that some critical nodes are protected from
the initial removal. In particular, the comparison is conducted as follows.
 We sort all nodes of a power grid in a list by ∆1syn, i.e., the strength of
one-node attacks, from the largest to the smallest. Note that ∆1syn and ∆
1
seq
are the same since there is no sequential concept when considering one-node
attacks. The nodes on the top of the list are the ones to be protected.
 We introduce the protection rate, denoted by α. Assume that the top dNB×
αe nodes on the above list are protected, where d•e is to obtain the nearest
integer towards infinity. That is, these nodes cannot be initially removed by
the attacker, but can be failed due to the overloading during the cascading
process.
 We consider multiple-node attacks, where nodes can only be chosen from the
N
′
B = NB − dNB × αe unprotected nodes. Let ∆seq and ∆syn denote the
average blackout size for the sequential attack and the synchronous attack,
respectively. Considering M -node attacks, there are in total
(
N
′
B
M
)
combina-
tions. We perform the sequential attack on each combination, and average all
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(
N
′
B
M
)
strength values as ∆seq. Similarly, we conduct the synchronous attack
on all combinations and obtain ∆syn.
 In simulations, α is chosen from 0 to 0.4 with the step size as 0.05; M is set
to be 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
Comparisons are demonstrated in Fig. 6.6, where three subfigures show com-
parisons regarding two-node attacks, three-node attacks and four-node attacks,
respectively. In each subfigure, the x-axis represents the protect rate; y-axis repre-
sents the average blackout size. In addition, the red-square curve represents ∆seq;
the blue-star curve represents ∆syn. The observations and discussions made from
Fig. 6.6 are given as follows.
First, on average, the sequential attack is stronger than the synchronous at-
tack. In the three subfigures, the red-square curves are higher than the blue-star
curves. That is, the sequential attack can obtain better average attack perfor-
mance. For instance, when the protect rate is zero (α = 0), meaning no nodes are
protected, ∆seq are 0.38, 0.56 and 0.69, while ∆syn are relatively 0.32, 0.42 and 0.5
(see in Fig. 6.6).
Second, the protection scheme can reduce the damage caused by initial re-
movals to the power grid. As α increases from 0 to 0.25, all curves in Fig. 6.6
decrease. This is reasonable. Because, as the number of critical nodes that are
protected from initial removals increases, there will be less and less multiple-node
combinations that can yield strong attack performance. Therefore, as α further
increases from 0.3 to 0.4, the curves do not reduce monotonically. The small fluc-
tuations occur because the total number of combinations at these α values are
different and their average blackout size fluctuates. In general, both ∆syn and
∆syn go down as α increases in a range, from 0 to 0.25 on IEEE 39 bus system.
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Third, the protection scheme alone cannot solve the cascading failure problem.
The simulation is conducted under the assumption that up to 40% of nodes are ini-
tially protected, which is really high percentage in any realistic systems. However,
even α is chosen as 0.4, on IEEE 39 bus system the average blackout size caused by
the sequential attack is still around 0.28 for two-node attacks, 0.47 for three-node
attacks, and 0.62 for four-node attacks. Besides the protected nodes, there are
many remaining nodes, whose single removals might not cause serious cascading
failures. The combination of these nodes, however, can cause moderate-scale, even
large-scale, power outages. Note that our discussion here bases on the assumption
that people can only choose and protect a limited number of critical nodes. It is
not practical to protect a large number of, or even all, nodes in a power grid.
Finally, as M increases, the sequential attack yields better attack strength.
We can see from the three subfigures in Fig. 6.6 that the gap between the two
curves becomes larger while M increases from 2 to 4. This is reasonable. In this
work, for a M -node combination, we perform the exhaustive search to find the
removal order with the largest ∆ for the sequential attack (discussed in Section
6.5.2). When M increases, the total number of removal orders (i.e., M !) increases
sharply. The sequential attack has more flexibility, and the synchronous attack is
a special case of the sequential attack.
6.7.3 Comparison among Different Sequential Attack Strategies
In this subsection, we compare the proposed the SGA-based SeqAS with the
straightforward degree-based SeqAS and load-based SeqAS. Comparisons are con-
ducted on IEEE 39 and 300 bus systems and Polish transmission system, where
the number of VNs (M) is set to be 2, 3, 4 or 5. Results are shown in Fig. 6.7,
where three subplots represent comparisons on different test benchmarks. In each
subplot, x-axis represents the number of victim nodes (VNs); y-axis represents
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the blackout size. In addition, red-triangle curves, blue-square curves and green-
pentagram curves represent the strength of SeqASMSAG, SeqAS
M
load and SeqAS
M
degree,
respectively. Based on Fig. 6.7, we have the following observations and discussions.
First, the proposed metric, SAG, is better than the widely-studied metrics,
degree and load, in terms of finding stronger sequential attacks. It is clearly seen
from Fig. 6.7 that the proposed SeqASMSAG is much stronger than SeqAS
M
load and
SeqASMdegree. In Fig. 6.7(b), for instance, the strengths of SeqAS
3
SAG, SeqAS
3
load
and SeqAS3degree are 0.78, 0.32 and 0.17, respectively. These results are reasonable.
The metrics, degree and load, are not specifically designed for the sequential attack.
These metrics cannot accurately find VNs and the removal order, which can yield
strong sequential attack. However, the proposed metric, SAG, can reveal not only
vulnerable nodes but orders of their removals (an example is shown in Fig. 6.5).
From the perspective of the sequential attack, SAG is an effective metric.
Second, it is highly possible to cause serious power loss to a power grid by only
sequentially removing several VNs. This observation agrees with a recent discovery
in [35]. In this article published at Nature news, the author discussed that in
power grids failure in one place leads to failure in another place, which cascades
into collapse. SeqASMSAG is powerful to cause serious power loss. In Fig. 6.7(c),
for example, if only two VNs are chosen and removed from Polish transmission
system (less than 1h of the total number of nodes), SeqAS2SAG can cause nearly
87% power loss, a serious blackout case. It is clearly seen that SeqASMSAG is a
strong attack strategy against power grids.
6.7.4 Comparison Between the proposed SeqAS and Synchronous At-
tack Strategies
In this subsection, we compare the SAG-based SeqAS with three synchronous
attack strategies, the degree-based SynAS, denoted by SynASMdegree, the load-
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Table 6.6. Comparisons between the proposed attack strategy with other attack
strategies
Test
Benchmark
Attack
Strategy
M = 2 M = 3 M = 4 M = 5
IEEE 39
Bus System
SeqASMSAG 0.66 1 1 1
SynASMdegree 0.43 0.63 0.63 0.63
SynASMload 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.74
SynASMRG 0.89 0.65 1 1
IEEE 300
Bus System
SeqASMSAG 0.57 0.78 0.85 0.89
SynASMdegree 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.26
SynASMload 0.15 0.30 0.35 0.37
SynASMRG 0.48 0.77 0.84 0.86
Polish
System
SeqASMSAG 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.93
SynASMdegree 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.39
SynASMload 0.53 0.39 0.39 0.38
SynASMRG 0.78 0.86 0.93 0.87
based SynAS, denoted by SynASMload, and the RiskGraph-based SynAS, denoted
by SynASMRG. In the current literature [8, 9, 11, 21, 25], there schemes represent
the most popular ones and are conducted as follows.
 SynASMdegree: Calculate the degree for all nodes, and select M nodes with
top largest degree as VNs [9].
 SynASMload: Calculate the load for all nodes, and select M nodes with top
largest load as VNs [21].
 SynASMRG: Construct the metric, Risk Graph (RG), and select M nodes that
are tightly connected in RG as VNs [11].
All three benchmarks are used in this comparison. We set the number of VNs
(i.e., M) to be 2, 3, 4 and 5. Results are demonstrated in Table 6.6. The strengths
of SeqASMSAG are underlined; in each group comparison, the strongest strength is
highlighted in bold. We make the following observations.
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First, SeqASMSAG is much stronger than SynAS
M
load and SynAS
M
degree. Because,
the metric, SAG, is specifically designed and more accurate than degree and load
in finding multiple-node combinations that yield strong attacks.
Second, SeqASMSAG is mostly stronger than SynAS
M
RG, with a few exceptions.
In Table 6.6, we can see that SeqASMSAG is weaker than SynAS
M
RG only at M = 2
for IEEE 39 bus system and M = 4 for Polish transmission system. We explain
this as follows. In Fig. 6.3, it is already shown that the strongest synchronous
attack (according to x-axis) has similar strength to the strongest sequential at-
tack (according to y-axis). Although, in an average sense the sequential attack
is stronger the synchronous attack, the SeqAS does not guarantee to yield the
strongest attack. This also indicates that SeqASMSAG can be further improved. For
example, we allow that more than one nodes can be removed at the same time.
That is, allow “equality” in the Equ. 6.3. This combination of sequential and
synchronous attacks has a potential to yield strong attacks.
In summary, compared with the existing synchronous attack strategies,
SeqASMSAG can surely yield larger damage and needs to be considered in designing
defense approaches for power grids.
6.7.5 Complexity Analysis of Different Attack Strategies
In the current literature [3, 4, 26], the cascading failure in power grids is
considered to be a complex process, and the close-form theoretical analysis the
cascading failure is still unavailable. In this work, we use two CFSs, the sequential
attack CFS and the synchronous attack CFS. Both are introduced in Section 6.4.
We use OSeqCFS to represent the computational complexity of the sequential attack
CFS and OSynCFS to represent the computational complexity of the synchronous
attack CFS.
Although, theoretical complexities of OSeqCFS and OSynCFS are unavailable,
184
their numerical complexities can be obtained by simulations. On Window 7 OS
with 4 GB memory and dual-core i5 CPU (2.4GHz each), we run the sequential
attack CFS for 1000 times on each test benchmark, and obtain the average time
as the numerical complexity of OSeqCFS. Similarly, we can obtain the numerical
complexity of OSynCFS. In Table 6.7, numerical complexities are demonstrated.
The unit is second (s). We have the following observations.
 Numerically, OSeqCFS and OSynCFS are almost the same on each test bench-
mark. Because, both CFSs use similar cascading procedures (discussed in
Section 6.4).
 The numerical complexities increase dramatically as NB increases. The scale
of the power gird is an important factor to the computational complexity of
both CFSs.
Table 6.7. Numerical complexity values.
NB = 39 NB = 300 NB = 2383
OSeqCFS 0.0107 (S) 0.0367 (S) 41.37 (S)
OSynCFS 0.0108 (S) 0.0367 (S) 40.82 (S)
To compare different attack strategies on the same power grid, we use OSeqCFS
and OSynCFS as the basic unit for complexity analysis. In other words, the com-
plexity of an attack strategy is the number of times that this method needs to
launch CFS before identifying its VNs. Compared with running once CFS, the
complexity of other calculations is negligible. This philosophy of complexity anal-
ysis has been widely adopted in the existing works [4, 22, 32].
First, we calculate the complexity of SeqASMES, denoted by Ω
ES
SeqAS. SeqAS
M
ES
needs to search among
(
NB
M
)×M ! different removal orders. The complexity of
SeqASMES is,
ΩESSeqAS =
(
NB
M
)
×M ! (6.5)
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Second, we calculate the complexity of SeqASMdegree, denoted by Ω
degree
SeqAS. There
are two steps to obtain ΩdegreeSeqAS. The first step is to obtain the metric, degree. This
step dose not rely on CFS; the complexity is counted as 0. The second step is to
determine VNs as well as the removal order. Determining VNs dose not rely on
CFS; the complexity is counted as 0. Determining the removal order needs to run
CFS twice, meaning the complexity is counted as 2. Therefore, the complexity of
the second step is counted as 2. In summary, ΩdegreeSeqAS is counted as 2 (i.e., 0 + 2).
In addition, let ΩdegreeSynAS denote the complexity of SynAS
M
degree. The calculation
of ΩdegreeSynAS is similar to that of Ω
degree
SeqAS. The difference is that SynAS
M
degree does not
need to determine the removal order of VNs. Therefore, determining VNs for
SynASMdegree does not rely on CFS; Ω
degree
SynAS is counted as 0. The complexities of
SynASMdegree and SeqAS
M
degree are,
ΩdegreeSynAS = 0
ΩdegreeSeqAS = 2
(6.6)
Third, calculating the complexity of SeqASMload, denoted by Ω
load
SeqAS, is similar
to that of ΩdegreeSeqAS; calculating the complexity of SynAS
M
load, denoted by Ω
load
SynAS, is
similar to that of ΩdegreeSynAS.
Finally, we calculate the complexity of SeqASMSAG, denoted by Ω
SAG
SeqAS. There
are two steps to obtain ΩSAGSeqAS. The first step is to obtain the metric, SAG,
which includes searching for RRCS (discussed in Section 6.6.3) and constructing
SAG (discussed in Section 6.6.3). Obtaining RRCS needs to run CFS in total
NB + P × P × (M − 1) times; constructing SAG dose not rely on CFS. Therefore,
the complexity of the first step is counted as NB + P × P × (M − 1). R and P
are chosen to be less or equal to NB. At the worst case, when R = P = NB, the
complexity of the first step is counted as (M − 1)× (NB)2 +NB, the same order to
M × (NB)2. The second step is to choose VNs and the removal order from SAG
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Table 6.8. The complexity comparison among different attack strategies.
Attack
Strategies
SeqASMES SeqAS
M
SAG SynAS
M
RG SynAS
M
degree SynAS
M
load SeqAS
M
degree SeqAS
M
load
Complexity
(NB
M
)·M ! Off-line On-line Off-line On-line 0 0 2 2
M × (NB)2 0 M × (NB)2 0
(discussed in Section 6.6.3). This step does not rely on CFS; the complexity is
counted as 0.
In practice, as long as attackers know the topology and electrical features of
a power grid, they can construct SAG of the power grid in advance. This step can
be done off-line. When conducting the attack, attackers may encounter different
situations. If an attacker, for instance, has observed that node 31 in Fig. 6.5 is
down for some reasons (e.g., nature disasters and previous attacks), he/she can
quickly identify a sequential attack strategy by adding another VN, e.g. node
39, to the already-down node 31. Therefore, sequential attacks can be conducted
on-line based on SAG.
From the above discussions, ΩSAGSeqAS consists of two parts as follows,
ΩSAGSeqAS =
{
M × (NB)2 Off-line
0 On-line
(6.7)
The calculation of the complexity of SynASMRG, denoted by Ω
RG
SynAS, is similar
to that of ΩSAGSeqAS.
Generally speaking, other attack strategies in this work are conducted on-
line. SeqASMES is not a metric-based approach, and can only be conducted on-line.
In addition, compared with simulating cascading failures, obtaining the metrics,
degree and load, is fast, and does not need to be specifically calculated off-line.
Therefore, the degree-based and load-based approaches can be conducted on-line.
In summary, complexity comparisons among different attack strategies in this
work are given in Table 6.8. For the proposed SAG-based SeqAS, its on-line
complexity is as low as that of the degree-based and load-based attack strategies,
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and its off-line complexity is much lower than that of the exhaustive search SeqAS.
6.8 Conclusions and Future Works
In this work, we investigated the sequential attack against power grids. The
sequential attack can discover new vulnerabilities of power grids. We specifically
designed the metric SAG, and proposed the SAG-based SeqAS. Intensive experi-
ments were conducted to study the features of the sequential attack, and to com-
pare the proposed SAG-based SeqAS with the existing approaches.
There are several possible future directions along this topic. First, it is of
importance to study the relation between the removal order of VNs and the perfor-
mance. Are there better methods to determine the removal order besides searching
all possible removal orders? Second, the proposed metric, SAG, demonstrates how
nodes are related to each other in terms of sequential removals. This information
can be exploited in terms of designing defense solutions against malicious attacks.
Third, the construction of SAG on large-scale power grids, e.g., with thousands of
nodes, is time-consuming, even computationally infeasible. Developing new strong
SeqAS with lower complexity is needed. Finally, the visulization of sequential at-
tacks and cascading process can help people better understand the triggers and
propagation of cascading failures.
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CHAPTER 7
Summary
This dissertation is the study of malicious attack strategies against power
grids. It investigated the vulnerability of power grids from the attack perspective.
Different from the traditional contingency analysis, malicious attacks can be care-
fully designed by select substations, transmission lines, or both, as targets. In this
dissertation, malicious attacks have been investigated from several perspectives.
 In manuscript 1, the details of failure propagation was demonstrated by
a newly-designed platform. The proposed platform could visualize failure
propagation in details, which was of great importance to help people under-
stand such complicated phenomenon. In addition, by using the proposed
platform to investigating single-substation failures, three different types of
initial failures were discovered, which were non-critical failures, rapid-and-
critical failures, and propagative-and-critical failures. These discoveries were
meaningful to both attackers and defenders. For instance, from the attack-
ers’ perspective, propagative-and-critical failures provided a good direction
to find stronger attacks. From the defenders’ perspective, substations that
yielded rapid-and-critical failures were very critical to the grid and needed
to be protected from initial failures.
 In manuscript 2, it was assumed that attackers knew the topology of the
target grid. Under this assumption, the efficiency model was used to mimic
cascading failures. In particular, a new metric load distribution vector (LDV)
was designed, and the LDV-based attack strategy was proposed. The load-
based attack strategy was adopted as the comparison scheme, where the load
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of a substation/transmission line was calculated as its betweenness. The
simulation results showed that the LDV-based attack strategy could cause
more damage than the comparison scheme in terms of reducing the grid
network efficiency.
 In manuscript 3, it was assumed that the attackers would have some general
information on the target grid, including the topology, the types of sub-
stations, and the admittance of transmission lines. With knowing of these
information, the extended model was developed to mimic cascading failures.
The extended model, obeying the Kirchoff’s and Ohm’s Laws, was more ac-
curate than the efficiency model to reveal the power distribution in power
systems. In particular, a novel metric risk graph was proposed to show
the vulnerability relationship among critical substations/transmission lines.
Based on the proposed metric, the riskgraph-based attack strategy was de-
veloped. The proposed attack strategy was compared with four other attack
strategies in terms of attack performance and complexity analysis on three
test benchmarks. The comparison results showed that the riskgraph-based
attack strategy had strong performance and low complexity.
 In manuscript 4, it was assumed that attacks could occur on both substations
and transmission, which was referred to as the joint-substation-transmission-
line perspective. This assumption was a nature extension to the existing as-
sumption that attacks/contingencies occurred on substations only or trans-
mission lines only, which were referred to as the substation-only perspective
and the transmission-line perspective. In this work, both the vulnerability
analysis and the attack strategy were conducted from the joint-substation-
transmission-line perspective. Specifically, there were many joint-substation-
transmission-line combinations that could yield large attack strength. Such
193
combinations represented the joint-substation-transmission-line vulnerabili-
ties, which were ignored by substation-only and transmission-line-only per-
spectives. In addition, three metrics, i.e., CIG, load and degree, were adopted
to investigate joint-substation-transmission-line attack strategies. The met-
ric CIG was newly-designed in this work; the other two were existing met-
rics. The comparison results showed that the CIG-based attack strategy had
strong performance by balancing to choose substations and transmission lines
as targets.
 In manuscript 5, the sequential attack was introduced to analyze the vulner-
ability and study the attack strategy of power grids. In the existing works,
it was assumed that the attacks/contingencies occurred synchronously, re-
ferred to as the synchronous attack. Referring to malicious attacks, however,
multiple attacks could be launched sequentially. The sequential attack was
a new direction to conduct vulnerability analysis and develop attack strat-
egy. In this work, it has been found that the sequential attack could discover
many combinations of substation whose failures caused large attack strength.
Previously, these combinations were ignored by the synchronous attack. In
addition, a new metric, called the sequential attack graph (SAG), was pro-
posed to reveal the relationship among substations/transmission lines. The
SAG-based sequential attack strategy was developed from the attacker’s per-
spective. Extensive simulations were conducted. Referring to simulation
results and complexity analysis, the proposed SAG-based sequential attack
strategy had strong performance and low complexity.
